security/selinux/hooks.c

   1 /*
   2  *  NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
   3  *
   4  *  This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
   5  *
   6  *  Authors:  Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
   7  *            Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
   8  *            Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
   9  *            James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
  10  *
  11  *  Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
  12  *  Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
  13  *                                         Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
  14  *  Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
  15  *                          <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
  16  *  Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
  17  *      Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
  18  *  Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
  19  *                     Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
  20  *
  21  *      This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  22  *      it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
  23  *      as published by the Free Software Foundation.
  24  */
  25
  26 #include <linux/init.h>
  27 #include <linux/kd.h>
  28 #include <linux/kernel.h>
  29 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
  30 #include <linux/errno.h>
  31 #include <linux/sched.h>
  32 #include <linux/security.h>
  33 #include <linux/xattr.h>
  34 #include <linux/capability.h>
  35 #include <linux/unistd.h>
  36 #include <linux/mm.h>
  37 #include <linux/mman.h>
  38 #include <linux/slab.h>
  39 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
  40 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
  41 #include <linux/swap.h>
  42 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
  43 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
  44 #include <linux/dcache.h>
  45 #include <linux/file.h>
  46 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
  47 #include <linux/namei.h>
  48 #include <linux/mount.h>
  49 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
  50 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
  51 #include <linux/tty.h>
  52 #include <net/icmp.h>
  53 #include <net/ip.h>             /* for local_port_range[] */
  54 #include <net/sock.h>
  55 #include <net/tcp.h>            /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
  56 #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
  57 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
  58 #include <net/netlabel.h>
  59 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
  60 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
  61 #include <linux/atomic.h>
  62 #include <linux/bitops.h>
  63 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
  64 #include <linux/netdevice.h>    /* for network interface checks */
  65 #include <net/netlink.h>
  66 #include <linux/tcp.h>
  67 #include <linux/udp.h>
  68 #include <linux/dccp.h>
  69 #include <linux/quota.h>
  70 #include <linux/un.h>           /* for Unix socket types */
  71 #include <net/af_unix.h>        /* for Unix socket types */
  72 #include <linux/parser.h>
  73 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
  74 #include <net/ipv6.h>
  75 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
  76 #include <linux/personality.h>
  77 #include <linux/audit.h>
  78 #include <linux/string.h>
  79 #include <linux/selinux.h>
  80 #include <linux/mutex.h>
  81 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
  82 #include <linux/syslog.h>
  83 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
  84 #include <linux/export.h>
  85 #include <linux/msg.h>
  86 #include <linux/shm.h>
  87
  88 #include "avc.h"
  89 #include "objsec.h"
  90 #include "netif.h"
  91 #include "netnode.h"
  92 #include "netport.h"
  93 #include "xfrm.h"
  94 #include "netlabel.h"
  95 #include "audit.h"
  96 #include "avc_ss.h"
  97
  98 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
  99
 100 /* SECMARK reference count */
 101 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
 102
 103 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
 104 int selinux_enforcing;
 105
 106 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
 107 {
 108         unsigned long enforcing;
 109         if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
 110                 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
 111         return 1;
 112 }
 113 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
 114 #endif
 115
 116 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
 117 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
 118
 119 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
 120 {
 121         unsigned long enabled;
 122         if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
 123                 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
 124         return 1;
 125 }
 126 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
 127 #else
 128 int selinux_enabled = 1;
 129 #endif
 130
 131 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
 132
 133 /**
 134  * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
 135  *
 136  * Description:
 137  * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
 138  * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
 139  * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled.  Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
 140  * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.  If the always_check_network
 141  * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
 142  *
 143  */
 144 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
 145 {
 146         return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
 147 }
 148
 149 /**
 150  * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
 151  *
 152  * Description:
 153  * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled.  Returns true
 154  * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled.  If the
 155  * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
 156  * is always considered enabled.
 157  *
 158  */
 159 static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
 160 {
 161         return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
 162 }
 163
 164 static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
 165 {
 166         if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
 167                 sel_netif_flush();
 168                 sel_netnode_flush();
 169                 sel_netport_flush();
 170                 synchronize_net();
 171         }
 172         return 0;
 173 }
 174
 175 /*
 176  * initialise the security for the init task
 177  */
 178 static void cred_init_security(void)
 179 {
 180         struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
 181         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 182
 183         tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 184         if (!tsec)
 185                 panic("SELinux:  Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
 186
 187         tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
 188         cred->security = tsec;
 189 }
 190
 191 /*
 192  * get the security ID of a set of credentials
 193  */
 194 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
 195 {
 196         const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 197
 198         tsec = cred->security;
 199         return tsec->sid;
 200 }
 201
 202 /*
 203  * get the objective security ID of a task
 204  */
 205 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
 206 {
 207         u32 sid;
 208
 209         rcu_read_lock();
 210         sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
 211         rcu_read_unlock();
 212         return sid;
 213 }
 214
 215 /*
 216  * get the subjective security ID of the current task
 217  */
 218 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
 219 {
 220         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
 221
 222         return tsec->sid;
 223 }
 224
 225 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
 226
 227 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
 228 {
 229         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 230         u32 sid = current_sid();
 231
 232         isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
 233         if (!isec)
 234                 return -ENOMEM;
 235
 236         mutex_init(&isec->lock);
 237         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
 238         isec->inode = inode;
 239         isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 240         isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
 241         isec->task_sid = sid;
 242         inode->i_security = isec;
 243
 244         return 0;
 245 }
 246
 247 static void inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
 248 {
 249         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 250
 251         isec = container_of(head, struct inode_security_struct, rcu);
 252         kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
 253 }
 254
 255 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
 256 {
 257         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
 258         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
 259
 260         spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 261         if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
 262                 list_del_init(&isec->list);
 263         spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 264
 265         /*
 266          * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
 267          * a call to selinux_inode_permission() can be made
 268          * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
 269          * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
 270          * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
 271          * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
 272          * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
 273          */
 274         call_rcu(&isec->rcu, inode_free_rcu);
 275 }
 276
 277 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
 278 {
 279         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
 280         u32 sid = current_sid();
 281
 282         fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 283         if (!fsec)
 284                 return -ENOMEM;
 285
 286         fsec->sid = sid;
 287         fsec->fown_sid = sid;
 288         file->f_security = fsec;
 289
 290         return 0;
 291 }
 292
 293 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
 294 {
 295         struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
 296         file->f_security = NULL;
 297         kfree(fsec);
 298 }
 299
 300 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
 301 {
 302         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
 303
 304         sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 305         if (!sbsec)
 306                 return -ENOMEM;
 307
 308         mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
 309         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
 310         spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 311         sbsec->sb = sb;
 312         sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 313         sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
 314         sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 315         sb->s_security = sbsec;
 316
 317         return 0;
 318 }
 319
 320 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
 321 {
 322         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 323         sb->s_security = NULL;
 324         kfree(sbsec);
 325 }
 326
 327 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
 328
 329 static const char *labeling_behaviors[7] = {
 330         "uses xattr",
 331         "uses transition SIDs",
 332         "uses task SIDs",
 333         "uses genfs_contexts",
 334         "not configured for labeling",
 335         "uses mountpoint labeling",
 336         "uses native labeling",
 337 };
 338
 339 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
 340
 341 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
 342 {
 343         return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
 344 }
 345
 346 enum {
 347         Opt_error = -1,
 348         Opt_context = 1,
 349         Opt_fscontext = 2,
 350         Opt_defcontext = 3,
 351         Opt_rootcontext = 4,
 352         Opt_labelsupport = 5,
 353         Opt_nextmntopt = 6,
 354 };
 355
 356 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS        (Opt_nextmntopt - 1)
 357
 358 static const match_table_t tokens = {
 359         {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
 360         {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
 361         {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
 362         {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
 363         {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
 364         {Opt_error, NULL},
 365 };
 366
 367 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux:  duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
 368
 369 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
 370                         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
 371                         const struct cred *cred)
 372 {
 373         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
 374         int rc;
 375
 376         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 377                           FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
 378         if (rc)
 379                 return rc;
 380
 381         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 382                           FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
 383         return rc;
 384 }
 385
 386 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
 387                         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
 388                         const struct cred *cred)
 389 {
 390         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
 391         int rc;
 392         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 393                           FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
 394         if (rc)
 395                 return rc;
 396
 397         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 398                           FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
 399         return rc;
 400 }
 401
 402 static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
 403 {
 404         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 405
 406         if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR ||
 407             sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS ||
 408             sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK)
 409                 return 1;
 410
 411         /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
 412         if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
 413                 return 1;
 414
 415         /*
 416          * Special handling for rootfs. Is genfs but supports
 417          * setting SELinux context on in-core inodes.
 418          */
 419         if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs", sizeof("rootfs")) == 0)
 420                 return 1;
 421
 422         return 0;
 423 }
 424
 425 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
 426 {
 427         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 428         struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
 429         struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
 430         int rc = 0;
 431
 432         if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
 433                 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
 434                    error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
 435                    the root directory.  -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
 436                    the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
 437                    assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
 438                 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
 439                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
 440                                "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 441                         rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 442                         goto out;
 443                 }
 444                 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
 445                 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
 446                         if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
 447                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
 448                                        "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
 449                                        sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 450                         else
 451                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
 452                                        "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
 453                                        sb->s_type->name, -rc);
 454                         goto out;
 455                 }
 456         }
 457
 458         if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
 459                 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
 460                        sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 461         else
 462                 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
 463                        sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
 464                        labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
 465
 466         sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
 467         if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
 468                 sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
 469
 470         /* Initialize the root inode. */
 471         rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
 472
 473         /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
 474            inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
 475            during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
 476            populates itself. */
 477         spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 478 next_inode:
 479         if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
 480                 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
 481                                 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
 482                                            struct inode_security_struct, list);
 483                 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
 484                 list_del_init(&isec->list);
 485                 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 486                 inode = igrab(inode);
 487                 if (inode) {
 488                         if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
 489                                 inode_doinit(inode);
 490                         iput(inode);
 491                 }
 492                 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 493                 goto next_inode;
 494         }
 495         spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 496 out:
 497         return rc;
 498 }
 499
 500 /*
 501  * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
 502  * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
 503  * mount options, or whatever.
 504  */
 505 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
 506                                 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
 507 {
 508         int rc = 0, i;
 509         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 510         char *context = NULL;
 511         u32 len;
 512         char tmp;
 513
 514         security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
 515
 516         if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
 517                 return -EINVAL;
 518
 519         if (!ss_initialized)
 520                 return -EINVAL;
 521
 522         /* make sure we always check enough bits to cover the mask */
 523         BUILD_BUG_ON(SE_MNTMASK >= (1 << NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS));
 524
 525         tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
 526         /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
 527         for (i = 0; i < NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS; i++) {
 528                 if (tmp & 0x01)
 529                         opts->num_mnt_opts++;
 530                 tmp >>= 1;
 531         }
 532         /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
 533         if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)
 534                 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
 535
 536         opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
 537         if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
 538                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 539                 goto out_free;
 540         }
 541
 542         opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
 543         if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
 544                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 545                 goto out_free;
 546         }
 547
 548         i = 0;
 549         if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
 550                 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
 551                 if (rc)
 552                         goto out_free;
 553                 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
 554                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
 555         }
 556         if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
 557                 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
 558                 if (rc)
 559                         goto out_free;
 560                 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
 561                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
 562         }
 563         if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
 564                 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
 565                 if (rc)
 566                         goto out_free;
 567                 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
 568                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
 569         }
 570         if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
 571                 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
 572                 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
 573
 574                 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
 575                 if (rc)
 576                         goto out_free;
 577                 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
 578                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
 579         }
 580         if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
 581                 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
 582                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SBLABEL_MNT;
 583         }
 584
 585         BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
 586
 587         return 0;
 588
 589 out_free:
 590         security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
 591         return rc;
 592 }
 593
 594 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
 595                       u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
 596 {
 597         char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
 598
 599         /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
 600         if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
 601                 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
 602                     (old_sid != new_sid))
 603                         return 1;
 604
 605         /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
 606          * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
 607          */
 608         if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
 609                 if (mnt_flags & flag)
 610                         return 1;
 611         return 0;
 612 }
 613
 614 /*
 615  * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
 616  * labeling information.
 617  */
 618 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 619                                 struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
 620                                 unsigned long kern_flags,
 621                                 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
 622 {
 623         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 624         int rc = 0, i;
 625         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 626         const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
 627         struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
 628         struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
 629         u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
 630         u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
 631         char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
 632         int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
 633         int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
 634
 635         mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
 636
 637         if (!ss_initialized) {
 638                 if (!num_opts) {
 639                         /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
 640                            after the initial policy is loaded and the security
 641                            server is ready to handle calls. */
 642                         goto out;
 643                 }
 644                 rc = -EINVAL;
 645                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
 646                         "before the security server is initialized\n");
 647                 goto out;
 648         }
 649         if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) {
 650                 /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
 651                  * place the results is not allowed */
 652                 rc = -EINVAL;
 653                 goto out;
 654         }
 655
 656         /*
 657          * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice.  Once
 658          * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
 659          * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
 660          * we need to skip the double mount verification.
 661          *
 662          * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
 663          * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
 664          * this sb does not set any security options.  (The first options
 665          * will be used for both mounts)
 666          */
 667         if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
 668             && (num_opts == 0))
 669                 goto out;
 670
 671         /*
 672          * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
 673          * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
 674          * than once with different security options.
 675          */
 676         for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
 677                 u32 sid;
 678
 679                 if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
 680                         continue;
 681                 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
 682                                              strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
 683                 if (rc) {
 684                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
 685                                "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
 686                                mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
 687                         goto out;
 688                 }
 689                 switch (flags[i]) {
 690                 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
 691                         fscontext_sid = sid;
 692
 693                         if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
 694                                         fscontext_sid))
 695                                 goto out_double_mount;
 696
 697                         sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
 698                         break;
 699                 case CONTEXT_MNT:
 700                         context_sid = sid;
 701
 702                         if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
 703                                         context_sid))
 704                                 goto out_double_mount;
 705
 706                         sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
 707                         break;
 708                 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
 709                         rootcontext_sid = sid;
 710
 711                         if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
 712                                         rootcontext_sid))
 713                                 goto out_double_mount;
 714
 715                         sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
 716
 717                         break;
 718                 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
 719                         defcontext_sid = sid;
 720
 721                         if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
 722                                         defcontext_sid))
 723                                 goto out_double_mount;
 724
 725                         sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
 726
 727                         break;
 728                 default:
 729                         rc = -EINVAL;
 730                         goto out;
 731                 }
 732         }
 733
 734         if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
 735                 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
 736                 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
 737                         goto out_double_mount;
 738                 rc = 0;
 739                 goto out;
 740         }
 741
 742         if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
 743                 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
 744
 745         if (!sbsec->behavior) {
 746                 /*
 747                  * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
 748                  * filesystem type.
 749                  */
 750                 rc = security_fs_use(sb);
 751                 if (rc) {
 752                         printk(KERN_WARNING
 753                                 "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
 754                                         __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
 755                         goto out;
 756                 }
 757         }
 758         /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
 759         if (fscontext_sid) {
 760                 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
 761                 if (rc)
 762                         goto out;
 763
 764                 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
 765         }
 766
 767         /*
 768          * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
 769          * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
 770          * the superblock context if not already set.
 771          */
 772         if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
 773                 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
 774                 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
 775         }
 776
 777         if (context_sid) {
 778                 if (!fscontext_sid) {
 779                         rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
 780                                                           cred);
 781                         if (rc)
 782                                 goto out;
 783                         sbsec->sid = context_sid;
 784                 } else {
 785                         rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
 786                                                              cred);
 787                         if (rc)
 788                                 goto out;
 789                 }
 790                 if (!rootcontext_sid)
 791                         rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
 792
 793                 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
 794                 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
 795         }
 796
 797         if (rootcontext_sid) {
 798                 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
 799                                                      cred);
 800                 if (rc)
 801                         goto out;
 802
 803                 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
 804                 root_isec->initialized = 1;
 805         }
 806
 807         if (defcontext_sid) {
 808                 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
 809                         sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) {
 810                         rc = -EINVAL;
 811                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
 812                                "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
 813                         goto out;
 814                 }
 815
 816                 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
 817                         rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
 818                                                              sbsec, cred);
 819                         if (rc)
 820                                 goto out;
 821                 }
 822
 823                 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
 824         }
 825
 826         rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
 827 out:
 828         mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
 829         return rc;
 830 out_double_mount:
 831         rc = -EINVAL;
 832         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid.  Same superblock, different "
 833                "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
 834         goto out;
 835 }
 836
 837 static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
 838                                     const struct super_block *newsb)
 839 {
 840         struct superblock_security_struct *old = oldsb->s_security;
 841         struct superblock_security_struct *new = newsb->s_security;
 842         char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
 843         char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
 844
 845         if (oldflags != newflags)
 846                 goto mismatch;
 847         if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid)
 848                 goto mismatch;
 849         if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid)
 850                 goto mismatch;
 851         if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid)
 852                 goto mismatch;
 853         if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
 854                 struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = oldsb->s_root->d_inode->i_security;
 855                 struct inode_security_struct *newroot = newsb->s_root->d_inode->i_security;
 856                 if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid)
 857                         goto mismatch;
 858         }
 859         return 0;
 860 mismatch:
 861         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid.  Same superblock, "
 862                             "different security settings for (dev %s, "
 863                             "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name);
 864         return -EBUSY;
 865 }
 866
 867 static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
 868                                         struct super_block *newsb)
 869 {
 870         const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
 871         struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
 872
 873         int set_fscontext =     (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
 874         int set_context =       (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
 875         int set_rootcontext =   (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
 876
 877         /*
 878          * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
 879          * mount options.  thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
 880          */
 881         if (!ss_initialized)
 882                 return 0;
 883
 884         /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
 885         BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
 886
 887         /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
 888         if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
 889                 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
 890
 891         mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
 892
 893         newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
 894
 895         newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
 896         newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
 897         newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
 898
 899         if (set_context) {
 900                 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
 901
 902                 if (!set_fscontext)
 903                         newsbsec->sid = sid;
 904                 if (!set_rootcontext) {
 905                         struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
 906                         struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
 907                         newisec->sid = sid;
 908                 }
 909                 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
 910         }
 911         if (set_rootcontext) {
 912                 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
 913                 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
 914                 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
 915                 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
 916
 917                 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
 918         }
 919
 920         sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
 921         mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
 922         return 0;
 923 }
 924
 925 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
 926                                   struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
 927 {
 928         char *p;
 929         char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
 930         char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
 931         int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
 932
 933         opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
 934
 935         /* Standard string-based options. */
 936         while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
 937                 int token;
 938                 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
 939
 940                 if (!*p)
 941                         continue;
 942
 943                 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
 944
 945                 switch (token) {
 946                 case Opt_context:
 947                         if (context || defcontext) {
 948                                 rc = -EINVAL;
 949                                 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
 950                                 goto out_err;
 951                         }
 952                         context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 953                         if (!context) {
 954                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 955                                 goto out_err;
 956                         }
 957                         break;
 958
 959                 case Opt_fscontext:
 960                         if (fscontext) {
 961                                 rc = -EINVAL;
 962                                 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
 963                                 goto out_err;
 964                         }
 965                         fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 966                         if (!fscontext) {
 967                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 968                                 goto out_err;
 969                         }
 970                         break;
 971
 972                 case Opt_rootcontext:
 973                         if (rootcontext) {
 974                                 rc = -EINVAL;
 975                                 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
 976                                 goto out_err;
 977                         }
 978                         rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 979                         if (!rootcontext) {
 980                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 981                                 goto out_err;
 982                         }
 983                         break;
 984
 985                 case Opt_defcontext:
 986                         if (context || defcontext) {
 987                                 rc = -EINVAL;
 988                                 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
 989                                 goto out_err;
 990                         }
 991                         defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 992                         if (!defcontext) {
 993                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 994                                 goto out_err;
 995                         }
 996                         break;
 997                 case Opt_labelsupport:
 998                         break;
 999                 default:
1000                         rc = -EINVAL;
1001                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux:  unknown mount option\n");
1002                         goto out_err;
1003
1004                 }
1005         }
1006
1007         rc = -ENOMEM;
1008         opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
1009         if (!opts->mnt_opts)
1010                 goto out_err;
1011
1012         opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
1013         if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
1014                 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
1015                 goto out_err;
1016         }
1017
1018         if (fscontext) {
1019                 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
1020                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
1021         }
1022         if (context) {
1023                 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
1024                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
1025         }
1026         if (rootcontext) {
1027                 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
1028                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
1029         }
1030         if (defcontext) {
1031                 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
1032                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
1033         }
1034
1035         opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
1036         return 0;
1037
1038 out_err:
1039         kfree(context);
1040         kfree(defcontext);
1041         kfree(fscontext);
1042         kfree(rootcontext);
1043         return rc;
1044 }
1045 /*
1046  * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
1047  */
1048 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
1049 {
1050         int rc = 0;
1051         char *options = data;
1052         struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1053
1054         security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
1055
1056         if (!data)
1057                 goto out;
1058
1059         BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
1060
1061         rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
1062         if (rc)
1063                 goto out_err;
1064
1065 out:
1066         rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts, 0, NULL);
1067
1068 out_err:
1069         security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1070         return rc;
1071 }
1072
1073 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
1074                                struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1075 {
1076         int i;
1077         char *prefix;
1078
1079         for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
1080                 char *has_comma;
1081
1082                 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
1083                         has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1084                 else
1085                         has_comma = NULL;
1086
1087                 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1088                 case CONTEXT_MNT:
1089                         prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1090                         break;
1091                 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
1092                         prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1093                         break;
1094                 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1095                         prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1096                         break;
1097                 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1098                         prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1099                         break;
1100                 case SBLABEL_MNT:
1101                         seq_putc(m, ',');
1102                         seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
1103                         continue;
1104                 default:
1105                         BUG();
1106                         return;
1107                 };
1108                 /* we need a comma before each option */
1109                 seq_putc(m, ',');
1110                 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1111                 if (has_comma)
1112                         seq_putc(m, '\"');
1113                 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1114                 if (has_comma)
1115                         seq_putc(m, '\"');
1116         }
1117 }
1118
1119 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1120 {
1121         struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1122         int rc;
1123
1124         rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1125         if (rc) {
1126                 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1127                 if (rc == -EINVAL)
1128                         rc = 0;
1129                 return rc;
1130         }
1131
1132         selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1133
1134         security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1135
1136         return rc;
1137 }
1138
1139 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1140 {
1141         switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1142         case S_IFSOCK:
1143                 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1144         case S_IFLNK:
1145                 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1146         case S_IFREG:
1147                 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1148         case S_IFBLK:
1149                 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1150         case S_IFDIR:
1151                 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1152         case S_IFCHR:
1153                 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1154         case S_IFIFO:
1155                 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1156
1157         }
1158
1159         return SECCLASS_FILE;
1160 }
1161
1162 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1163 {
1164         return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1165 }
1166
1167 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1168 {
1169         return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1170 }
1171
1172 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1173 {
1174         switch (family) {
1175         case PF_UNIX:
1176                 switch (type) {
1177                 case SOCK_STREAM:
1178                 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1179                         return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1180                 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1181                         return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1182                 }
1183                 break;
1184         case PF_INET:
1185         case PF_INET6:
1186                 switch (type) {
1187                 case SOCK_STREAM:
1188                         if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1189                                 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1190                         else
1191                                 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1192                 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1193                         if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1194                                 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1195                         else
1196                                 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1197                 case SOCK_DCCP:
1198                         return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1199                 default:
1200                         return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1201                 }
1202                 break;
1203         case PF_NETLINK:
1204                 switch (protocol) {
1205                 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
1206                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1207                 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1208                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1209                 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1210                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1211                 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
1212                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1213                 case NETLINK_XFRM:
1214                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1215                 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1216                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1217                 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
1218                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1219                 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1220                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1221                 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1222                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1223                 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1224                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1225                 default:
1226                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1227                 }
1228         case PF_PACKET:
1229                 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1230         case PF_KEY:
1231                 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1232         case PF_APPLETALK:
1233                 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1234         }
1235
1236         return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1237 }
1238
1239 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1240 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1241                                 u16 tclass,
1242                                 u32 *sid)
1243 {
1244         int rc;
1245         char *buffer, *path;
1246
1247         buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1248         if (!buffer)
1249                 return -ENOMEM;
1250
1251         path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1252         if (IS_ERR(path))
1253                 rc = PTR_ERR(path);
1254         else {
1255                 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1256                  * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1257                  * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1258                 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1259                         path[1] = '/';
1260                         path++;
1261                 }
1262                 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1263         }
1264         free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1265         return rc;
1266 }
1267 #else
1268 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1269                                 u16 tclass,
1270                                 u32 *sid)
1271 {
1272         return -EINVAL;
1273 }
1274 #endif
1275
1276 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1277 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1278 {
1279         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1280         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1281         u32 sid;
1282         struct dentry *dentry;
1283 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1284         char *context = NULL;
1285         unsigned len = 0;
1286         int rc = 0;
1287
1288         if (isec->initialized)
1289                 goto out;
1290
1291         mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1292         if (isec->initialized)
1293                 goto out_unlock;
1294
1295         sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1296         if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1297                 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1298                    after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1299                    server is ready to handle calls. */
1300                 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1301                 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1302                         list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1303                 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1304                 goto out_unlock;
1305         }
1306
1307         switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1308         case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
1309                 break;
1310         case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1311                 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1312                         isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1313                         break;
1314                 }
1315
1316                 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1317                    Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1318                 if (opt_dentry) {
1319                         /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1320                         dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1321                 } else {
1322                         /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1323                         dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1324                 }
1325                 if (!dentry) {
1326                         /*
1327                          * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1328                          * before the policy is loaded.  When we load policy we
1329                          * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1330                          * sbsec->isec_head list.  No reason to complain as these
1331                          * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1332                          * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1333                          * be used again by userspace.
1334                          */
1335                         goto out_unlock;
1336                 }
1337
1338                 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1339                 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1340                 if (!context) {
1341                         rc = -ENOMEM;
1342                         dput(dentry);
1343                         goto out_unlock;
1344                 }
1345                 context[len] = '\0';
1346                 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1347                                            context, len);
1348                 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1349                         kfree(context);
1350
1351                         /* Need a larger buffer.  Query for the right size. */
1352                         rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1353                                                    NULL, 0);
1354                         if (rc < 0) {
1355                                 dput(dentry);
1356                                 goto out_unlock;
1357                         }
1358                         len = rc;
1359                         context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1360                         if (!context) {
1361                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
1362                                 dput(dentry);
1363                                 goto out_unlock;
1364                         }
1365                         context[len] = '\0';
1366                         rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1367                                                    XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1368                                                    context, len);
1369                 }
1370                 dput(dentry);
1371                 if (rc < 0) {
1372                         if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1373                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  getxattr returned "
1374                                        "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1375                                        -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1376                                 kfree(context);
1377                                 goto out_unlock;
1378                         }
1379                         /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1380                         sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1381                         rc = 0;
1382                 } else {
1383                         rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1384                                                              sbsec->def_sid,
1385                                                              GFP_NOFS);
1386                         if (rc) {
1387                                 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1388                                 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1389
1390                                 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1391                                         if (printk_ratelimit())
1392                                                 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1393                                                         "context=%s.  This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1394                                                         "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1395                                 } else {
1396                                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  context_to_sid(%s) "
1397                                                "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1398                                                __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1399                                 }
1400                                 kfree(context);
1401                                 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1402                                 rc = 0;
1403                                 break;
1404                         }
1405                 }
1406                 kfree(context);
1407                 isec->sid = sid;
1408                 break;
1409         case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1410                 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1411                 break;
1412         case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1413                 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1414                 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1415
1416                 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1417                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1418                 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, sbsec->sid,
1419                                              isec->sclass, NULL, &sid);
1420                 if (rc)
1421                         goto out_unlock;
1422                 isec->sid = sid;
1423                 break;
1424         case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1425                 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1426                 break;
1427         default:
1428                 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1429                 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1430
1431                 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1432                         /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1433                          * procfs inodes */
1434                         if (opt_dentry)
1435                                 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1436                                  * d_splice_alias. */
1437                                 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1438                         else
1439                                 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1440                                  * find a dentry. */
1441                                 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1442                         /*
1443                          * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1444                          * before the policy is loaded.  When we load policy we
1445                          * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1446                          * sbsec->isec_head list.  No reason to complain as
1447                          * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1448                          * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1449                          * could be used again by userspace.
1450                          */
1451                         if (!dentry)
1452                                 goto out_unlock;
1453                         isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1454                         rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(dentry, isec->sclass, &sid);
1455                         dput(dentry);
1456                         if (rc)
1457                                 goto out_unlock;
1458                         isec->sid = sid;
1459                 }
1460                 break;
1461         }
1462
1463         isec->initialized = 1;
1464
1465 out_unlock:
1466         mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1467 out:
1468         if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1469                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1470         return rc;
1471 }
1472
1473 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1474 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1475 {
1476         u32 perm = 0;
1477
1478         switch (sig) {
1479         case SIGCHLD:
1480                 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1481                 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1482                 break;
1483         case SIGKILL:
1484                 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1485                 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1486                 break;
1487         case SIGSTOP:
1488                 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1489                 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1490                 break;
1491         default:
1492                 /* All other signals. */
1493                 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1494                 break;
1495         }
1496
1497         return perm;
1498 }
1499
1500 /*
1501  * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1502  * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1503  */
1504 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1505                          const struct cred *target,
1506                          u32 perms)
1507 {
1508         u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1509
1510         return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1511 }
1512
1513 /*
1514  * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1515  * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1516  * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1517  * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1518  */
1519 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1520                          const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1521                          u32 perms)
1522 {
1523         const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1524         u32 sid1, sid2;
1525
1526         rcu_read_lock();
1527         __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security;  sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1528         __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security;  sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1529         rcu_read_unlock();
1530         return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1531 }
1532
1533 /*
1534  * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1535  * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1536  * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1537  * - this uses current's subjective creds
1538  */
1539 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1540                             u32 perms)
1541 {
1542         u32 sid, tsid;
1543
1544         sid = current_sid();
1545         tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1546         return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1547 }
1548
1549 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1550 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1551 #endif
1552
1553 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1554 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1555                                int cap, int audit)
1556 {
1557         struct common_audit_data ad;
1558         struct av_decision avd;
1559         u16 sclass;
1560         u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1561         u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1562         int rc;
1563
1564         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
1565         ad.u.cap = cap;
1566
1567         switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1568         case 0:
1569                 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1570                 break;
1571         case 1:
1572                 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1573                 break;
1574         default:
1575                 printk(KERN_ERR
1576                        "SELinux:  out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1577                 BUG();
1578                 return -EINVAL;
1579         }
1580
1581         rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1582         if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
1583                 int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1584                 if (rc2)
1585                         return rc2;
1586         }
1587         return rc;
1588 }
1589
1590 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1591 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1592                            u32 perms)
1593 {
1594         u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1595
1596         return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1597                             SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1598 }
1599
1600 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1601    The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1602    data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1603 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1604                           struct inode *inode,
1605                           u32 perms,
1606                           struct common_audit_data *adp)
1607 {
1608         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1609         u32 sid;
1610
1611         validate_creds(cred);
1612
1613         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1614                 return 0;
1615
1616         sid = cred_sid(cred);
1617         isec = inode->i_security;
1618
1619         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1620 }
1621
1622 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1623    the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1624    pathname if needed. */
1625 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1626                                   struct dentry *dentry,
1627                                   u32 av)
1628 {
1629         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1630         struct common_audit_data ad;
1631
1632         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1633         ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1634         return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1635 }
1636
1637 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1638    the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1639    pathname if needed. */
1640 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1641                                 struct path *path,
1642                                 u32 av)
1643 {
1644         struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
1645         struct common_audit_data ad;
1646
1647         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1648         ad.u.path = *path;
1649         return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1650 }
1651
1652 /* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1653 static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1654                                      struct file *file,
1655                                      u32 av)
1656 {
1657         struct common_audit_data ad;
1658
1659         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1660         ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1661         return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
1662 }
1663
1664 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1665    access an inode in a given way.  Check access to the
1666    descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1667    check a particular permission to the file.
1668    Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1669    has the same SID as the process.  If av is zero, then
1670    access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1671    where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1672 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1673                          struct file *file,
1674                          u32 av)
1675 {
1676         struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1677         struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1678         struct common_audit_data ad;
1679         u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1680         int rc;
1681
1682         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1683         ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1684
1685         if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1686                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1687                                   SECCLASS_FD,
1688                                   FD__USE,
1689                                   &ad);
1690                 if (rc)
1691                         goto out;
1692         }
1693
1694         /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1695         rc = 0;
1696         if (av)
1697                 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1698
1699 out:
1700         return rc;
1701 }
1702
1703 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1704 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1705                       struct dentry *dentry,
1706                       u16 tclass)
1707 {
1708         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
1709         struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1710         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1711         u32 sid, newsid;
1712         struct common_audit_data ad;
1713         int rc;
1714
1715         dsec = dir->i_security;
1716         sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1717
1718         sid = tsec->sid;
1719         newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1720
1721         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1722         ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1723
1724         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1725                           DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1726                           &ad);
1727         if (rc)
1728                 return rc;
1729
1730         if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) {
1731                 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1732                                              &dentry->d_name, &newsid);
1733                 if (rc)
1734                         return rc;
1735         }
1736
1737         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1738         if (rc)
1739                 return rc;
1740
1741         return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1742                             SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1743                             FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1744 }
1745
1746 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1747 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1748                           struct task_struct *ctx)
1749 {
1750         u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1751
1752         return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1753 }
1754
1755 #define MAY_LINK        0
1756 #define MAY_UNLINK      1
1757 #define MAY_RMDIR       2
1758
1759 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1760 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1761                     struct dentry *dentry,
1762                     int kind)
1763
1764 {
1765         struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1766         struct common_audit_data ad;
1767         u32 sid = current_sid();
1768         u32 av;
1769         int rc;
1770
1771         dsec = dir->i_security;
1772         isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1773
1774         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1775         ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1776
1777         av = DIR__SEARCH;
1778         av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1779         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1780         if (rc)
1781                 return rc;
1782
1783         switch (kind) {
1784         case MAY_LINK:
1785                 av = FILE__LINK;
1786                 break;
1787         case MAY_UNLINK:
1788                 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1789                 break;
1790         case MAY_RMDIR:
1791                 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1792                 break;
1793         default:
1794                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized kind %d\n",
1795                         __func__, kind);
1796                 return 0;
1797         }
1798
1799         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1800         return rc;
1801 }
1802
1803 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1804                              struct dentry *old_dentry,
1805                              struct inode *new_dir,
1806                              struct dentry *new_dentry)
1807 {
1808         struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1809         struct common_audit_data ad;
1810         u32 sid = current_sid();
1811         u32 av;
1812         int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1813         int rc;
1814
1815         old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1816         old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1817         old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1818         new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1819
1820         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1821
1822         ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1823         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1824                           DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1825         if (rc)
1826                 return rc;
1827         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1828                           old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1829         if (rc)
1830                 return rc;
1831         if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1832                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1833                                   old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1834                 if (rc)
1835                         return rc;
1836         }
1837
1838         ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1839         av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1840         if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1841                 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1842         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1843         if (rc)
1844                 return rc;
1845         if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1846                 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1847                 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1848                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1849                                   new_isec->sclass,
1850                                   (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1851                 if (rc)
1852                         return rc;
1853         }
1854
1855         return 0;
1856 }
1857
1858 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1859 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1860                                struct super_block *sb,
1861                                u32 perms,
1862                                struct common_audit_data *ad)
1863 {
1864         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1865         u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1866
1867         sbsec = sb->s_security;
1868         return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1869 }
1870
1871 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1872 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1873 {
1874         u32 av = 0;
1875
1876         if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
1877                 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1878                         av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1879                 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1880                         av |= FILE__READ;
1881
1882                 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1883                         av |= FILE__APPEND;
1884                 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1885                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
1886
1887         } else {
1888                 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1889                         av |= DIR__SEARCH;
1890                 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1891                         av |= DIR__WRITE;
1892                 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1893                         av |= DIR__READ;
1894         }
1895
1896         return av;
1897 }
1898
1899 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1900 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1901 {
1902         u32 av = 0;
1903
1904         if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1905                 av |= FILE__READ;
1906         if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1907                 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1908                         av |= FILE__APPEND;
1909                 else
1910                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
1911         }
1912         if (!av) {
1913                 /*
1914                  * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1915                  */
1916                 av = FILE__IOCTL;
1917         }
1918
1919         return av;
1920 }
1921
1922 /*
1923  * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1924  * open permission.
1925  */
1926 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1927 {
1928         u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1929
1930         if (selinux_policycap_openperm)
1931                 av |= FILE__OPEN;
1932
1933         return av;
1934 }
1935
1936 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1937
1938 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
1939                                      unsigned int mode)
1940 {
1941         int rc;
1942
1943         rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
1944         if (rc)
1945                 return rc;
1946
1947         if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1948                 u32 sid = current_sid();
1949                 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1950                 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1951         }
1952
1953         return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1954 }
1955
1956 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1957 {
1958         int rc;
1959
1960         rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
1961         if (rc)
1962                 return rc;
1963
1964         return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1965 }
1966
1967 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1968                           kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1969 {
1970         int error;
1971
1972         error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1973         if (error)
1974                 return error;
1975
1976         return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1977 }
1978
1979 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1980                           const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1981                           const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1982                           const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1983 {
1984         int error;
1985
1986         error = cap_capset(new, old,
1987                                       effective, inheritable, permitted);
1988         if (error)
1989                 return error;
1990
1991         return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1992 }
1993
1994 /*
1995  * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1996  * which was removed).
1997  *
1998  * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1999  * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
2000  * need to control this operation.  However, SELinux does control the use of
2001  * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
2002  */
2003
2004 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
2005                            int cap, int audit)
2006 {
2007         int rc;
2008
2009         rc = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
2010         if (rc)
2011                 return rc;
2012
2013         return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit);
2014 }
2015
2016 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2017 {
2018         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2019         int rc = 0;
2020
2021         if (!sb)
2022                 return 0;
2023
2024         switch (cmds) {
2025         case Q_SYNC:
2026         case Q_QUOTAON:
2027         case Q_QUOTAOFF:
2028         case Q_SETINFO:
2029         case Q_SETQUOTA:
2030                 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2031                 break;
2032         case Q_GETFMT:
2033         case Q_GETINFO:
2034         case Q_GETQUOTA:
2035                 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2036                 break;
2037         default:
2038                 rc = 0;  /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2039                 break;
2040         }
2041         return rc;
2042 }
2043
2044 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2045 {
2046         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2047
2048         return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2049 }
2050
2051 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2052 {
2053         int rc;
2054
2055         switch (type) {
2056         case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL:    /* Read last kernel messages */
2057         case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2058                 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
2059                 break;
2060         case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
2061         case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON:  /* Enable logging to console */
2062         /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2063         case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
2064                 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
2065                 break;
2066         case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE:       /* Close log */
2067         case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN:        /* Open log */
2068         case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ:        /* Read from log */
2069         case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR:  /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2070         case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR:       /* Clear ring buffer */
2071         default:
2072                 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
2073                 break;
2074         }
2075         return rc;
2076 }
2077
2078 /*
2079  * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2080  * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2081  * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2082  *
2083  * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2084  * processes that allocate mappings.
2085  */
2086 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2087 {
2088         int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2089
2090         rc = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2091                              SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2092         if (rc == 0)
2093                 cap_sys_admin = 1;
2094
2095         return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
2096 }
2097
2098 /* binprm security operations */
2099
2100 static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2101                             const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec,
2102                             const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
2103 {
2104         int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
2105         int nosuid = (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID);
2106         int rc;
2107
2108         if (!nnp && !nosuid)
2109                 return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
2110
2111         if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid)
2112                 return 0; /* No change in credentials */
2113
2114         /*
2115          * The only transitions we permit under NNP or nosuid
2116          * are transitions to bounded SIDs, i.e. SIDs that are
2117          * guaranteed to only be allowed a subset of the permissions
2118          * of the current SID.
2119          */
2120         rc = security_bounded_transition(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid);
2121         if (rc) {
2122                 /*
2123                  * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
2124                  * NNP:  Operation not permitted for caller.
2125                  * nosuid:  Permission denied to file.
2126                  */
2127                 if (nnp)
2128                         return -EPERM;
2129                 else
2130                         return -EACCES;
2131         }
2132         return 0;
2133 }
2134
2135 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2136 {
2137         const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2138         struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2139         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2140         struct common_audit_data ad;
2141         struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
2142         int rc;
2143
2144         rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
2145         if (rc)
2146                 return rc;
2147
2148         /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2149          * the script interpreter */
2150         if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2151                 return 0;
2152
2153         old_tsec = current_security();
2154         new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2155         isec = inode->i_security;
2156
2157         /* Default to the current task SID. */
2158         new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2159         new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2160
2161         /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2162         new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2163         new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2164         new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2165
2166         if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2167                 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2168                 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2169                 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2170
2171                 /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
2172                 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2173                 if (rc)
2174                         return rc;
2175         } else {
2176                 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2177                 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2178                                              SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2179                                              &new_tsec->sid);
2180                 if (rc)
2181                         return rc;
2182
2183                 /*
2184                  * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
2185                  * transition.
2186                  */
2187                 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2188                 if (rc)
2189                         new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2190         }
2191
2192         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2193         ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2194
2195         if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2196                 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2197                                   SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2198                 if (rc)
2199                         return rc;
2200         } else {
2201                 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2202                 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2203                                   SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2204                 if (rc)
2205                         return rc;
2206
2207                 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2208                                   SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2209                 if (rc)
2210                         return rc;
2211
2212                 /* Check for shared state */
2213                 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2214                         rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2215                                           SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2216                                           NULL);
2217                         if (rc)
2218                                 return -EPERM;
2219                 }
2220
2221                 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2222                  * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2223                 if (bprm->unsafe &
2224                     (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2225                         struct task_struct *tracer;
2226                         struct task_security_struct *sec;
2227                         u32 ptsid = 0;
2228
2229                         rcu_read_lock();
2230                         tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2231                         if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2232                                 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2233                                 ptsid = sec->sid;
2234                         }
2235                         rcu_read_unlock();
2236
2237                         if (ptsid != 0) {
2238                                 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2239                                                   SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2240                                                   PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2241                                 if (rc)
2242                                         return -EPERM;
2243                         }
2244                 }
2245
2246                 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2247                 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2248         }
2249
2250         return 0;
2251 }
2252
2253 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2254 {
2255         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2256         u32 sid, osid;
2257         int atsecure = 0;
2258
2259         sid = tsec->sid;
2260         osid = tsec->osid;
2261
2262         if (osid != sid) {
2263                 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2264                    the noatsecure permission is granted between
2265                    the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2266                 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2267                                         SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2268                                         PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2269         }
2270
2271         return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2272 }
2273
2274 static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
2275 {
2276         return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
2277 }
2278
2279 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2280 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2281                                             struct files_struct *files)
2282 {
2283         struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2284         struct tty_struct *tty;
2285         int drop_tty = 0;
2286         unsigned n;
2287
2288         tty = get_current_tty();
2289         if (tty) {
2290                 spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
2291                 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2292                         struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2293
2294                         /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2295                            Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2296                            rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2297                            open file may belong to another process and we are
2298                            only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2299                         file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2300                                                 struct tty_file_private, list);
2301                         file = file_priv->file;
2302                         if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2303                                 drop_tty = 1;
2304                 }
2305                 spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
2306                 tty_kref_put(tty);
2307         }
2308         /* Reset controlling tty. */
2309         if (drop_tty)
2310                 no_tty();
2311
2312         /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2313         n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
2314         if (!n) /* none found? */
2315                 return;
2316
2317         devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
2318         if (IS_ERR(devnull))
2319                 devnull = NULL;
2320         /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2321         do {
2322                 replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
2323         } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2324         if (devnull)
2325                 fput(devnull);
2326 }
2327
2328 /*
2329  * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2330  */
2331 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2332 {
2333         struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2334         struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2335         int rc, i;
2336
2337         new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2338         if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2339                 return;
2340
2341         /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2342         flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2343
2344         /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2345         current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2346
2347         /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2348          * SID.  If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2349          * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2350          *
2351          * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2352          * controlled by the setrlimit check.  The inclusion of the init task's
2353          * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2354          * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2355          * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2356          */
2357         rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2358                           PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2359         if (rc) {
2360                 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2361                 task_lock(current);
2362                 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2363                         rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2364                         initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2365                         rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2366                 }
2367                 task_unlock(current);
2368                 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2369         }
2370 }
2371
2372 /*
2373  * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2374  * due to exec
2375  */
2376 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2377 {
2378         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2379         struct itimerval itimer;
2380         u32 osid, sid;
2381         int rc, i;
2382
2383         osid = tsec->osid;
2384         sid = tsec->sid;
2385
2386         if (sid == osid)
2387                 return;
2388
2389         /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2390          * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2391          * flush and unblock signals.
2392          *
2393          * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2394          * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2395          */
2396         rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2397         if (rc) {
2398                 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2399                 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2400                         do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2401                 spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
2402                 if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
2403                         __flush_signals(current);
2404                         flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2405                         sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
2406                 }
2407                 spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
2408         }
2409
2410         /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2411          * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2412         read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2413         __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2414         read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2415 }
2416
2417 /* superblock security operations */
2418
2419 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2420 {
2421         return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2422 }
2423
2424 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2425 {
2426         superblock_free_security(sb);
2427 }
2428
2429 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2430 {
2431         if (plen > olen)
2432                 return 0;
2433
2434         return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2435 }
2436
2437 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2438 {
2439         return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2440                 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2441                 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2442                 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2443                 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2444 }
2445
2446 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2447 {
2448         if (!*first) {
2449                 **to = ',';
2450                 *to += 1;
2451         } else
2452                 *first = 0;
2453         memcpy(*to, from, len);
2454         *to += len;
2455 }
2456
2457 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2458                                        int len)
2459 {
2460         int current_size = 0;
2461
2462         if (!*first) {
2463                 **to = '|';
2464                 *to += 1;
2465         } else
2466                 *first = 0;
2467
2468         while (current_size < len) {
2469                 if (*from != '"') {
2470                         **to = *from;
2471                         *to += 1;
2472                 }
2473                 from += 1;
2474                 current_size += 1;
2475         }
2476 }
2477
2478 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2479 {
2480         int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2481         char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2482         char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2483         int open_quote = 0;
2484
2485         in_curr = orig;
2486         sec_curr = copy;
2487
2488         nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2489         if (!nosec) {
2490                 rc = -ENOMEM;
2491                 goto out;
2492         }
2493
2494         nosec_save = nosec;
2495         fnosec = fsec = 1;
2496         in_save = in_end = orig;
2497
2498         do {
2499                 if (*in_end == '"')
2500                         open_quote = !open_quote;
2501                 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2502                                 *in_end == '\0') {
2503                         int len = in_end - in_curr;
2504
2505                         if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2506                                 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2507                         else
2508                                 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2509
2510                         in_curr = in_end + 1;
2511                 }
2512         } while (*in_end++);
2513
2514         strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2515         free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2516 out:
2517         return rc;
2518 }
2519
2520 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2521 {
2522         int rc, i, *flags;
2523         struct security_mnt_opts opts;
2524         char *secdata, **mount_options;
2525         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2526
2527         if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2528                 return 0;
2529
2530         if (!data)
2531                 return 0;
2532
2533         if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
2534                 return 0;
2535
2536         security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
2537         secdata = alloc_secdata();
2538         if (!secdata)
2539                 return -ENOMEM;
2540         rc = selinux_sb_copy_data(data, secdata);
2541         if (rc)
2542                 goto out_free_secdata;
2543
2544         rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata, &opts);
2545         if (rc)
2546                 goto out_free_secdata;
2547
2548         mount_options = opts.mnt_opts;
2549         flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags;
2550
2551         for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) {
2552                 u32 sid;
2553                 size_t len;
2554
2555                 if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
2556                         continue;
2557                 len = strlen(mount_options[i]);
2558                 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid,
2559                                              GFP_KERNEL);
2560                 if (rc) {
2561                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
2562                                "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
2563                                mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
2564                         goto out_free_opts;
2565                 }
2566                 rc = -EINVAL;
2567                 switch (flags[i]) {
2568                 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
2569                         if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2570                                 goto out_bad_option;
2571                         break;
2572                 case CONTEXT_MNT:
2573                         if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2574                                 goto out_bad_option;
2575                         break;
2576                 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: {
2577                         struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2578                         root_isec = sb->s_root->d_inode->i_security;
2579
2580                         if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2581                                 goto out_bad_option;
2582                         break;
2583                 }
2584                 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
2585                         if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2586                                 goto out_bad_option;
2587                         break;
2588                 default:
2589                         goto out_free_opts;
2590                 }
2591         }
2592
2593         rc = 0;
2594 out_free_opts:
2595         security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
2596 out_free_secdata:
2597         free_secdata(secdata);
2598         return rc;
2599 out_bad_option:
2600         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options "
2601                "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2602                sb->s_type->name);
2603         goto out_free_opts;
2604 }
2605
2606 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2607 {
2608         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2609         struct common_audit_data ad;
2610         int rc;
2611
2612         rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2613         if (rc)
2614                 return rc;
2615
2616         /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2617         if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2618                 return 0;
2619
2620         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2621         ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2622         return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2623 }
2624
2625 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2626 {
2627         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2628         struct common_audit_data ad;
2629
2630         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2631         ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2632         return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2633 }
2634
2635 static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
2636                          struct path *path,
2637                          const char *type,
2638                          unsigned long flags,
2639                          void *data)
2640 {
2641         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2642
2643         if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2644                 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2645                                            FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2646         else
2647                 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2648 }
2649
2650 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2651 {
2652         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2653
2654         return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2655                                    FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2656 }
2657
2658 /* inode security operations */
2659
2660 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2661 {
2662         return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2663 }
2664
2665 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2666 {
2667         inode_free_security(inode);
2668 }
2669
2670 static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2671                                         struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
2672                                         u32 *ctxlen)
2673 {
2674         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2675         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2676         struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2677         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2678         struct inode *dir = dentry->d_parent->d_inode;
2679         u32 newsid;
2680         int rc;
2681
2682         tsec = cred->security;
2683         dsec = dir->i_security;
2684         sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2685
2686         if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2687                 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2688         } else {
2689                 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2690                                              inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2691                                              name,
2692                                              &newsid);
2693                 if (rc) {
2694                         printk(KERN_WARNING
2695                                 "%s: security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d\n",
2696                                __func__, -rc);
2697                         return rc;
2698                 }
2699         }
2700
2701         return security_sid_to_context(newsid, (char **)ctx, ctxlen);
2702 }
2703
2704 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2705                                        const struct qstr *qstr,
2706                                        const char **name,
2707                                        void **value, size_t *len)
2708 {
2709         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2710         struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2711         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2712         u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2713         int rc;
2714         char *context;
2715
2716         dsec = dir->i_security;
2717         sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2718
2719         sid = tsec->sid;
2720         newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2721
2722         if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
2723             (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT))
2724                 newsid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
2725         else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) {
2726                 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2727                                              inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2728                                              qstr, &newsid);
2729                 if (rc) {
2730                         printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  "
2731                                "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2732                                "ino=%ld)\n",
2733                                __func__,
2734                                -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2735                         return rc;
2736                 }
2737         }
2738
2739         /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2740         if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2741                 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2742                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2743                 isec->sid = newsid;
2744                 isec->initialized = 1;
2745         }
2746
2747         if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
2748                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2749
2750         if (name)
2751                 *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2752
2753         if (value && len) {
2754                 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2755                 if (rc)
2756                         return rc;
2757                 *value = context;
2758                 *len = clen;
2759         }
2760
2761         return 0;
2762 }
2763
2764 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
2765 {
2766         return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2767 }
2768
2769 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2770 {
2771         return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2772 }
2773
2774 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2775 {
2776         return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2777 }
2778
2779 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2780 {
2781         return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2782 }
2783
2784 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
2785 {
2786         return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2787 }
2788
2789 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2790 {
2791         return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2792 }
2793
2794 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
2795 {
2796         return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2797 }
2798
2799 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2800                                 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2801 {
2802         return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2803 }
2804
2805 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2806 {
2807         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2808
2809         return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2810 }
2811
2812 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2813 {
2814         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2815
2816         return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2817 }
2818
2819 static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
2820                                            u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
2821                                            int result,
2822                                            unsigned flags)
2823 {
2824         struct common_audit_data ad;
2825         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2826         int rc;
2827
2828         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
2829         ad.u.inode = inode;
2830
2831         rc = slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
2832                             audited, denied, result, &ad, flags);
2833         if (rc)
2834                 return rc;
2835         return 0;
2836 }
2837
2838 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2839 {
2840         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2841         u32 perms;
2842         bool from_access;
2843         unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
2844         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2845         u32 sid;
2846         struct av_decision avd;
2847         int rc, rc2;
2848         u32 audited, denied;
2849
2850         from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
2851         mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
2852
2853         /* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
2854         if (!mask)
2855                 return 0;
2856
2857         validate_creds(cred);
2858
2859         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
2860                 return 0;
2861
2862         perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
2863
2864         sid = cred_sid(cred);
2865         isec = inode->i_security;
2866
2867         rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);
2868         audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
2869                                      from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
2870                                      &denied);
2871         if (likely(!audited))
2872                 return rc;
2873
2874         rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc, flags);
2875         if (rc2)
2876                 return rc2;
2877         return rc;
2878 }
2879
2880 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2881 {
2882         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2883         unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
2884         __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
2885
2886         /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2887         if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
2888                 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
2889                               ATTR_FORCE);
2890                 if (!ia_valid)
2891                         return 0;
2892         }
2893
2894         if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2895                         ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
2896                 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2897
2898         if (selinux_policycap_openperm && (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE))
2899                 av |= FILE__OPEN;
2900
2901         return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
2902 }
2903
2904 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2905 {
2906         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2907         struct path path;
2908
2909         path.dentry = dentry;
2910         path.mnt = mnt;
2911
2912         return path_has_perm(cred, &path, FILE__GETATTR);
2913 }
2914
2915 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2916 {
2917         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2918
2919         if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2920                      sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2921                 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2922                         if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2923                                 return -EPERM;
2924                 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2925                         /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2926                            Restrict to administrator. */
2927                         return -EPERM;
2928                 }
2929         }
2930
2931         /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2932            ordinary setattr permission. */
2933         return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2934 }
2935
2936 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2937                                   const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2938 {
2939         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2940         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2941         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2942         struct common_audit_data ad;
2943         u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2944         int rc = 0;
2945
2946         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2947                 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2948
2949         sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2950         if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
2951                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2952
2953         if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
2954                 return -EPERM;
2955
2956         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2957         ad.u.dentry = dentry;
2958
2959         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2960                           FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2961         if (rc)
2962                 return rc;
2963
2964         rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
2965         if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2966                 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
2967                         struct audit_buffer *ab;
2968                         size_t audit_size;
2969                         const char *str;
2970
2971                         /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
2972                          * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
2973                         if (value) {
2974                                 str = value;
2975                                 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
2976                                         audit_size = size - 1;
2977                                 else
2978                                         audit_size = size;
2979                         } else {
2980                                 str = "";
2981                                 audit_size = 0;
2982                         }
2983                         ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
2984                         audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
2985                         audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
2986                         audit_log_end(ab);
2987
2988                         return rc;
2989                 }
2990                 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2991         }
2992         if (rc)
2993                 return rc;
2994
2995         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2996                           FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2997         if (rc)
2998                 return rc;
2999
3000         rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
3001                                           isec->sclass);
3002         if (rc)
3003                 return rc;
3004
3005         return avc_has_perm(newsid,
3006                             sbsec->sid,
3007                             SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
3008                             FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
3009                             &ad);
3010 }
3011
3012 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3013                                         const void *value, size_t size,
3014                                         int flags)
3015 {
3016         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
3017         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3018         u32 newsid;
3019         int rc;
3020
3021         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3022                 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
3023                 return;
3024         }
3025
3026         rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
3027         if (rc) {
3028                 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  unable to map context to SID"
3029                        "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
3030                        inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
3031                 return;
3032         }
3033
3034         isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3035         isec->sid = newsid;
3036         isec->initialized = 1;
3037
3038         return;
3039 }
3040
3041 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3042 {
3043         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3044
3045         return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3046 }
3047
3048 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
3049 {
3050         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3051
3052         return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3053 }
3054
3055 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3056 {
3057         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
3058                 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
3059
3060         /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
3061            You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
3062         return -EACCES;
3063 }
3064
3065 /*
3066  * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3067  *
3068  * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3069  */
3070 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
3071 {
3072         u32 size;
3073         int error;
3074         char *context = NULL;
3075         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3076
3077         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3078                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3079
3080         /*
3081          * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3082          * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3083          * use the in-core value under current policy.
3084          * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3085          * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3086          * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3087          * in-core context value, not a denial.
3088          */
3089         error = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
3090                                 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
3091         if (!error)
3092                 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
3093                                                       &size);
3094         else
3095                 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
3096         if (error)
3097                 return error;
3098         error = size;
3099         if (alloc) {
3100                 *buffer = context;
3101                 goto out_nofree;
3102         }
3103         kfree(context);
3104 out_nofree:
3105         return error;
3106 }
3107
3108 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3109                                      const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3110 {
3111         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3112         u32 newsid;
3113         int rc;
3114
3115         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3116                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3117
3118         if (!value || !size)
3119                 return -EACCES;
3120
3121         rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
3122         if (rc)
3123                 return rc;
3124
3125         isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3126         isec->sid = newsid;
3127         isec->initialized = 1;
3128         return 0;
3129 }
3130
3131 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
3132 {
3133         const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
3134         if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
3135                 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
3136         return len;
3137 }
3138
3139 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
3140 {
3141         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3142         *secid = isec->sid;
3143 }
3144
3145 /* file security operations */
3146
3147 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3148 {
3149         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3150         struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3151
3152         /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3153         if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
3154                 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
3155
3156         return file_has_perm(cred, file,
3157                              file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
3158 }
3159
3160 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3161 {
3162         struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3163         struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
3164         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3165         u32 sid = current_sid();
3166
3167         if (!mask)
3168                 /* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
3169                 return 0;
3170
3171         if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
3172             fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
3173                 /* No change since file_open check. */
3174                 return 0;
3175
3176         return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3177 }
3178
3179 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3180 {
3181         return file_alloc_security(file);
3182 }
3183
3184 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
3185 {
3186         file_free_security(file);
3187 }
3188
3189 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3190                               unsigned long arg)
3191 {
3192         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3193         int error = 0;
3194
3195         switch (cmd) {
3196         case FIONREAD:
3197         /* fall through */
3198         case FIBMAP:
3199         /* fall through */
3200         case FIGETBSZ:
3201         /* fall through */
3202         case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
3203         /* fall through */
3204         case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
3205                 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
3206                 break;
3207
3208         case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
3209         /* fall through */
3210         case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
3211                 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3212                 break;
3213
3214         /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3215         case FIONBIO:
3216         /* fall through */
3217         case FIOASYNC:
3218                 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3219                 break;
3220
3221         case KDSKBENT:
3222         case KDSKBSENT:
3223                 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3224                                             SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
3225                 break;
3226
3227         /* default case assumes that the command will go
3228          * to the file's ioctl() function.
3229          */
3230         default:
3231                 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL);
3232         }
3233         return error;
3234 }
3235
3236 static int default_noexec;
3237
3238 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3239 {
3240         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3241         int rc = 0;
3242
3243         if (default_noexec &&
3244             (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3245                 /*
3246                  * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3247                  * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3248                  * This has an additional check.
3249                  */
3250                 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3251                 if (rc)
3252                         goto error;
3253         }
3254
3255         if (file) {
3256                 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3257                 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3258
3259                 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3260                 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3261                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
3262
3263                 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3264                         av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3265
3266                 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3267         }
3268
3269 error:
3270         return rc;
3271 }
3272
3273 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
3274 {
3275         int rc;
3276
3277         /* do DAC check on address space usage */
3278         rc = cap_mmap_addr(addr);
3279         if (rc)
3280                 return rc;
3281
3282         if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3283                 u32 sid = current_sid();
3284                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3285                                   MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3286         }
3287
3288         return rc;
3289 }
3290
3291 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3292                              unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
3293 {
3294         if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3295                 prot = reqprot;
3296
3297         return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3298                                    (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3299 }
3300
3301 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3302                                  unsigned long reqprot,
3303                                  unsigned long prot)
3304 {
3305         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3306
3307         if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3308                 prot = reqprot;
3309
3310         if (default_noexec &&
3311             (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3312                 int rc = 0;
3313                 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3314                     vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3315                         rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3316                 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3317                            vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3318                            vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3319                         rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3320                 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3321                         /*
3322                          * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3323                          * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3324                          * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3325                          * modified content.  This typically should only
3326                          * occur for text relocations.
3327                          */
3328                         rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3329                 }
3330                 if (rc)
3331                         return rc;
3332         }
3333
3334         return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3335 }
3336
3337 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3338 {
3339         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3340
3341         return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3342 }
3343
3344 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3345                               unsigned long arg)
3346 {
3347         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3348         int err = 0;
3349
3350         switch (cmd) {
3351         case F_SETFL:
3352                 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3353                         err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3354                         break;
3355                 }
3356                 /* fall through */
3357         case F_SETOWN:
3358         case F_SETSIG:
3359         case F_GETFL:
3360         case F_GETOWN:
3361         case F_GETSIG:
3362         case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
3363                 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3364                 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3365                 break;
3366         case F_GETLK:
3367         case F_SETLK:
3368         case F_SETLKW:
3369         case F_OFD_GETLK:
3370         case F_OFD_SETLK:
3371         case F_OFD_SETLKW:
3372 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3373         case F_GETLK64:
3374         case F_SETLK64:
3375         case F_SETLKW64:
3376 #endif
3377                 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3378                 break;
3379         }
3380
3381         return err;
3382 }
3383
3384 static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3385 {
3386         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3387
3388         fsec = file->f_security;
3389         fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3390 }
3391
3392 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3393                                        struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3394 {
3395         struct file *file;
3396         u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3397         u32 perm;
3398         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3399
3400         /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3401         file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3402
3403         fsec = file->f_security;
3404
3405         if (!signum)
3406                 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3407         else
3408                 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3409
3410         return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3411                             SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3412 }
3413
3414 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3415 {
3416         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3417
3418         return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3419 }
3420
3421 static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3422 {
3423         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3424         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3425
3426         fsec = file->f_security;
3427         isec = file_inode(file)->i_security;
3428         /*
3429          * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3430          * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3431          * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3432          * Task label is already saved in the file security
3433          * struct as its SID.
3434          */
3435         fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3436         fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3437         /*
3438          * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3439          * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3440          * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3441          * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3442          * new inode label or new policy.
3443          * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3444          */
3445         return file_path_has_perm(cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
3446 }
3447
3448 /* task security operations */
3449
3450 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3451 {
3452         return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3453 }
3454
3455 /*
3456  * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3457  */
3458 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
3459 {
3460         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3461
3462         tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3463         if (!tsec)
3464                 return -ENOMEM;
3465
3466         cred->security = tsec;
3467         return 0;
3468 }
3469
3470 /*
3471  * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3472  */
3473 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3474 {
3475         struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3476
3477         /*
3478          * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
3479          * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
3480          */
3481         BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
3482         cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
3483         kfree(tsec);
3484 }
3485
3486 /*
3487  * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3488  */
3489 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3490                                 gfp_t gfp)
3491 {
3492         const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3493         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3494
3495         old_tsec = old->security;
3496
3497         tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3498         if (!tsec)
3499                 return -ENOMEM;
3500
3501         new->security = tsec;
3502         return 0;
3503 }
3504
3505 /*
3506  * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3507  */
3508 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3509 {
3510         const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
3511         struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3512
3513         *tsec = *old_tsec;
3514 }
3515
3516 /*
3517  * set the security data for a kernel service
3518  * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3519  */
3520 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3521 {
3522         struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3523         u32 sid = current_sid();
3524         int ret;
3525
3526         ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3527                            SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3528                            KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3529                            NULL);
3530         if (ret == 0) {
3531                 tsec->sid = secid;
3532                 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3533                 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3534                 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3535         }
3536         return ret;
3537 }
3538
3539 /*
3540  * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3541  * objective context of the specified inode
3542  */
3543 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3544 {
3545         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3546         struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3547         u32 sid = current_sid();
3548         int ret;
3549
3550         ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3551                            SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3552                            KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3553                            NULL);
3554
3555         if (ret == 0)
3556                 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3557         return ret;
3558 }
3559
3560 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
3561 {
3562         u32 sid;
3563         struct common_audit_data ad;
3564
3565         sid = task_sid(current);
3566
3567         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
3568         ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
3569
3570         return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3571                             SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
3572 }
3573
3574 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3575 {
3576         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3577 }
3578
3579 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3580 {
3581         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3582 }
3583
3584 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3585 {
3586         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3587 }
3588
3589 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3590 {
3591         *secid = task_sid(p);
3592 }
3593
3594 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3595 {
3596         int rc;
3597
3598         rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
3599         if (rc)
3600                 return rc;
3601
3602         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3603 }
3604
3605 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3606 {
3607         int rc;
3608
3609         rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3610         if (rc)
3611                 return rc;
3612
3613         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3614 }
3615
3616 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3617 {
3618         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3619 }
3620
3621 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
3622                 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3623 {
3624         struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
3625
3626         /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3627            lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3628            later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3629            upon context transitions.  See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3630         if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3631                 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3632
3633         return 0;
3634 }
3635
3636 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3637 {
3638         int rc;
3639
3640         rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p);
3641         if (rc)
3642                 return rc;
3643
3644         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3645 }
3646
3647 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3648 {
3649         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3650 }
3651
3652 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3653 {
3654         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3655 }
3656
3657 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3658                                 int sig, u32 secid)
3659 {
3660         u32 perm;
3661         int rc;
3662
3663         if (!sig)
3664                 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3665         else
3666                 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3667         if (secid)
3668                 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3669                                   SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3670         else
3671                 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3672         return rc;
3673 }
3674
3675 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3676 {
3677         return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3678 }
3679
3680 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3681                                   struct inode *inode)
3682 {
3683         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3684         u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3685
3686         isec->sid = sid;
3687         isec->initialized = 1;
3688 }
3689
3690 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3691 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3692                         struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3693 {
3694         int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3695         struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3696
3697         offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3698         ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3699         if (ih == NULL)
3700                 goto out;
3701
3702         ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3703         if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3704                 goto out;
3705
3706         ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3707         ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3708         ret = 0;
3709
3710         if (proto)
3711                 *proto = ih->protocol;
3712
3713         switch (ih->protocol) {
3714         case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3715                 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3716
3717                 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3718                         break;
3719
3720                 offset += ihlen;
3721                 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3722                 if (th == NULL)
3723                         break;
3724
3725                 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
3726                 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
3727                 break;
3728         }
3729
3730         case IPPROTO_UDP: {
3731                 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3732
3733                 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3734                         break;
3735
3736                 offset += ihlen;
3737                 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3738                 if (uh == NULL)
3739                         break;
3740
3741                 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
3742                 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
3743                 break;
3744         }
3745
3746         case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3747                 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3748
3749                 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3750                         break;
3751
3752                 offset += ihlen;
3753                 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3754                 if (dh == NULL)
3755                         break;
3756
3757                 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3758                 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3759                 break;
3760         }
3761
3762         default:
3763                 break;
3764         }
3765 out:
3766         return ret;
3767 }
3768
3769 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3770
3771 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3772 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3773                         struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3774 {
3775         u8 nexthdr;
3776         int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3777         struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3778         __be16 frag_off;
3779
3780         offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3781         ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3782         if (ip6 == NULL)
3783                 goto out;
3784
3785         ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
3786         ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
3787         ret = 0;
3788
3789         nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3790         offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3791         offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
3792         if (offset < 0)
3793                 goto out;
3794
3795         if (proto)
3796                 *proto = nexthdr;
3797
3798         switch (nexthdr) {
3799         case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3800                 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3801
3802                 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3803                 if (th == NULL)
3804                         break;
3805
3806                 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
3807                 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
3808                 break;
3809         }
3810
3811         case IPPROTO_UDP: {
3812                 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3813
3814                 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3815                 if (uh == NULL)
3816                         break;
3817
3818                 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
3819                 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
3820                 break;
3821         }
3822
3823         case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3824                 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3825
3826                 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3827                 if (dh == NULL)
3828                         break;
3829
3830                 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3831                 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3832                 break;
3833         }
3834
3835         /* includes fragments */
3836         default:
3837                 break;
3838         }
3839 out:
3840         return ret;
3841 }
3842
3843 #endif /* IPV6 */
3844
3845 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
3846                              char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3847 {
3848         char *addrp;
3849         int ret;
3850
3851         switch (ad->u.net->family) {
3852         case PF_INET:
3853                 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3854                 if (ret)
3855                         goto parse_error;
3856                 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
3857                                        &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
3858                 goto okay;
3859
3860 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3861         case PF_INET6:
3862                 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3863                 if (ret)
3864                         goto parse_error;
3865                 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
3866                                        &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
3867                 goto okay;
3868 #endif  /* IPV6 */
3869         default:
3870                 addrp = NULL;
3871                 goto okay;
3872         }
3873
3874 parse_error:
3875         printk(KERN_WARNING
3876                "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3877                " unable to parse packet\n");
3878         return ret;
3879
3880 okay:
3881         if (_addrp)
3882                 *_addrp = addrp;
3883         return 0;
3884 }
3885
3886 /**
3887  * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3888  * @skb: the packet
3889  * @family: protocol family
3890  * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3891  *
3892  * Description:
3893  * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3894  * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3895  * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp().  The function
3896  * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3897  * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3898  * peer labels.
3899  *
3900  */
3901 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3902 {
3903         int err;
3904         u32 xfrm_sid;
3905         u32 nlbl_sid;
3906         u32 nlbl_type;
3907
3908         err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3909         if (unlikely(err))
3910                 return -EACCES;
3911         err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3912         if (unlikely(err))
3913                 return -EACCES;
3914
3915         err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3916         if (unlikely(err)) {
3917                 printk(KERN_WARNING
3918                        "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3919                        " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3920                 return -EACCES;
3921         }
3922
3923         return 0;
3924 }
3925
3926 /**
3927  * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
3928  * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
3929  * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
3930  * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
3931  *
3932  * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
3933  * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
3934  * @conn_sid.  If @skb_sid is not valid then then @conn_sid is simply a copy
3935  * of @sk_sid.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
3936  *
3937  */
3938 static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
3939 {
3940         int err = 0;
3941
3942         if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
3943                 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid, skb_sid, conn_sid);
3944         else
3945                 *conn_sid = sk_sid;
3946
3947         return err;
3948 }
3949
3950 /* socket security operations */
3951
3952 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
3953                                  u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
3954 {
3955         if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
3956                 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3957                 return 0;
3958         }
3959
3960         return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL,
3961                                        socksid);
3962 }
3963
3964 static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
3965 {
3966         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3967         struct common_audit_data ad;
3968         struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
3969         u32 tsid = task_sid(task);
3970
3971         if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3972                 return 0;
3973
3974         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
3975         ad.u.net = &net;
3976         ad.u.net->sk = sk;
3977
3978         return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3979 }
3980
3981 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3982                                  int protocol, int kern)
3983 {
3984         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3985         u32 newsid;
3986         u16 secclass;
3987         int rc;
3988
3989         if (kern)
3990                 return 0;
3991
3992         secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3993         rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
3994         if (rc)
3995                 return rc;
3996
3997         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3998 }
3999
4000 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
4001                                       int type, int protocol, int kern)
4002 {
4003         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
4004         struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4005         struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4006         int err = 0;
4007
4008         isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4009
4010         if (kern)
4011                 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4012         else {
4013                 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, isec->sclass, &(isec->sid));
4014                 if (err)
4015                         return err;
4016         }
4017
4018         isec->initialized = 1;
4019
4020         if (sock->sk) {
4021                 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4022                 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
4023                 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4024                 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
4025         }
4026
4027         return err;
4028 }
4029
4030 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
4031    Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
4032    permission check between the socket and the port number. */
4033
4034 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4035 {
4036         struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4037         u16 family;
4038         int err;
4039
4040         err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__BIND);
4041         if (err)
4042                 goto out;
4043
4044         /*
4045          * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
4046          * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
4047          * check the first address now.
4048          */
4049         family = sk->sk_family;
4050         if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
4051                 char *addrp;
4052                 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4053                 struct common_audit_data ad;
4054                 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4055                 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4056                 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4057                 unsigned short snum;
4058                 u32 sid, node_perm;
4059
4060                 if (family == PF_INET) {
4061                         addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4062                         snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4063                         addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4064                 } else {
4065                         addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4066                         snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4067                         addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
4068                 }
4069
4070                 if (snum) {
4071                         int low, high;
4072
4073                         inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high);
4074
4075                         if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
4076                                 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4077                                                       snum, &sid);
4078                                 if (err)
4079                                         goto out;
4080                                 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4081                                 ad.u.net = &net;
4082                                 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4083                                 ad.u.net->family = family;
4084                                 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
4085                                                    sksec->sclass,
4086                                                    SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
4087                                 if (err)
4088                                         goto out;
4089                         }
4090                 }
4091
4092                 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4093                 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4094                         node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4095                         break;
4096
4097                 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4098                         node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4099                         break;
4100
4101                 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4102                         node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4103                         break;
4104
4105                 default:
4106                         node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4107                         break;
4108                 }
4109
4110                 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
4111                 if (err)
4112                         goto out;
4113
4114                 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4115                 ad.u.net = &net;
4116                 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4117                 ad.u.net->family = family;
4118
4119                 if (family == PF_INET)
4120                         ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4121                 else
4122                         ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
4123
4124                 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
4125                                    sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
4126                 if (err)
4127                         goto out;
4128         }
4129 out:
4130         return err;
4131 }
4132
4133 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4134 {
4135         struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4136         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4137         int err;
4138
4139         err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
4140         if (err)
4141                 return err;
4142
4143         /*
4144          * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
4145          */
4146         if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
4147             sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
4148                 struct common_audit_data ad;
4149                 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4150                 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4151                 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4152                 unsigned short snum;
4153                 u32 sid, perm;
4154
4155                 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
4156                         addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4157                         if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4158                                 return -EINVAL;
4159                         snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4160                 } else {
4161                         addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4162                         if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4163                                 return -EINVAL;
4164                         snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4165                 }
4166
4167                 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
4168                 if (err)
4169                         goto out;
4170
4171                 perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
4172                        TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4173
4174                 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4175                 ad.u.net = &net;
4176                 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
4177                 ad.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
4178                 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
4179                 if (err)
4180                         goto out;
4181         }
4182
4183         err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
4184
4185 out:
4186         return err;
4187 }
4188
4189 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
4190 {
4191         return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
4192 }
4193
4194 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
4195 {
4196         int err;
4197         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4198         struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
4199
4200         err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
4201         if (err)
4202                 return err;
4203
4204         newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
4205
4206         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4207         newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4208         newisec->sid = isec->sid;
4209         newisec->initialized = 1;
4210
4211         return 0;
4212 }
4213
4214 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4215                                   int size)
4216 {
4217         return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
4218 }
4219
4220 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4221                                   int size, int flags)
4222 {
4223         return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
4224 }
4225
4226 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4227 {
4228         return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4229 }
4230
4231 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4232 {
4233         return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4234 }
4235
4236 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4237 {
4238         int err;
4239
4240         err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4241         if (err)
4242                 return err;
4243
4244         return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4245 }
4246
4247 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4248                                      int optname)
4249 {
4250         return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4251 }
4252
4253 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4254 {
4255         return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4256 }
4257
4258 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4259                                               struct sock *other,
4260                                               struct sock *newsk)
4261 {
4262         struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4263         struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4264         struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4265         struct common_audit_data ad;
4266         struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4267         int err;
4268
4269         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4270         ad.u.net = &net;
4271         ad.u.net->sk = other;
4272
4273         err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4274                            sksec_other->sclass,
4275                            UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4276         if (err)
4277                 return err;
4278
4279         /* server child socket */
4280         sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4281         err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid,
4282                                     &sksec_new->sid);
4283         if (err)
4284                 return err;
4285
4286         /* connecting socket */
4287         sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4288
4289         return 0;
4290 }
4291
4292 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4293                                         struct socket *other)
4294 {
4295         struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4296         struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4297         struct common_audit_data ad;
4298         struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4299
4300         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4301         ad.u.net = &net;
4302         ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
4303
4304         return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
4305                             &ad);
4306 }
4307
4308 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
4309                                     char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid,
4310                                     struct common_audit_data *ad)
4311 {
4312         int err;
4313         u32 if_sid;
4314         u32 node_sid;
4315
4316         err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
4317         if (err)
4318                 return err;
4319         err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4320                            SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4321         if (err)
4322                 return err;
4323
4324         err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4325         if (err)
4326                 return err;
4327         return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4328                             SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4329 }
4330
4331 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4332                                        u16 family)
4333 {
4334         int err = 0;
4335         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4336         u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4337         struct common_audit_data ad;
4338         struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4339         char *addrp;
4340
4341         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4342         ad.u.net = &net;
4343         ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4344         ad.u.net->family = family;
4345         err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4346         if (err)
4347                 return err;
4348
4349         if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4350                 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4351                                    PACKET__RECV, &ad);
4352                 if (err)
4353                         return err;
4354         }
4355
4356         err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4357         if (err)
4358                 return err;
4359         err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4360
4361         return err;
4362 }
4363
4364 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4365 {
4366         int err;
4367         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4368         u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4369         u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4370         struct common_audit_data ad;
4371         struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4372         char *addrp;
4373         u8 secmark_active;
4374         u8 peerlbl_active;
4375
4376         if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4377                 return 0;
4378
4379         /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4380         if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4381                 family = PF_INET;
4382
4383         /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4384          * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4385          * special handling.  We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4386          * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4387         if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4388                 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4389
4390         secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4391         peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4392         if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4393                 return 0;
4394
4395         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4396         ad.u.net = &net;
4397         ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4398         ad.u.net->family = family;
4399         err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4400         if (err)
4401                 return err;
4402
4403         if (peerlbl_active) {
4404                 u32 peer_sid;
4405
4406                 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4407                 if (err)
4408                         return err;
4409                 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif,
4410                                                addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
4411                 if (err) {
4412                         selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4413                         return err;
4414                 }
4415                 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4416                                    PEER__RECV, &ad);
4417                 if (err) {
4418                         selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4419                         return err;
4420                 }
4421         }
4422
4423         if (secmark_active) {
4424                 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4425                                    PACKET__RECV, &ad);
4426                 if (err)
4427                         return err;
4428         }
4429
4430         return err;
4431 }
4432
4433 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4434                                             int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4435 {
4436         int err = 0;
4437         char *scontext;
4438         u32 scontext_len;
4439         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4440         u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4441
4442         if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4443             sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
4444                 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4445         if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
4446                 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
4447
4448         err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4449         if (err)
4450                 return err;
4451
4452         if (scontext_len > len) {
4453                 err = -ERANGE;
4454                 goto out_len;
4455         }
4456
4457         if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4458                 err = -EFAULT;
4459
4460 out_len:
4461         if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4462                 err = -EFAULT;
4463         kfree(scontext);
4464         return err;
4465 }
4466
4467 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4468 {
4469         u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4470         u16 family;
4471
4472         if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4473                 family = PF_INET;
4474         else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4475                 family = PF_INET6;
4476         else if (sock)
4477                 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4478         else
4479                 goto out;
4480
4481         if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4482                 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4483         else if (skb)
4484                 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4485
4486 out:
4487         *secid = peer_secid;
4488         if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4489                 return -EINVAL;
4490         return 0;
4491 }
4492
4493 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4494 {
4495         struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4496
4497         sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
4498         if (!sksec)
4499                 return -ENOMEM;
4500
4501         sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4502         sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4503         selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
4504         sk->sk_security = sksec;
4505
4506         return 0;
4507 }
4508
4509 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4510 {
4511         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4512
4513         sk->sk_security = NULL;
4514         selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
4515         kfree(sksec);
4516 }
4517
4518 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4519 {
4520         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4521         struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4522
4523         newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
4524         newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4525         newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
4526
4527         selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
4528 }
4529
4530 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4531 {
4532         if (!sk)
4533                 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4534         else {
4535                 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4536
4537                 *secid = sksec->sid;
4538         }
4539 }
4540
4541 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4542 {
4543         struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4544         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4545
4546         if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4547             sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4548                 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4549         sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4550 }
4551
4552 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4553                                      struct request_sock *req)
4554 {
4555         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4556         int err;
4557         u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
4558         u32 connsid;
4559         u32 peersid;
4560
4561         err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4562         if (err)
4563                 return err;
4564         err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
4565         if (err)
4566                 return err;
4567         req->secid = connsid;
4568         req->peer_secid = peersid;
4569
4570         return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
4571 }
4572
4573 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4574                                    const struct request_sock *req)
4575 {
4576         struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4577
4578         newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4579         newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4580         /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4581            new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4582            So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4583            time it will have been created and available. */
4584
4585         /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4586          * thread with access to newsksec */
4587         selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
4588 }
4589
4590 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4591 {
4592         u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4593         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4594
4595         /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4596         if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4597                 family = PF_INET;
4598
4599         selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4600 }
4601
4602 static void selinux_skb_owned_by(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
4603 {
4604         skb_set_owner_w(skb, sk);
4605 }
4606
4607 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
4608 {
4609         const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
4610         u32 tsid;
4611
4612         __tsec = current_security();
4613         tsid = __tsec->sid;
4614
4615         return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4616 }
4617
4618 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
4619 {
4620         atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4621 }
4622
4623 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
4624 {
4625         atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4626 }
4627
4628 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4629                                       struct flowi *fl)
4630 {
4631         fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
4632 }
4633
4634 static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
4635 {
4636         struct tun_security_struct *tunsec;
4637
4638         tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL);
4639         if (!tunsec)
4640                 return -ENOMEM;
4641         tunsec->sid = current_sid();
4642
4643         *security = tunsec;
4644         return 0;
4645 }
4646
4647 static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
4648 {
4649         kfree(security);
4650 }
4651
4652 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4653 {
4654         u32 sid = current_sid();
4655
4656         /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4657          * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4658          * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4659          * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4660          * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4661          * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4662
4663         return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
4664                             NULL);
4665 }
4666
4667 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
4668 {
4669         struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4670
4671         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4672                             TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
4673 }
4674
4675 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
4676 {
4677         struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4678         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4679
4680         /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4681          * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4682          * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4683          * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4684          * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4685          * protocols were being used */
4686
4687         sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
4688         sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
4689
4690         return 0;
4691 }
4692
4693 static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
4694 {
4695         struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4696         u32 sid = current_sid();
4697         int err;
4698
4699         err = avc_has_perm(sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4700                            TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
4701         if (err)
4702                 return err;
4703         err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4704                            TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4705         if (err)
4706                 return err;
4707         tunsec->sid = sid;
4708
4709         return 0;
4710 }
4711
4712 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4713 {
4714         int err = 0;
4715         u32 perm;
4716         struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4717         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4718
4719         if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN) {
4720                 err = -EINVAL;
4721                 goto out;
4722         }
4723         nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4724
4725         err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4726         if (err) {
4727                 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4728                         printk(KERN_WARNING
4729                                "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message:"
4730                                " protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%hu\n",
4731                                sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass);
4732                         if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4733                                 err = 0;
4734                 }
4735
4736                 /* Ignore */
4737                 if (err == -ENOENT)
4738                         err = 0;
4739                 goto out;
4740         }
4741
4742         err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm);
4743 out:
4744         return err;
4745 }
4746
4747 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4748
4749 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb,
4750                                        const struct net_device *indev,
4751                                        u16 family)
4752 {
4753         int err;
4754         char *addrp;
4755         u32 peer_sid;
4756         struct common_audit_data ad;
4757         struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4758         u8 secmark_active;
4759         u8 netlbl_active;
4760         u8 peerlbl_active;
4761
4762         if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4763                 return NF_ACCEPT;
4764
4765         secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4766         netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4767         peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4768         if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4769                 return NF_ACCEPT;
4770
4771         if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4772                 return NF_DROP;
4773
4774         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4775         ad.u.net = &net;
4776         ad.u.net->netif = indev->ifindex;
4777         ad.u.net->family = family;
4778         if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4779                 return NF_DROP;
4780
4781         if (peerlbl_active) {
4782                 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev), indev->ifindex,
4783                                                addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
4784                 if (err) {
4785                         selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4786                         return NF_DROP;
4787                 }
4788         }
4789
4790         if (secmark_active)
4791                 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4792                                  SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4793                         return NF_DROP;
4794
4795         if (netlbl_active)
4796                 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4797                  * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4798                  * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4799                  * protection */
4800                 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4801                         return NF_DROP;
4802
4803         return NF_ACCEPT;
4804 }
4805
4806 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
4807                                          struct sk_buff *skb,
4808                                          const struct net_device *in,
4809                                          const struct net_device *out,
4810                                          int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4811 {
4812         return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in, PF_INET);
4813 }
4814
4815 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4816 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
4817                                          struct sk_buff *skb,
4818                                          const struct net_device *in,
4819                                          const struct net_device *out,
4820                                          int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4821 {
4822         return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in, PF_INET6);
4823 }
4824 #endif  /* IPV6 */
4825
4826 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4827                                       u16 family)
4828 {
4829         struct sock *sk;
4830         u32 sid;
4831
4832         if (!netlbl_enabled())
4833                 return NF_ACCEPT;
4834
4835         /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4836          * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4837          * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4838         sk = skb->sk;
4839         if (sk) {
4840                 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4841
4842                 if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)
4843                         /* if the socket is the listening state then this
4844                          * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
4845                          * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
4846                          * not the parent socket.  unfortunately, we can't
4847                          * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
4848                          * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
4849                          * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
4850                          * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
4851                          * from the initial connection request (in the IP
4852                          * layer).  it is far from ideal, but until we get a
4853                          * security label in the packet itself this is the
4854                          * best we can do. */
4855                         return NF_ACCEPT;
4856
4857                 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
4858                 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4859                 sid = sksec->sid;
4860         } else
4861                 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4862         if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4863                 return NF_DROP;
4864
4865         return NF_ACCEPT;
4866 }
4867
4868 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
4869                                         struct sk_buff *skb,
4870                                         const struct net_device *in,
4871                                         const struct net_device *out,
4872                                         int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4873 {
4874         return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4875 }
4876
4877 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4878                                                 int ifindex,
4879                                                 u16 family)
4880 {
4881         struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4882         struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4883         struct common_audit_data ad;
4884         struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4885         char *addrp;
4886         u8 proto;
4887
4888         if (sk == NULL)
4889                 return NF_ACCEPT;
4890         sksec = sk->sk_security;
4891
4892         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4893         ad.u.net = &net;
4894         ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
4895         ad.u.net->family = family;
4896         if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4897                 return NF_DROP;
4898
4899         if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4900                 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4901                                  SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4902                         return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4903
4904         if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4905                 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4906
4907         return NF_ACCEPT;
4908 }
4909
4910 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
4911                                          const struct net_device *outdev,
4912                                          u16 family)
4913 {
4914         u32 secmark_perm;
4915         u32 peer_sid;
4916         int ifindex = outdev->ifindex;
4917         struct sock *sk;
4918         struct common_audit_data ad;
4919         struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4920         char *addrp;
4921         u8 secmark_active;
4922         u8 peerlbl_active;
4923
4924         /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4925          * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4926          * special handling.  We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4927          * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4928         if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4929                 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4930
4931         secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4932         peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4933         if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4934                 return NF_ACCEPT;
4935
4936         sk = skb->sk;
4937
4938 #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
4939         /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4940          * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4941          * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4942          * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4943          * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4944          *       is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
4945          * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
4946          *       TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
4947          *       is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
4948          *       unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
4949          *       connection. */
4950         if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
4951             !(sk != NULL && sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN))
4952                 return NF_ACCEPT;
4953 #endif
4954
4955         if (sk == NULL) {
4956                 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
4957                  * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
4958                  * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
4959                  * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
4960                 if (skb->skb_iif) {
4961                         secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4962                         if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4963                                 return NF_DROP;
4964                 } else {
4965                         secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4966                         peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4967                 }
4968         } else if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) {
4969                 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
4970                  * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet.  In
4971                  * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
4972                  * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
4973                  * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
4974                  * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
4975                  * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
4976                  * selinux_inet_conn_request().  See also selinux_ip_output()
4977                  * for similar problems. */
4978                 u32 skb_sid;
4979                 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4980                 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
4981                         return NF_DROP;
4982                 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
4983                  * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
4984                  * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
4985                  * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
4986                  * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
4987                  * pass the packet. */
4988                 if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4989                         switch (family) {
4990                         case PF_INET:
4991                                 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
4992                                         return NF_ACCEPT;
4993                                 break;
4994                         case PF_INET6:
4995                                 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
4996                                         return NF_ACCEPT;
4997                                 break;
4998                         default:
4999                                 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5000                         }
5001                 }
5002                 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
5003                         return NF_DROP;
5004                 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5005         } else {
5006                 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
5007                  * associated socket. */
5008                 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5009                 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
5010                 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5011         }
5012
5013         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5014         ad.u.net = &net;
5015         ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5016         ad.u.net->family = family;
5017         if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
5018                 return NF_DROP;
5019
5020         if (secmark_active)
5021                 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5022                                  SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
5023                         return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5024
5025         if (peerlbl_active) {
5026                 u32 if_sid;
5027                 u32 node_sid;
5028
5029                 if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev), ifindex, &if_sid))
5030                         return NF_DROP;
5031                 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
5032                                  SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
5033                         return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5034
5035                 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
5036                         return NF_DROP;
5037                 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
5038                                  SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
5039                         return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5040         }
5041
5042         return NF_ACCEPT;
5043 }
5044
5045 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
5046                                            struct sk_buff *skb,
5047                                            const struct net_device *in,
5048                                            const struct net_device *out,
5049                                            int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
5050 {
5051         return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out, PF_INET);
5052 }
5053
5054 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5055 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
5056                                            struct sk_buff *skb,
5057                                            const struct net_device *in,
5058                                            const struct net_device *out,
5059                                            int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
5060 {
5061         return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out, PF_INET6);
5062 }
5063 #endif  /* IPV6 */
5064
5065 #endif  /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5066
5067 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5068 {
5069         int err;
5070
5071         err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
5072         if (err)
5073                 return err;
5074
5075         return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
5076 }
5077
5078 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
5079                               struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
5080                               u16 sclass)
5081 {
5082         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5083         u32 sid;
5084
5085         isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5086         if (!isec)
5087                 return -ENOMEM;
5088
5089         sid = task_sid(task);
5090         isec->sclass = sclass;
5091         isec->sid = sid;
5092         perm->security = isec;
5093
5094         return 0;
5095 }
5096
5097 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
5098 {
5099         struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
5100         perm->security = NULL;
5101         kfree(isec);
5102 }
5103
5104 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5105 {
5106         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5107
5108         msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5109         if (!msec)
5110                 return -ENOMEM;
5111
5112         msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5113         msg->security = msec;
5114
5115         return 0;
5116 }
5117
5118 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5119 {
5120         struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
5121
5122         msg->security = NULL;
5123         kfree(msec);
5124 }
5125
5126 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
5127                         u32 perms)
5128 {
5129         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5130         struct common_audit_data ad;
5131         u32 sid = current_sid();
5132
5133         isec = ipc_perms->security;
5134
5135         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5136         ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
5137
5138         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
5139 }
5140
5141 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5142 {
5143         return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
5144 }
5145
5146 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5147 {
5148         msg_msg_free_security(msg);
5149 }
5150
5151 /* message queue security operations */
5152 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
5153 {
5154         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5155         struct common_audit_data ad;
5156         u32 sid = current_sid();
5157         int rc;
5158
5159         rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
5160         if (rc)
5161                 return rc;
5162
5163         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5164
5165         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5166         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5167
5168         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5169                           MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
5170         if (rc) {
5171                 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
5172                 return rc;
5173         }
5174         return 0;
5175 }
5176
5177 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
5178 {
5179         ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
5180 }
5181
5182 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
5183 {
5184         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5185         struct common_audit_data ad;
5186         u32 sid = current_sid();
5187
5188         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5189
5190         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5191         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5192
5193         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5194                             MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5195 }
5196
5197 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
5198 {
5199         int err;
5200         int perms;
5201
5202         switch (cmd) {
5203         case IPC_INFO:
5204         case MSG_INFO:
5205                 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5206                 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5207         case IPC_STAT:
5208         case MSG_STAT:
5209                 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
5210                 break;
5211         case IPC_SET:
5212                 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
5213                 break;
5214         case IPC_RMID:
5215                 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
5216                 break;
5217         default:
5218                 return 0;
5219         }
5220
5221         err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
5222         return err;
5223 }
5224
5225 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
5226 {
5227         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5228         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5229         struct common_audit_data ad;
5230         u32 sid = current_sid();
5231         int rc;
5232
5233         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5234         msec = msg->security;
5235
5236         /*
5237          * First time through, need to assign label to the message
5238          */
5239         if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
5240                 /*
5241                  * Compute new sid based on current process and
5242                  * message queue this message will be stored in
5243                  */
5244                 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5245                                              NULL, &msec->sid);
5246                 if (rc)
5247                         return rc;
5248         }
5249
5250         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5251         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5252
5253         /* Can this process write to the queue? */
5254         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5255                           MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
5256         if (!rc)
5257                 /* Can this process send the message */
5258                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5259                                   MSG__SEND, &ad);
5260         if (!rc)
5261                 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
5262                 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5263                                   MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
5264
5265         return rc;
5266 }
5267
5268 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
5269                                     struct task_struct *target,
5270                                     long type, int mode)
5271 {
5272         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5273         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5274         struct common_audit_data ad;
5275         u32 sid = task_sid(target);
5276         int rc;
5277
5278         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5279         msec = msg->security;
5280
5281         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5282         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5283
5284         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
5285                           SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
5286         if (!rc)
5287                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
5288                                   SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
5289         return rc;
5290 }
5291
5292 /* Shared Memory security operations */
5293 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5294 {
5295         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5296         struct common_audit_data ad;
5297         u32 sid = current_sid();
5298         int rc;
5299
5300         rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
5301         if (rc)
5302                 return rc;
5303
5304         isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5305
5306         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5307         ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5308
5309         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5310                           SHM__CREATE, &ad);
5311         if (rc) {
5312                 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5313                 return rc;
5314         }
5315         return 0;
5316 }
5317
5318 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5319 {
5320         ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5321 }
5322
5323 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5324 {
5325         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5326         struct common_audit_data ad;
5327         u32 sid = current_sid();
5328
5329         isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5330
5331         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5332         ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5333
5334         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5335                             SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5336 }
5337
5338 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5339 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5340 {
5341         int perms;
5342         int err;
5343
5344         switch (cmd) {
5345         case IPC_INFO:
5346         case SHM_INFO:
5347                 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5348                 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5349         case IPC_STAT:
5350         case SHM_STAT:
5351                 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5352                 break;
5353         case IPC_SET:
5354                 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5355                 break;
5356         case SHM_LOCK:
5357         case SHM_UNLOCK:
5358                 perms = SHM__LOCK;
5359                 break;
5360         case IPC_RMID:
5361                 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5362                 break;
5363         default:
5364                 return 0;
5365         }
5366
5367         err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5368         return err;
5369 }
5370
5371 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5372                              char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5373 {
5374         u32 perms;
5375
5376         if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5377                 perms = SHM__READ;
5378         else
5379                 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5380
5381         return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5382 }
5383
5384 /* Semaphore security operations */
5385 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5386 {
5387         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5388         struct common_audit_data ad;
5389         u32 sid = current_sid();
5390         int rc;
5391
5392         rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5393         if (rc)
5394                 return rc;
5395
5396         isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5397
5398         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5399         ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5400
5401         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5402                           SEM__CREATE, &ad);
5403         if (rc) {
5404                 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5405                 return rc;
5406         }
5407         return 0;
5408 }
5409
5410 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5411 {
5412         ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5413 }
5414
5415 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5416 {
5417         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5418         struct common_audit_data ad;
5419         u32 sid = current_sid();
5420
5421         isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5422
5423         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5424         ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5425
5426         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5427                             SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5428 }
5429
5430 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5431 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5432 {
5433         int err;
5434         u32 perms;
5435
5436         switch (cmd) {
5437         case IPC_INFO:
5438         case SEM_INFO:
5439                 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5440                 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5441         case GETPID:
5442         case GETNCNT:
5443         case GETZCNT:
5444                 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5445                 break;
5446         case GETVAL:
5447         case GETALL:
5448                 perms = SEM__READ;
5449                 break;
5450         case SETVAL:
5451         case SETALL:
5452                 perms = SEM__WRITE;
5453                 break;
5454         case IPC_RMID:
5455                 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5456                 break;
5457         case IPC_SET:
5458                 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5459                 break;
5460         case IPC_STAT:
5461         case SEM_STAT:
5462                 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5463                 break;
5464         default:
5465                 return 0;
5466         }
5467
5468         err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5469         return err;
5470 }
5471
5472 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5473                              struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5474 {
5475         u32 perms;
5476
5477         if (alter)
5478                 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5479         else
5480                 perms = SEM__READ;
5481
5482         return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5483 }
5484
5485 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5486 {
5487         u32 av = 0;
5488
5489         av = 0;
5490         if (flag & S_IRUGO)
5491                 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5492         if (flag & S_IWUGO)
5493                 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5494
5495         if (av == 0)
5496                 return 0;
5497
5498         return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5499 }
5500
5501 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5502 {
5503         struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5504         *secid = isec->sid;
5505 }
5506
5507 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5508 {
5509         if (inode)
5510                 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5511 }
5512
5513 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5514                                char *name, char **value)
5515 {
5516         const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5517         u32 sid;
5518         int error;
5519         unsigned len;
5520
5521         if (current != p) {
5522                 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5523                 if (error)
5524                         return error;
5525         }
5526
5527         rcu_read_lock();
5528         __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5529
5530         if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5531                 sid = __tsec->sid;
5532         else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5533                 sid = __tsec->osid;
5534         else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5535                 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5536         else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5537                 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5538         else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5539                 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5540         else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5541                 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5542         else
5543                 goto invalid;
5544         rcu_read_unlock();
5545
5546         if (!sid)
5547                 return 0;
5548
5549         error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5550         if (error)
5551                 return error;
5552         return len;
5553
5554 invalid:
5555         rcu_read_unlock();
5556         return -EINVAL;
5557 }
5558
5559 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5560                                char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5561 {
5562         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5563         struct task_struct *tracer;
5564         struct cred *new;
5565         u32 sid = 0, ptsid;
5566         int error;
5567         char *str = value;
5568
5569         if (current != p) {
5570                 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5571                    security attributes. */
5572                 return -EACCES;
5573         }
5574
5575         /*
5576          * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5577          * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5578          * above restriction is ever removed.
5579          */
5580         if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5581                 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5582         else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5583                 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5584         else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5585                 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5586         else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5587                 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5588         else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5589                 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5590         else
5591                 error = -EINVAL;
5592         if (error)
5593                 return error;
5594
5595         /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5596         if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5597                 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5598                         str[size-1] = 0;
5599                         size--;
5600                 }
5601                 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
5602                 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5603                         if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
5604                                 struct audit_buffer *ab;
5605                                 size_t audit_size;
5606
5607                                 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
5608                                  * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
5609                                 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
5610                                         audit_size = size - 1;
5611                                 else
5612                                         audit_size = size;
5613                                 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
5614                                 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
5615                                 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
5616                                 audit_log_end(ab);
5617
5618                                 return error;
5619                         }
5620                         error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5621                                                               &sid);
5622                 }
5623                 if (error)
5624                         return error;
5625         }
5626
5627         new = prepare_creds();
5628         if (!new)
5629                 return -ENOMEM;
5630
5631         /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5632            performed during the actual operation (execve,
5633            open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5634            operation.  See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5635            checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5636            operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5637         tsec = new->security;
5638         if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5639                 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5640         } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5641                 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5642         } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5643                 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5644                 if (error)
5645                         goto abort_change;
5646                 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5647         } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5648                 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5649         } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5650                 error = -EINVAL;
5651                 if (sid == 0)
5652                         goto abort_change;
5653
5654                 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5655                 error = -EPERM;
5656                 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5657                         error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5658                         if (error)
5659                                 goto abort_change;
5660                 }
5661
5662                 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5663                 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5664                                      PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5665                 if (error)
5666                         goto abort_change;
5667
5668                 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5669                    Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5670                 ptsid = 0;
5671                 rcu_read_lock();
5672                 tracer = ptrace_parent(p);
5673                 if (tracer)
5674                         ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5675                 rcu_read_unlock();
5676
5677                 if (tracer) {
5678                         error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5679                                              PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5680                         if (error)
5681                                 goto abort_change;
5682                 }
5683
5684                 tsec->sid = sid;
5685         } else {
5686                 error = -EINVAL;
5687                 goto abort_change;
5688         }
5689
5690         commit_creds(new);
5691         return size;
5692
5693 abort_change:
5694         abort_creds(new);
5695         return error;
5696 }
5697
5698 static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
5699 {
5700         return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
5701 }
5702
5703 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5704 {
5705         return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5706 }
5707
5708 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5709 {
5710         return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid, GFP_KERNEL);
5711 }
5712
5713 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5714 {
5715         kfree(secdata);
5716 }
5717
5718 /*
5719  *      called with inode->i_mutex locked
5720  */
5721 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5722 {
5723         return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5724 }
5725
5726 /*
5727  *      called with inode->i_mutex locked
5728  */
5729 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5730 {
5731         return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5732 }
5733
5734 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
5735 {
5736         int len = 0;
5737         len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
5738                                                 ctx, true);
5739         if (len < 0)
5740                 return len;
5741         *ctxlen = len;
5742         return 0;
5743 }
5744 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
5745
5746 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5747                              unsigned long flags)
5748 {
5749         const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5750         struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5751
5752         ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5753         if (!ksec)
5754                 return -ENOMEM;
5755
5756         tsec = cred->security;
5757         if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5758                 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5759         else
5760                 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5761
5762         k->security = ksec;
5763         return 0;
5764 }
5765
5766 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5767 {
5768         struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5769
5770         k->security = NULL;
5771         kfree(ksec);
5772 }
5773
5774 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5775                                   const struct cred *cred,
5776                                   unsigned perm)
5777 {
5778         struct key *key;
5779         struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5780         u32 sid;
5781
5782         /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5783            permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5784            appear to be created. */
5785         if (perm == 0)
5786                 return 0;
5787
5788         sid = cred_sid(cred);
5789
5790         key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5791         ksec = key->security;
5792
5793         return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5794 }
5795
5796 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5797 {
5798         struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5799         char *context = NULL;
5800         unsigned len;
5801         int rc;
5802
5803         rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5804         if (!rc)
5805                 rc = len;
5806         *_buffer = context;
5807         return rc;
5808 }
5809
5810 #endif
5811
5812 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5813         .name =                         "selinux",
5814
5815         .ptrace_access_check =          selinux_ptrace_access_check,
5816         .ptrace_traceme =               selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5817         .capget =                       selinux_capget,
5818         .capset =                       selinux_capset,
5819         .capable =                      selinux_capable,
5820         .quotactl =                     selinux_quotactl,
5821         .quota_on =                     selinux_quota_on,
5822         .syslog =                       selinux_syslog,
5823         .vm_enough_memory =             selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5824
5825         .netlink_send =                 selinux_netlink_send,
5826
5827         .bprm_set_creds =               selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5828         .bprm_committing_creds =        selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5829         .bprm_committed_creds =         selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5830         .bprm_secureexec =              selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5831
5832         .sb_alloc_security =            selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5833         .sb_free_security =             selinux_sb_free_security,
5834         .sb_copy_data =                 selinux_sb_copy_data,
5835         .sb_remount =                   selinux_sb_remount,
5836         .sb_kern_mount =                selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5837         .sb_show_options =              selinux_sb_show_options,
5838         .sb_statfs =                    selinux_sb_statfs,
5839         .sb_mount =                     selinux_mount,
5840         .sb_umount =                    selinux_umount,
5841         .sb_set_mnt_opts =              selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5842         .sb_clone_mnt_opts =            selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5843         .sb_parse_opts_str =            selinux_parse_opts_str,
5844
5845         .dentry_init_security =         selinux_dentry_init_security,
5846
5847         .inode_alloc_security =         selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5848         .inode_free_security =          selinux_inode_free_security,
5849         .inode_init_security =          selinux_inode_init_security,
5850         .inode_create =                 selinux_inode_create,
5851         .inode_link =                   selinux_inode_link,
5852         .inode_unlink =                 selinux_inode_unlink,
5853         .inode_symlink =                selinux_inode_symlink,
5854         .inode_mkdir =                  selinux_inode_mkdir,
5855         .inode_rmdir =                  selinux_inode_rmdir,
5856         .inode_mknod =                  selinux_inode_mknod,
5857         .inode_rename =                 selinux_inode_rename,
5858         .inode_readlink =               selinux_inode_readlink,
5859         .inode_follow_link =            selinux_inode_follow_link,
5860         .inode_permission =             selinux_inode_permission,
5861         .inode_setattr =                selinux_inode_setattr,
5862         .inode_getattr =                selinux_inode_getattr,
5863         .inode_setxattr =               selinux_inode_setxattr,
5864         .inode_post_setxattr =          selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5865         .inode_getxattr =               selinux_inode_getxattr,
5866         .inode_listxattr =              selinux_inode_listxattr,
5867         .inode_removexattr =            selinux_inode_removexattr,
5868         .inode_getsecurity =            selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5869         .inode_setsecurity =            selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5870         .inode_listsecurity =           selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5871         .inode_getsecid =               selinux_inode_getsecid,
5872
5873         .file_permission =              selinux_file_permission,
5874         .file_alloc_security =          selinux_file_alloc_security,
5875         .file_free_security =           selinux_file_free_security,
5876         .file_ioctl =                   selinux_file_ioctl,
5877         .mmap_file =                    selinux_mmap_file,
5878         .mmap_addr =                    selinux_mmap_addr,
5879         .file_mprotect =                selinux_file_mprotect,
5880         .file_lock =                    selinux_file_lock,
5881         .file_fcntl =                   selinux_file_fcntl,
5882         .file_set_fowner =              selinux_file_set_fowner,
5883         .file_send_sigiotask =          selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5884         .file_receive =                 selinux_file_receive,
5885
5886         .file_open =                    selinux_file_open,
5887
5888         .task_create =                  selinux_task_create,
5889         .cred_alloc_blank =             selinux_cred_alloc_blank,
5890         .cred_free =                    selinux_cred_free,
5891         .cred_prepare =                 selinux_cred_prepare,
5892         .cred_transfer =                selinux_cred_transfer,
5893         .kernel_act_as =                selinux_kernel_act_as,
5894         .kernel_create_files_as =       selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5895         .kernel_module_request =        selinux_kernel_module_request,
5896         .task_setpgid =                 selinux_task_setpgid,
5897         .task_getpgid =                 selinux_task_getpgid,
5898         .task_getsid =                  selinux_task_getsid,
5899         .task_getsecid =                selinux_task_getsecid,
5900         .task_setnice =                 selinux_task_setnice,
5901         .task_setioprio =               selinux_task_setioprio,
5902         .task_getioprio =               selinux_task_getioprio,
5903         .task_setrlimit =               selinux_task_setrlimit,
5904         .task_setscheduler =            selinux_task_setscheduler,
5905         .task_getscheduler =            selinux_task_getscheduler,
5906         .task_movememory =              selinux_task_movememory,
5907         .task_kill =                    selinux_task_kill,
5908         .task_wait =                    selinux_task_wait,
5909         .task_to_inode =                selinux_task_to_inode,
5910
5911         .ipc_permission =               selinux_ipc_permission,
5912         .ipc_getsecid =                 selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5913
5914         .msg_msg_alloc_security =       selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5915         .msg_msg_free_security =        selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5916
5917         .msg_queue_alloc_security =     selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5918         .msg_queue_free_security =      selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5919         .msg_queue_associate =          selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5920         .msg_queue_msgctl =             selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5921         .msg_queue_msgsnd =             selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5922         .msg_queue_msgrcv =             selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5923
5924         .shm_alloc_security =           selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5925         .shm_free_security =            selinux_shm_free_security,
5926         .shm_associate =                selinux_shm_associate,
5927         .shm_shmctl =                   selinux_shm_shmctl,
5928         .shm_shmat =                    selinux_shm_shmat,
5929
5930         .sem_alloc_security =           selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5931         .sem_free_security =            selinux_sem_free_security,
5932         .sem_associate =                selinux_sem_associate,
5933         .sem_semctl =                   selinux_sem_semctl,
5934         .sem_semop =                    selinux_sem_semop,
5935
5936         .d_instantiate =                selinux_d_instantiate,
5937
5938         .getprocattr =                  selinux_getprocattr,
5939         .setprocattr =                  selinux_setprocattr,
5940
5941         .ismaclabel =                   selinux_ismaclabel,
5942         .secid_to_secctx =              selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5943         .secctx_to_secid =              selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5944         .release_secctx =               selinux_release_secctx,
5945         .inode_notifysecctx =           selinux_inode_notifysecctx,
5946         .inode_setsecctx =              selinux_inode_setsecctx,
5947         .inode_getsecctx =              selinux_inode_getsecctx,
5948
5949         .unix_stream_connect =          selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5950         .unix_may_send =                selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5951
5952         .socket_create =                selinux_socket_create,
5953         .socket_post_create =           selinux_socket_post_create,
5954         .socket_bind =                  selinux_socket_bind,
5955         .socket_connect =               selinux_socket_connect,
5956         .socket_listen =                selinux_socket_listen,
5957         .socket_accept =                selinux_socket_accept,
5958         .socket_sendmsg =               selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5959         .socket_recvmsg =               selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5960         .socket_getsockname =           selinux_socket_getsockname,
5961         .socket_getpeername =           selinux_socket_getpeername,
5962         .socket_getsockopt =            selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5963         .socket_setsockopt =            selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5964         .socket_shutdown =              selinux_socket_shutdown,
5965         .socket_sock_rcv_skb =          selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5966         .socket_getpeersec_stream =     selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5967         .socket_getpeersec_dgram =      selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5968         .sk_alloc_security =            selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5969         .sk_free_security =             selinux_sk_free_security,
5970         .sk_clone_security =            selinux_sk_clone_security,
5971         .sk_getsecid =                  selinux_sk_getsecid,
5972         .sock_graft =                   selinux_sock_graft,
5973         .inet_conn_request =            selinux_inet_conn_request,
5974         .inet_csk_clone =               selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5975         .inet_conn_established =        selinux_inet_conn_established,
5976         .secmark_relabel_packet =       selinux_secmark_relabel_packet,
5977         .secmark_refcount_inc =         selinux_secmark_refcount_inc,
5978         .secmark_refcount_dec =         selinux_secmark_refcount_dec,
5979         .req_classify_flow =            selinux_req_classify_flow,
5980         .tun_dev_alloc_security =       selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security,
5981         .tun_dev_free_security =        selinux_tun_dev_free_security,
5982         .tun_dev_create =               selinux_tun_dev_create,
5983         .tun_dev_attach_queue =         selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue,
5984         .tun_dev_attach =               selinux_tun_dev_attach,
5985         .tun_dev_open =                 selinux_tun_dev_open,
5986         .skb_owned_by =                 selinux_skb_owned_by,
5987
5988 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5989         .xfrm_policy_alloc_security =   selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5990         .xfrm_policy_clone_security =   selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5991         .xfrm_policy_free_security =    selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5992         .xfrm_policy_delete_security =  selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5993         .xfrm_state_alloc =             selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5994         .xfrm_state_alloc_acquire =     selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
5995         .xfrm_state_free_security =     selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5996         .xfrm_state_delete_security =   selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5997         .xfrm_policy_lookup =           selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5998         .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match =    selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5999         .xfrm_decode_session =          selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
6000 #endif
6001
6002 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
6003         .key_alloc =                    selinux_key_alloc,
6004         .key_free =                     selinux_key_free,
6005         .key_permission =               selinux_key_permission,
6006         .key_getsecurity =              selinux_key_getsecurity,
6007 #endif
6008
6009 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
6010         .audit_rule_init =              selinux_audit_rule_init,
6011         .audit_rule_known =             selinux_audit_rule_known,
6012         .audit_rule_match =             selinux_audit_rule_match,
6013         .audit_rule_free =              selinux_audit_rule_free,
6014 #endif
6015 };
6016
6017 static __init int selinux_init(void)
6018 {
6019         if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
6020                 selinux_enabled = 0;
6021                 return 0;
6022         }
6023
6024         if (!selinux_enabled) {
6025                 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Disabled at boot.\n");
6026                 return 0;
6027         }
6028
6029         printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Initializing.\n");
6030
6031         /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
6032         cred_init_security();
6033
6034         default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
6035
6036         sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
6037                                             sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
6038                                             0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
6039         avc_init();
6040
6041         if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
6042                 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
6043
6044         if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
6045                 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
6046
6047         if (selinux_enforcing)
6048                 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Starting in enforcing mode\n");
6049         else
6050                 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Starting in permissive mode\n");
6051
6052         return 0;
6053 }
6054
6055 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
6056 {
6057         superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
6058 }
6059
6060 void selinux_complete_init(void)
6061 {
6062         printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Completing initialization.\n");
6063
6064         /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
6065         printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
6066         iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
6067 }
6068
6069 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
6070    all processes and objects when they are created. */
6071 security_initcall(selinux_init);
6072
6073 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
6074
6075 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
6076         {
6077                 .hook =         selinux_ipv4_postroute,
6078                 .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
6079                 .pf =           NFPROTO_IPV4,
6080                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
6081                 .priority =     NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
6082         },
6083         {
6084                 .hook =         selinux_ipv4_forward,
6085                 .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
6086                 .pf =           NFPROTO_IPV4,
6087                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_FORWARD,
6088                 .priority =     NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6089         },
6090         {
6091                 .hook =         selinux_ipv4_output,
6092                 .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
6093                 .pf =           NFPROTO_IPV4,
6094                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
6095                 .priority =     NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6096         },
6097 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
6098         {
6099                 .hook =         selinux_ipv6_postroute,
6100                 .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
6101                 .pf =           NFPROTO_IPV6,
6102                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
6103                 .priority =     NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
6104         },
6105         {
6106                 .hook =         selinux_ipv6_forward,
6107                 .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
6108                 .pf =           NFPROTO_IPV6,
6109                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_FORWARD,
6110                 .priority =     NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6111         },
6112 #endif  /* IPV6 */
6113 };
6114
6115 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
6116 {
6117         int err;
6118
6119         if (!selinux_enabled)
6120                 return 0;
6121
6122         printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Registering netfilter hooks\n");
6123
6124         err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
6125         if (err)
6126                 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks: error %d\n", err);
6127
6128         return 0;
6129 }
6130
6131 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
6132
6133 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6134 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
6135 {
6136         printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
6137
6138         nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
6139 }
6140 #endif
6141
6142 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6143
6144 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6145 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
6146 #endif
6147
6148 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6149
6150 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6151 static int selinux_disabled;
6152
6153 int selinux_disable(void)
6154 {
6155         if (ss_initialized) {
6156                 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
6157                 return -EINVAL;
6158         }
6159
6160         if (selinux_disabled) {
6161                 /* Only do this once. */
6162                 return -EINVAL;
6163         }
6164
6165         printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Disabled at runtime.\n");
6166
6167         selinux_disabled = 1;
6168         selinux_enabled = 0;
6169
6170         reset_security_ops();
6171
6172         /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
6173         avc_disable();
6174
6175         /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
6176         selinux_nf_ip_exit();
6177
6178         /* Unregister selinuxfs. */
6179         exit_sel_fs();
6180
6181         return 0;
6182 }
6183 #endif