LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions
authorKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Wed, 20 Apr 2016 22:46:28 +0000 (15:46 -0700)
committerJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Thu, 21 Apr 2016 00:47:27 +0000 (10:47 +1000)
This LSM enforces that kernel-loaded files (modules, firmware, etc)
must all come from the same filesystem, with the expectation that
such a filesystem is backed by a read-only device such as dm-verity
or CDROM. This allows systems that have a verified and/or unchangeable
filesystem to enforce module and firmware loading restrictions without
needing to sign the files individually.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Documentation/security/LoadPin.txt [new file with mode: 0644]
MAINTAINERS
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
security/Kconfig
security/Makefile
security/loadpin/Kconfig [new file with mode: 0644]
security/loadpin/Makefile [new file with mode: 0644]
security/loadpin/loadpin.c [new file with mode: 0644]
security/security.c

diff --git a/Documentation/security/LoadPin.txt b/Documentation/security/LoadPin.txt
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..e11877f
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+LoadPin is a Linux Security Module that ensures all kernel-loaded files
+(modules, firmware, etc) all originate from the same filesystem, with
+the expectation that such a filesystem is backed by a read-only device
+such as dm-verity or CDROM. This allows systems that have a verified
+and/or unchangeable filesystem to enforce module and firmware loading
+restrictions without needing to sign the files individually.
+
+The LSM is selectable at build-time with CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN, and
+can be controlled at boot-time with the kernel command line option
+"loadpin.enabled". By default, it is enabled, but can be disabled at
+boot ("loadpin.enabled=0").
+
+LoadPin starts pinning when it sees the first file loaded. If the
+block device backing the filesystem is not read-only, a sysctl is
+created to toggle pinning: /proc/sys/kernel/loadpin/enabled. (Having
+a mutable filesystem means pinning is mutable too, but having the
+sysctl allows for easy testing on systems with a mutable filesystem.)
index 1c32f8a..b4b1e81 100644 (file)
@@ -9962,6 +9962,12 @@ T:       git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/apparmor-dev.git
 S:     Supported
 F:     security/apparmor/
 
+LOADPIN SECURITY MODULE
+M:     Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
+T:     git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git lsm/loadpin
+S:     Supported
+F:     security/loadpin/
+
 YAMA SECURITY MODULE
 M:     Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
 T:     git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git yama/tip
index ae25378..6e466fc 100644 (file)
@@ -1892,5 +1892,10 @@ extern void __init yama_add_hooks(void);
 #else
 static inline void __init yama_add_hooks(void) { }
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN
+void __init loadpin_add_hooks(void);
+#else
+static inline void loadpin_add_hooks(void) { };
+#endif
 
 #endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */
index e452378..176758c 100644 (file)
@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ source security/selinux/Kconfig
 source security/smack/Kconfig
 source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
 source security/apparmor/Kconfig
+source security/loadpin/Kconfig
 source security/yama/Kconfig
 
 source security/integrity/Kconfig
index c9bfbc8..f2d71cd 100644 (file)
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)         += smack
 subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO)        += tomoyo
 subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR)     += apparmor
 subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA)         += yama
+subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN)      += loadpin
 
 # always enable default capabilities
 obj-y                                  += commoncap.o
@@ -22,6 +23,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT)                   += lsm_audit.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO)          += tomoyo/
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR)                += apparmor/
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA)            += yama/
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN)         += loadpin/
 obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE)            += device_cgroup.o
 
 # Object integrity file lists
diff --git a/security/loadpin/Kconfig b/security/loadpin/Kconfig
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..c668ac4
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+config SECURITY_LOADPIN
+       bool "Pin load of kernel files (modules, fw, etc) to one filesystem"
+       depends on SECURITY && BLOCK
+       help
+         Any files read through the kernel file reading interface
+         (kernel modules, firmware, kexec images, security policy) will
+         be pinned to the first filesystem used for loading. Any files
+         that come from other filesystems will be rejected. This is best
+         used on systems without an initrd that have a root filesystem
+         backed by a read-only device such as dm-verity or a CDROM.
diff --git a/security/loadpin/Makefile b/security/loadpin/Makefile
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..c2d77f8
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin.o
diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..e4debae
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+/*
+ * Module and Firmware Pinning Security Module
+ *
+ * Copyright 2011-2016 Google Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
+ *
+ * This software is licensed under the terms of the GNU General Public
+ * License version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation, and
+ * may be copied, distributed, and modified under those terms.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "LoadPin: " fmt
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/path.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>       /* current */
+#include <linux/string_helpers.h>
+
+static void report_load(const char *origin, struct file *file, char *operation)
+{
+       char *cmdline, *pathname;
+
+       pathname = kstrdup_quotable_file(file, GFP_KERNEL);
+       cmdline = kstrdup_quotable_cmdline(current, GFP_KERNEL);
+
+       pr_notice("%s %s obj=%s%s%s pid=%d cmdline=%s%s%s\n",
+                 origin, operation,
+                 (pathname && pathname[0] != '<') ? "\"" : "",
+                 pathname,
+                 (pathname && pathname[0] != '<') ? "\"" : "",
+                 task_pid_nr(current),
+                 cmdline ? "\"" : "", cmdline, cmdline ? "\"" : "");
+
+       kfree(cmdline);
+       kfree(pathname);
+}
+
+static int enabled = 1;
+static struct super_block *pinned_root;
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pinned_root_spinlock);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+static int zero;
+static int one = 1;
+
+static struct ctl_path loadpin_sysctl_path[] = {
+       { .procname = "kernel", },
+       { .procname = "loadpin", },
+       { }
+};
+
+static struct ctl_table loadpin_sysctl_table[] = {
+       {
+               .procname       = "enabled",
+               .data           = &enabled,
+               .maxlen         = sizeof(int),
+               .mode           = 0644,
+               .proc_handler   = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+               .extra1         = &zero,
+               .extra2         = &one,
+       },
+       { }
+};
+
+/*
+ * This must be called after early kernel init, since then the rootdev
+ * is available.
+ */
+static void check_pinning_enforcement(struct super_block *mnt_sb)
+{
+       bool ro = false;
+
+       /*
+        * If load pinning is not enforced via a read-only block
+        * device, allow sysctl to change modes for testing.
+        */
+       if (mnt_sb->s_bdev) {
+               ro = bdev_read_only(mnt_sb->s_bdev);
+               pr_info("dev(%u,%u): %s\n",
+                       MAJOR(mnt_sb->s_bdev->bd_dev),
+                       MINOR(mnt_sb->s_bdev->bd_dev),
+                       ro ? "read-only" : "writable");
+       } else
+               pr_info("mnt_sb lacks block device, treating as: writable\n");
+
+       if (!ro) {
+               if (!register_sysctl_paths(loadpin_sysctl_path,
+                                          loadpin_sysctl_table))
+                       pr_notice("sysctl registration failed!\n");
+               else
+                       pr_info("load pinning can be disabled.\n");
+       } else
+               pr_info("load pinning engaged.\n");
+}
+#else
+static void check_pinning_enforcement(struct super_block *mnt_sb)
+{
+       pr_info("load pinning engaged.\n");
+}
+#endif
+
+static void loadpin_sb_free_security(struct super_block *mnt_sb)
+{
+       /*
+        * When unmounting the filesystem we were using for load
+        * pinning, we acknowledge the superblock release, but make sure
+        * no other modules or firmware can be loaded.
+        */
+       if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(pinned_root) && mnt_sb == pinned_root) {
+               pinned_root = ERR_PTR(-EIO);
+               pr_info("umount pinned fs: refusing further loads\n");
+       }
+}
+
+static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+{
+       struct super_block *load_root;
+       const char *origin = kernel_read_file_id_str(id);
+
+       /* This handles the older init_module API that has a NULL file. */
+       if (!file) {
+               if (!enabled) {
+                       report_load(origin, NULL, "old-api-pinning-ignored");
+                       return 0;
+               }
+
+               report_load(origin, NULL, "old-api-denied");
+               return -EPERM;
+       }
+
+       load_root = file->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb;
+
+       /* First loaded module/firmware defines the root for all others. */
+       spin_lock(&pinned_root_spinlock);
+       /*
+        * pinned_root is only NULL at startup. Otherwise, it is either
+        * a valid reference, or an ERR_PTR.
+        */
+       if (!pinned_root) {
+               pinned_root = load_root;
+               /*
+                * Unlock now since it's only pinned_root we care about.
+                * In the worst case, we will (correctly) report pinning
+                * failures before we have announced that pinning is
+                * enabled. This would be purely cosmetic.
+                */
+               spin_unlock(&pinned_root_spinlock);
+               check_pinning_enforcement(pinned_root);
+               report_load(origin, file, "pinned");
+       } else {
+               spin_unlock(&pinned_root_spinlock);
+       }
+
+       if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(pinned_root) || load_root != pinned_root) {
+               if (unlikely(!enabled)) {
+                       report_load(origin, file, "pinning-ignored");
+                       return 0;
+               }
+
+               report_load(origin, file, "denied");
+               return -EPERM;
+       }
+
+       return 0;
+}
+
+static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] = {
+       LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, loadpin_sb_free_security),
+       LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, loadpin_read_file),
+};
+
+void __init loadpin_add_hooks(void)
+{
+       pr_info("ready to pin (currently %sabled)", enabled ? "en" : "dis");
+       security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks));
+}
+
+/* Should not be mutable after boot, so not listed in sysfs (perm == 0). */
+module_param(enabled, int, 0);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(enabled, "Pin module/firmware loading (default: true)");
index 554c3fb..e428608 100644 (file)
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ int __init security_init(void)
         */
        capability_add_hooks();
        yama_add_hooks();
+       loadpin_add_hooks();
 
        /*
         * Load all the remaining security modules.