PKCS#7: Better handling of unsupported crypto
authorDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tue, 16 Sep 2014 16:36:15 +0000 (17:36 +0100)
committerDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tue, 16 Sep 2014 16:36:15 +0000 (17:36 +0100)
commit41559420003cfe99522257dded7793192c77b4e9
tree478af8309836992b40385a1aff6d8eae537d44c4
parent46963b774d441c833afc1535f6d84b3df2a94204
PKCS#7: Better handling of unsupported crypto

Provide better handling of unsupported crypto when verifying a PKCS#7 message.
If we can't bridge the gap between a pair of X.509 certs or between a signed
info block and an X.509 cert because it involves some crypto we don't support,
that's not necessarily the end of the world as there may be other ways points
at which we can intersect with a ring of trusted keys.

Instead, only produce ENOPKG immediately if all the signed info blocks in a
PKCS#7 message require unsupported crypto to bridge to the first X.509 cert.
Otherwise, we defer the generation of ENOPKG until we get ENOKEY during trust
validation.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c