Merge branch 'locks-3.15' of git://git.samba.org/jlayton/linux
[cascardo/linux.git] / security / selinux / hooks.c
index 3aa8763..b4beb77 100644 (file)
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ int selinux_enforcing;
 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
 {
        unsigned long enforcing;
-       if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
+       if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
                selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
        return 1;
 }
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
 {
        unsigned long enabled;
-       if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
+       if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
                selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
        return 1;
 }
@@ -668,7 +668,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
                if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
                        continue;
                rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
-                                            strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
+                                            strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
                if (rc) {
                        printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
                               "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
@@ -1418,15 +1418,33 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
                isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
 
                if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
-                       if (opt_dentry) {
-                               isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
-                               rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry,
-                                                         isec->sclass,
-                                                         &sid);
-                               if (rc)
-                                       goto out_unlock;
-                               isec->sid = sid;
-                       }
+                       /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
+                        * procfs inodes */
+                       if (opt_dentry)
+                               /* Called from d_instantiate or
+                                * d_splice_alias. */
+                               dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
+                       else
+                               /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
+                                * find a dentry. */
+                               dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
+                       /*
+                        * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
+                        * before the policy is loaded.  When we load policy we
+                        * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
+                        * sbsec->isec_head list.  No reason to complain as
+                        * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
+                        * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
+                        * could be used again by userspace.
+                        */
+                       if (!dentry)
+                               goto out_unlock;
+                       isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
+                       rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(dentry, isec->sclass, &sid);
+                       dput(dentry);
+                       if (rc)
+                               goto out_unlock;
+                       isec->sid = sid;
                }
                break;
        }
@@ -2489,7 +2507,8 @@ static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
                if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
                        continue;
                len = strlen(mount_options[i]);
-               rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid);
+               rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid,
+                                            GFP_KERNEL);
                if (rc) {
                        printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
                               "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
@@ -2893,7 +2912,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
        if (rc)
                return rc;
 
-       rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
+       rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
        if (rc == -EINVAL) {
                if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
                        struct audit_buffer *ab;
@@ -3050,7 +3069,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
        if (!value || !size)
                return -EACCES;
 
-       rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
+       rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
        if (rc)
                return rc;
 
@@ -3204,24 +3223,20 @@ error:
 
 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
 {
-       int rc = 0;
-       u32 sid = current_sid();
+       int rc;
+
+       /* do DAC check on address space usage */
+       rc = cap_mmap_addr(addr);
+       if (rc)
+               return rc;
 
-       /*
-        * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before
-        * the secondary cap_file_mmap check.  This is such a likely attempt
-        * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
-        * if DAC would have also denied the operation.
-        */
        if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
+               u32 sid = current_sid();
                rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
                                  MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
-               if (rc)
-                       return rc;
        }
 
-       /* do DAC check on address space usage */
-       return cap_mmap_addr(addr);
+       return rc;
 }
 
 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
@@ -5532,7 +5547,7 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
                        str[size-1] = 0;
                        size--;
                }
-               error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
+               error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
                if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
                        if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
                                struct audit_buffer *ab;
@@ -5641,7 +5656,7 @@ static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 
 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
 {
-       return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
+       return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid, GFP_KERNEL);
 }
 
 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)