seccomp: add "seccomp" syscall

This adds the new "seccomp" syscall with both an "operation" and "flags"
parameter for future expansion. The third argument is a pointer value,
used with the SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER operation. Currently, flags must
be 0. This is functionally equivalent to prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, ...).

In addition to the TSYNC flag later in this patch series, there is a
non-zero chance that this syscall could be used for configuring a fixed
argument area for seccomp-tracer-aware processes to pass syscall arguments
in the future. Hence, the use of "seccomp" not simply "seccomp_add_filter"
for this syscall. Additionally, this syscall uses operation, flags,
and user pointer for arguments because strictly passing arguments via
a user pointer would mean seccomp itself would be unable to trivially
filter the seccomp syscall itself.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>

diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
index 97ff872..0eae9df 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/Kconfig
@@ -321,6 +321,7 @@ config HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
          - secure_computing is called from a ptrace_event()-safe context
          - secure_computing return value is checked and a return value of -1
            results in the system call being skipped immediately.
+         - seccomp syscall wired up
 
 config SECCOMP_FILTER
        def_bool y

diff --git a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
index d6b8679..7527eac 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
+++ b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
@@ -360,3 +360,4 @@
 351    i386    sched_setattr           sys_sched_setattr
 352    i386    sched_getattr           sys_sched_getattr
 353    i386    renameat2               sys_renameat2
+354    i386    seccomp                 sys_seccomp

diff --git a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
index ec255a1..16272a6 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
+++ b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
@@ -323,6 +323,7 @@
 314    common  sched_setattr           sys_sched_setattr
 315    common  sched_getattr           sys_sched_getattr
 316    common  renameat2               sys_renameat2
+317    common  seccomp                 sys_seccomp
 
 #
 # x32-specific system call numbers start at 512 to avoid cache impact

diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
index b0881a0..1713977 100644 (file)
--- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
+++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
@@ -866,4 +866,6 @@ asmlinkage long sys_process_vm_writev(pid_t pid,
 asmlinkage long sys_kcmp(pid_t pid1, pid_t pid2, int type,
                         unsigned long idx1, unsigned long idx2);
 asmlinkage long sys_finit_module(int fd, const char __user *uargs, int flags);
+asmlinkage long sys_seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags,
+                           const char __user *uargs);
 #endif

diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
index 3336406..65acbf0 100644 (file)
--- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
+++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
@@ -699,9 +699,11 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_sched_setattr, sys_sched_setattr)
 __SYSCALL(__NR_sched_getattr, sys_sched_getattr)
 #define __NR_renameat2 276
 __SYSCALL(__NR_renameat2, sys_renameat2)
+#define __NR_seccomp 277
+__SYSCALL(__NR_seccomp, sys_seccomp)
 
 #undef __NR_syscalls
-#define __NR_syscalls 277
+#define __NR_syscalls 278
 
 /*
  * All syscalls below here should go away really,

diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
index ac2dc9f..b258878 100644 (file)
--- a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@
 #define SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT    1 /* uses hard-coded filter. */
 #define SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER    2 /* uses user-supplied filter. */
 
+/* Valid operations for seccomp syscall. */
+#define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT        0
+#define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER        1
+
 /*
  * All BPF programs must return a 32-bit value.
  * The bottom 16-bits are for optional return data.

diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index 05cac2c..f065257 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <linux/compat.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/seccomp.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
 
 /* #define SECCOMP_DEBUG 1 */
 
@@ -314,7 +315,7 @@ free_prog:
  *
  * Returns 0 on success and non-zero otherwise.
  */
-static long seccomp_attach_user_filter(char __user *user_filter)
+static long seccomp_attach_user_filter(const char __user *user_filter)
 {
        struct sock_fprog fprog;
        long ret = -EFAULT;
@@ -517,6 +518,7 @@ out:
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
 /**
  * seccomp_set_mode_filter: internal function for setting seccomp filter
+ * @flags:  flags to change filter behavior
  * @filter: struct sock_fprog containing filter
  *
  * This function may be called repeatedly to install additional filters.
@@ -527,11 +529,16 @@ out:
  *
  * Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure.
  */
-static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(char __user *filter)
+static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags,
+                                   const char __user *filter)
 {
        const unsigned long seccomp_mode = SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER;
        long ret = -EINVAL;
 
+       /* Validate flags. */
+       if (flags != 0)
+               goto out;
+
        if (!seccomp_may_assign_mode(seccomp_mode))
                goto out;
 
@@ -544,12 +551,35 @@ out:
        return ret;
 }
 #else
-static inline long seccomp_set_mode_filter(char __user *filter)
+static inline long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags,
+                                          const char __user *filter)
 {
        return -EINVAL;
 }
 #endif
 
+/* Common entry point for both prctl and syscall. */
+static long do_seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags,
+                      const char __user *uargs)
+{
+       switch (op) {
+       case SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT:
+               if (flags != 0 || uargs != NULL)
+                       return -EINVAL;
+               return seccomp_set_mode_strict();
+       case SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER:
+               return seccomp_set_mode_filter(flags, uargs);
+       default:
+               return -EINVAL;
+       }
+}
+
+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(seccomp, unsigned int, op, unsigned int, flags,
+                        const char __user *, uargs)
+{
+       return do_seccomp(op, flags, uargs);
+}
+
 /**
  * prctl_set_seccomp: configures current->seccomp.mode
  * @seccomp_mode: requested mode to use
@@ -559,12 +589,27 @@ static inline long seccomp_set_mode_filter(char __user *filter)
  */
 long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long seccomp_mode, char __user *filter)
 {
+       unsigned int op;
+       char __user *uargs;
+
        switch (seccomp_mode) {
        case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
-               return seccomp_set_mode_strict();
+               op = SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT;
+               /*
+                * Setting strict mode through prctl always ignored filter,
+                * so make sure it is always NULL here to pass the internal
+                * check in do_seccomp().
+                */
+               uargs = NULL;
+               break;
        case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER:
-               return seccomp_set_mode_filter(filter);
+               op = SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER;
+               uargs = filter;
+               break;
        default:
                return -EINVAL;
        }
+
+       /* prctl interface doesn't have flags, so they are always zero. */
+       return do_seccomp(op, 0, uargs);
 }

diff --git a/kernel/sys_ni.c b/kernel/sys_ni.c
index 36441b5..2904a21 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/sys_ni.c
+++ b/kernel/sys_ni.c
@@ -213,3 +213,6 @@ cond_syscall(compat_sys_open_by_handle_at);
 
 /* compare kernel pointers */
 cond_syscall(sys_kcmp);
+
+/* operate on Secure Computing state */
+cond_syscall(sys_seccomp);