X-Git-Url: http://git.cascardo.info/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=kernel%2Fuser_namespace.c;h=4109f8320684a81af4cd9d0c7262f83812c300f2;hb=eb46e2215fc6bdaaf8eda3a6c7c0dd033d171cad;hp=aa312b0dc3ec254a55bf77c37116170b301988e5;hpb=ac14ae25b676d721b6bfcfb046dc53a9f7760d83;p=cascardo%2Flinux.git diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c index aa312b0dc3ec..4109f8320684 100644 --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __read_mostly; +static DEFINE_MUTEX(userns_state_mutex); static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap_setid, @@ -86,11 +87,12 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new) if (!ns) return -ENOMEM; - ret = proc_alloc_inum(&ns->proc_inum); + ret = ns_alloc_inum(&ns->ns); if (ret) { kmem_cache_free(user_ns_cachep, ns); return ret; } + ns->ns.ops = &userns_operations; atomic_set(&ns->count, 1); /* Leave the new->user_ns reference with the new user namespace. */ @@ -99,6 +101,11 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new) ns->owner = owner; ns->group = group; + /* Inherit USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED from our parent */ + mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex); + ns->flags = parent_ns->flags; + mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex); + set_cred_user_ns(new, ns); #ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS @@ -136,7 +143,7 @@ void free_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns) #ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS key_put(ns->persistent_keyring_register); #endif - proc_free_inum(ns->proc_inum); + ns_free_inum(&ns->ns); kmem_cache_free(user_ns_cachep, ns); ns = parent; } while (atomic_dec_and_test(&parent->count)); @@ -583,9 +590,6 @@ static bool mappings_overlap(struct uid_gid_map *new_map, return false; } - -static DEFINE_MUTEX(id_map_mutex); - static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos, int cap_setid, @@ -602,7 +606,7 @@ static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, ssize_t ret = -EINVAL; /* - * The id_map_mutex serializes all writes to any given map. + * The userns_state_mutex serializes all writes to any given map. * * Any map is only ever written once. * @@ -620,7 +624,7 @@ static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, * order and smp_rmb() is guaranteed that we don't have crazy * architectures returning stale data. */ - mutex_lock(&id_map_mutex); + mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex); ret = -EPERM; /* Only allow one successful write to the map */ @@ -640,7 +644,7 @@ static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, if (!page) goto out; - /* Only allow <= page size writes at the beginning of the file */ + /* Only allow < page size writes at the beginning of the file */ ret = -EINVAL; if ((*ppos != 0) || (count >= PAGE_SIZE)) goto out; @@ -750,7 +754,7 @@ static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, *ppos = count; ret = count; out: - mutex_unlock(&id_map_mutex); + mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex); if (page) free_page(page); return ret; @@ -812,16 +816,21 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap_setid, struct uid_gid_map *new_map) { - /* Allow mapping to your own filesystem ids */ - if ((new_map->nr_extents == 1) && (new_map->extent[0].count == 1)) { + const struct cred *cred = file->f_cred; + /* Don't allow mappings that would allow anything that wouldn't + * be allowed without the establishment of unprivileged mappings. + */ + if ((new_map->nr_extents == 1) && (new_map->extent[0].count == 1) && + uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid)) { u32 id = new_map->extent[0].lower_first; if (cap_setid == CAP_SETUID) { kuid_t uid = make_kuid(ns->parent, id); - if (uid_eq(uid, file->f_cred->fsuid)) + if (uid_eq(uid, cred->euid)) return true; } else if (cap_setid == CAP_SETGID) { kgid_t gid = make_kgid(ns->parent, id); - if (gid_eq(gid, file->f_cred->fsgid)) + if (!(ns->flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED) && + gid_eq(gid, cred->egid)) return true; } } @@ -841,7 +850,106 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file, return false; } -static void *userns_get(struct task_struct *task) +int proc_setgroups_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) +{ + struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private; + unsigned long userns_flags = ACCESS_ONCE(ns->flags); + + seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", + (userns_flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED) ? + "allow" : "deny"); + return 0; +} + +ssize_t proc_setgroups_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +{ + struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data; + struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private; + char kbuf[8], *pos; + bool setgroups_allowed; + ssize_t ret; + + /* Only allow a very narrow range of strings to be written */ + ret = -EINVAL; + if ((*ppos != 0) || (count >= sizeof(kbuf))) + goto out; + + /* What was written? */ + ret = -EFAULT; + if (copy_from_user(kbuf, buf, count)) + goto out; + kbuf[count] = '\0'; + pos = kbuf; + + /* What is being requested? */ + ret = -EINVAL; + if (strncmp(pos, "allow", 5) == 0) { + pos += 5; + setgroups_allowed = true; + } + else if (strncmp(pos, "deny", 4) == 0) { + pos += 4; + setgroups_allowed = false; + } + else + goto out; + + /* Verify there is not trailing junk on the line */ + pos = skip_spaces(pos); + if (*pos != '\0') + goto out; + + ret = -EPERM; + mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex); + if (setgroups_allowed) { + /* Enabling setgroups after setgroups has been disabled + * is not allowed. + */ + if (!(ns->flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED)) + goto out_unlock; + } else { + /* Permanently disabling setgroups after setgroups has + * been enabled by writing the gid_map is not allowed. + */ + if (ns->gid_map.nr_extents != 0) + goto out_unlock; + ns->flags &= ~USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED; + } + mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex); + + /* Report a successful write */ + *ppos = count; + ret = count; +out: + return ret; +out_unlock: + mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex); + goto out; +} + +bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns) +{ + bool allowed; + + mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex); + /* It is not safe to use setgroups until a gid mapping in + * the user namespace has been established. + */ + allowed = ns->gid_map.nr_extents != 0; + /* Is setgroups allowed? */ + allowed = allowed && (ns->flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED); + mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex); + + return allowed; +} + +static inline struct user_namespace *to_user_ns(struct ns_common *ns) +{ + return container_of(ns, struct user_namespace, ns); +} + +static struct ns_common *userns_get(struct task_struct *task) { struct user_namespace *user_ns; @@ -849,17 +957,17 @@ static void *userns_get(struct task_struct *task) user_ns = get_user_ns(__task_cred(task)->user_ns); rcu_read_unlock(); - return user_ns; + return user_ns ? &user_ns->ns : NULL; } -static void userns_put(void *ns) +static void userns_put(struct ns_common *ns) { - put_user_ns(ns); + put_user_ns(to_user_ns(ns)); } -static int userns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, void *ns) +static int userns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, struct ns_common *ns) { - struct user_namespace *user_ns = ns; + struct user_namespace *user_ns = to_user_ns(ns); struct cred *cred; /* Don't allow gaining capabilities by reentering @@ -888,19 +996,12 @@ static int userns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, void *ns) return commit_creds(cred); } -static unsigned int userns_inum(void *ns) -{ - struct user_namespace *user_ns = ns; - return user_ns->proc_inum; -} - const struct proc_ns_operations userns_operations = { .name = "user", .type = CLONE_NEWUSER, .get = userns_get, .put = userns_put, .install = userns_install, - .inum = userns_inum, }; static __init int user_namespaces_init(void)