# Leavings from module signing
#
extra_certificates
+signing_key.pem
signing_key.priv
signing_key.x509
x509.genkey
o grub 0.93 # grub --version || grub-install --version
o mcelog 0.6 # mcelog --version
o iptables 1.4.2 # iptables -V
+o openssl & libcrypto 1.0.1k # openssl version
Kernel compilation
You will need bc to build kernels 3.10 and higher
+OpenSSL
+-------
+
+Module signing and external certificate handling use the OpenSSL program and
+crypto library to do key creation and signature generation.
+
+You will need openssl to build kernels 3.7 and higher if module signing is
+enabled. You will also need openssl development packages to build kernels 4.3
+and higher.
+
+
System utilities
================
--------
o <ftp://ftp.kernel.org/pub/linux/devel/binutils/>
+OpenSSL
+-------
+o <https://www.openssl.org/>
+
System utilities
****************
NFS-Utils
---------
o <http://nfs.sourceforge.net/>
-
The value can be overridden in which case the default value is ignored.
+KBUILD_SIGN_PIN
+--------------------------------------------------
+This variable allows a passphrase or PIN to be passed to the sign-file
+utility when signing kernel modules, if the private key requires such.
+
KBUILD_MODPOST_WARN
--------------------------------------------------
KBUILD_MODPOST_WARN can be set to avoid errors in case of undefined
their signatures checked without causing a dependency loop.
+ (4) "File name or PKCS#11 URI of module signing key" (CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY)
+
+ Setting this option to something other than its default of
+ "certs/signing_key.pem" will disable the autogeneration of signing keys
+ and allow the kernel modules to be signed with a key of your choosing.
+ The string provided should identify a file containing both a private key
+ and its corresponding X.509 certificate in PEM form, or — on systems where
+ the OpenSSL ENGINE_pkcs11 is functional — a PKCS#11 URI as defined by
+ RFC7512. In the latter case, the PKCS#11 URI should reference both a
+ certificate and a private key.
+
+ If the PEM file containing the private key is encrypted, or if the
+ PKCS#11 token requries a PIN, this can be provided at build time by
+ means of the KBUILD_SIGN_PIN variable.
+
+
+ (5) "Additional X.509 keys for default system keyring" (CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS)
+
+ This option can be set to the filename of a PEM-encoded file containing
+ additional certificates which will be included in the system keyring by
+ default.
+
+Note that enabling module signing adds a dependency on the OpenSSL devel
+packages to the kernel build processes for the tool that does the signing.
+
+
=======================
GENERATING SIGNING KEYS
=======================
kernel so that it can be used to check the signatures as the modules are
loaded.
-Under normal conditions, the kernel build will automatically generate a new
-keypair using openssl if one does not exist in the files:
+Under normal conditions, when CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY is unchanged from its
+default, the kernel build will automatically generate a new keypair using
+openssl if one does not exist in the file:
- signing_key.priv
- signing_key.x509
+ certs/signing_key.pem
during the building of vmlinux (the public part of the key needs to be built
into vmlinux) using parameters in the:
- x509.genkey
+ certs/x509.genkey
file (which is also generated if it does not already exist).
generate the public/private key files:
openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -sha256 -days 36500 -batch -x509 \
- -config x509.genkey -outform DER -out signing_key.x509 \
- -keyout signing_key.priv
+ -config x509.genkey -outform PEM -out kernel_key.pem \
+ -keyout kernel_key.pem
+
+The full pathname for the resulting kernel_key.pem file can then be specified
+in the CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY option, and the certificate and key therein will
+be used instead of an autogenerated keypair.
=========================
302d2d52 I------ 1 perm 1f010000 0 0 asymmetri Fedora kernel signing key: d69a84e6bce3d216b979e9505b3e3ef9a7118079: X509.RSA a7118079 []
...
-Beyond the public key generated specifically for module signing, any file
-placed in the kernel source root directory or the kernel build root directory
-whose name is suffixed with ".x509" will be assumed to be an X.509 public key
-and will be added to the keyring.
+Beyond the public key generated specifically for module signing, additional
+trusted certificates can be provided in a PEM-encoded file referenced by the
+CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS configuration option.
Further, the architecture code may take public keys from a hardware store and
add those in also (e.g. from the UEFI key database).
the Linux kernel source tree. The script requires 4 arguments:
1. The hash algorithm (e.g., sha256)
- 2. The private key filename
+ 2. The private key filename or PKCS#11 URI
3. The public key filename
4. The kernel module to be signed
doesn't, you should make sure that hash algorithm is either built into the
kernel or can be loaded without requiring itself.
+If the private key requires a passphrase or PIN, it can be provided in the
+$KBUILD_SIGN_PIN environment variable.
+
============================
SIGNED MODULES AND STRIPPING
configurations are intolerant of IP options and can impede
access to systems that use them as Smack does.
+Smack is used in the Tizen operating system. Please
+go to http://wiki.tizen.org for information about how
+Smack is used in Tizen.
+
The current git repository for Smack user space is:
git://github.com/smack-team/smack.git
on /sys/fs/smackfs.
access
+ Provided for backward compatibility. The access2 interface
+ is preferred and should be used instead.
This interface reports whether a subject with the specified
Smack label has a particular access to an object with a
specified Smack label. Write a fixed format access rule to
those in the fourth string. If there is no such rule it will be
created using the access specified in the third and the fourth strings.
cipso
+ Provided for backward compatibility. The cipso2 interface
+ is preferred and should be used instead.
This interface allows a specific CIPSO header to be assigned
to a Smack label. The format accepted on write is:
"%24s%4d%4d"["%4d"]...
doi
This contains the CIPSO domain of interpretation used in
network packets.
+ipv6host
+ This interface allows specific IPv6 internet addresses to be
+ treated as single label hosts. Packets are sent to single
+ label hosts only from processes that have Smack write access
+ to the host label. All packets received from single label hosts
+ are given the specified label. The format accepted on write is:
+ "%h:%h:%h:%h:%h:%h:%h:%h label" or
+ "%h:%h:%h:%h:%h:%h:%h:%h/%d label".
+ The "::" address shortcut is not supported.
+ If label is "-DELETE" a matched entry will be deleted.
load
+ Provided for backward compatibility. The load2 interface
+ is preferred and should be used instead.
This interface allows access control rules in addition to
the system defined rules to be specified. The format accepted
on write is:
permissions that are not allowed. The string "r-x--" would
specify read and execute access.
load-self
+ Provided for backward compatibility. The load-self2 interface
+ is preferred and should be used instead.
This interface allows process specific access rules to be
defined. These rules are only consulted if access would
otherwise be permitted, and are intended to provide additional
received from single label hosts are given the specified
label. The format accepted on write is:
"%d.%d.%d.%d label" or "%d.%d.%d.%d/%d label".
+ If the label specified is "-CIPSO" the address is treated
+ as a host that supports CIPSO headers.
onlycap
This contains labels processes must have for CAP_MAC_ADMIN
and CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE to be effective. If this file is empty
is dangerous and can ruin the proper labeling of your system.
It should never be used in production.
-You can add access rules in /etc/smack/accesses. They take the form:
+If you are using the smackload utility
+you can add access rules in /etc/smack/accesses. They take the form:
subjectlabel objectlabel access
-Yama is a Linux Security Module that collects a number of system-wide DAC
-security protections that are not handled by the core kernel itself. To
-select it at boot time, specify "security=yama" (though this will disable
-any other LSM).
-
-Yama is controlled through sysctl in /proc/sys/kernel/yama:
+Yama is a Linux Security Module that collects system-wide DAC security
+protections that are not handled by the core kernel itself. This is
+selectable at build-time with CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA, and can be controlled
+at run-time through sysctls in /proc/sys/kernel/yama:
- ptrace_scope
F: Documentation/filesystems/ceph.txt
F: fs/ceph/
+CERTIFICATE HANDLING:
+M: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+M: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
+L: keyrings@linux-nfs.org
+S: Maintained
+F: Documentation/module-signing.txt
+F: certs/
+F: scripts/extract-cert.c
+
CERTIFIED WIRELESS USB (WUSB) SUBSYSTEM:
L: linux-usb@vger.kernel.org
S: Orphan
KEYS/KEYRINGS:
M: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-L: keyrings@linux-nfs.org
+L: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
S: Maintained
F: Documentation/security/keys.txt
F: include/linux/key.h
M: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
M: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
-L: keyrings@linux-nfs.org
+L: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
S: Supported
F: Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
F: include/keys/trusted-type.h
M: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
M: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
-L: keyrings@linux-nfs.org
+L: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
S: Supported
F: Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
F: include/keys/encrypted-type.h
S: Supported
F: security/apparmor/
+YAMA SECURITY MODULE
+M: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
+T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git yama/tip
+S: Supported
+F: security/yama/
+
SENSABLE PHANTOM
M: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com>
S: Maintained
# export INITRD_COMPRESS := $(INITRD_COMPRESS-y)
ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_ALL
-MODSECKEY = ./signing_key.priv
-MODPUBKEY = ./signing_key.x509
-export MODPUBKEY
-mod_sign_cmd = perl $(srctree)/scripts/sign-file $(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH) $(MODSECKEY) $(MODPUBKEY)
+$(eval $(call config_filename,MODULE_SIG_KEY))
+
+mod_sign_cmd = scripts/sign-file $(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH) $(MODULE_SIG_KEY_SRCPREFIX)$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY) certs/signing_key.x509
else
mod_sign_cmd = true
endif
ifeq ($(KBUILD_EXTMOD),)
-core-y += kernel/ mm/ fs/ ipc/ security/ crypto/ block/
+core-y += kernel/ certs/ mm/ fs/ ipc/ security/ crypto/ block/
vmlinux-dirs := $(patsubst %/,%,$(filter %/, $(init-y) $(init-m) \
$(core-y) $(core-m) $(drivers-y) $(drivers-m) \
arch/*/include/generated .tmp_objdiff
MRPROPER_FILES += .config .config.old .version .old_version \
Module.symvers tags TAGS cscope* GPATH GTAGS GRTAGS GSYMS \
- signing_key.priv signing_key.x509 x509.genkey \
- extra_certificates signing_key.x509.keyid \
+ signing_key.pem signing_key.priv signing_key.x509 \
+ x509.genkey extra_certificates signing_key.x509.keyid \
signing_key.x509.signer vmlinux-gdb.py
# clean - Delete most, but leave enough to build external modules
CONFIG_SECURITY=y
CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK=y
CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA=y
-CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED=y
CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_AUTHENC=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_HMAC=y
int ret;
ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
- system_trusted_keyring, &trusted);
+ system_trusted_keyring,
+ VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE,
+ &trusted);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (!trusted)
--- /dev/null
+menu "Certificates for signature checking"
+
+config MODULE_SIG_KEY
+ string "File name or PKCS#11 URI of module signing key"
+ default "certs/signing_key.pem"
+ depends on MODULE_SIG
+ help
+ Provide the file name of a private key/certificate in PEM format,
+ or a PKCS#11 URI according to RFC7512. The file should contain, or
+ the URI should identify, both the certificate and its corresponding
+ private key.
+
+ If this option is unchanged from its default "certs/signing_key.pem",
+ then the kernel will automatically generate the private key and
+ certificate as described in Documentation/module-signing.txt
+
+config SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+ bool "Provide system-wide ring of trusted keys"
+ depends on KEYS
+ help
+ Provide a system keyring to which trusted keys can be added. Keys in
+ the keyring are considered to be trusted. Keys may be added at will
+ by the kernel from compiled-in data and from hardware key stores, but
+ userspace may only add extra keys if those keys can be verified by
+ keys already in the keyring.
+
+ Keys in this keyring are used by module signature checking.
+
+config SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS
+ string "Additional X.509 keys for default system keyring"
+ depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+ help
+ If set, this option should be the filename of a PEM-formatted file
+ containing trusted X.509 certificates to be included in the default
+ system keyring. Any certificate used for module signing is implicitly
+ also trusted.
+
+ NOTE: If you previously provided keys for the system keyring in the
+ form of DER-encoded *.x509 files in the top-level build directory,
+ those are no longer used. You will need to set this option instead.
+
+endmenu
--- /dev/null
+#
+# Makefile for the linux kernel signature checking certificates.
+#
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) += system_keyring.o system_certificates.o
+
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING),y)
+
+$(eval $(call config_filename,SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS))
+
+# GCC doesn't include .incbin files in -MD generated dependencies (PR#66871)
+$(obj)/system_certificates.o: $(obj)/x509_certificate_list
+
+# Cope with signing_key.x509 existing in $(srctree) not $(objtree)
+AFLAGS_system_certificates.o := -I$(srctree)
+
+quiet_cmd_extract_certs = EXTRACT_CERTS $(patsubst "%",%,$(2))
+ cmd_extract_certs = scripts/extract-cert $(2) $@ || ( rm $@; exit 1)
+
+targets += x509_certificate_list
+$(obj)/x509_certificate_list: scripts/extract-cert $(SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS_SRCPREFIX)$(SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS_FILENAME) FORCE
+ $(call if_changed,extract_certs,$(SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS_SRCPREFIX)$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS))
+endif
+
+clean-files := x509_certificate_list .x509.list
+
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG),y)
+###############################################################################
+#
+# If module signing is requested, say by allyesconfig, but a key has not been
+# supplied, then one will need to be generated to make sure the build does not
+# fail and that the kernel may be used afterwards.
+#
+###############################################################################
+ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH
+$(error Could not determine digest type to use from kernel config)
+endif
+
+# We do it this way rather than having a boolean option for enabling an
+# external private key, because 'make randconfig' might enable such a
+# boolean option and we unfortunately can't make it depend on !RANDCONFIG.
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY),"certs/signing_key.pem")
+$(obj)/signing_key.pem: $(obj)/x509.genkey
+ @echo "###"
+ @echo "### Now generating an X.509 key pair to be used for signing modules."
+ @echo "###"
+ @echo "### If this takes a long time, you might wish to run rngd in the"
+ @echo "### background to keep the supply of entropy topped up. It"
+ @echo "### needs to be run as root, and uses a hardware random"
+ @echo "### number generator if one is available."
+ @echo "###"
+ openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH) -days 36500 \
+ -batch -x509 -config $(obj)/x509.genkey \
+ -outform PEM -out $(obj)/signing_key.pem \
+ -keyout $(obj)/signing_key.pem 2>&1
+ @echo "###"
+ @echo "### Key pair generated."
+ @echo "###"
+
+$(obj)/x509.genkey:
+ @echo Generating X.509 key generation config
+ @echo >$@ "[ req ]"
+ @echo >>$@ "default_bits = 4096"
+ @echo >>$@ "distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name"
+ @echo >>$@ "prompt = no"
+ @echo >>$@ "string_mask = utf8only"
+ @echo >>$@ "x509_extensions = myexts"
+ @echo >>$@
+ @echo >>$@ "[ req_distinguished_name ]"
+ @echo >>$@ "#O = Unspecified company"
+ @echo >>$@ "CN = Build time autogenerated kernel key"
+ @echo >>$@ "#emailAddress = unspecified.user@unspecified.company"
+ @echo >>$@
+ @echo >>$@ "[ myexts ]"
+ @echo >>$@ "basicConstraints=critical,CA:FALSE"
+ @echo >>$@ "keyUsage=digitalSignature"
+ @echo >>$@ "subjectKeyIdentifier=hash"
+ @echo >>$@ "authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid"
+endif
+
+$(eval $(call config_filename,MODULE_SIG_KEY))
+
+# If CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY isn't a PKCS#11 URI, depend on it
+ifeq ($(patsubst pkcs11:%,%,$(firstword $(MODULE_SIG_KEY_FILENAME))),$(firstword $(MODULE_SIG_KEY_FILENAME)))
+X509_DEP := $(MODULE_SIG_KEY_SRCPREFIX)$(MODULE_SIG_KEY_FILENAME)
+endif
+
+# GCC PR#66871 again.
+$(obj)/system_certificates.o: $(obj)/signing_key.x509
+
+targets += signing_key.x509
+$(obj)/signing_key.x509: scripts/extract-cert $(X509_DEP) FORCE
+ $(call if_changed,extract_certs,$(MODULE_SIG_KEY_SRCPREFIX)$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY))
+endif
--- /dev/null
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+
+ __INITRODATA
+
+ .align 8
+ .globl VMLINUX_SYMBOL(system_certificate_list)
+VMLINUX_SYMBOL(system_certificate_list):
+__cert_list_start:
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
+ .incbin "certs/signing_key.x509"
+#endif
+ .incbin "certs/x509_certificate_list"
+__cert_list_end:
+
+ .align 8
+ .globl VMLINUX_SYMBOL(system_certificate_list_size)
+VMLINUX_SYMBOL(system_certificate_list_size):
+#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
+ .quad __cert_list_end - __cert_list_start
+#else
+ .long __cert_list_end - __cert_list_start
+#endif
--- /dev/null
+/* System trusted keyring for trusted public keys
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
+#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
+
+struct key *system_trusted_keyring;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(system_trusted_keyring);
+
+extern __initconst const u8 system_certificate_list[];
+extern __initconst const unsigned long system_certificate_list_size;
+
+/*
+ * Load the compiled-in keys
+ */
+static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void)
+{
+ pr_notice("Initialise system trusted keyring\n");
+
+ system_trusted_keyring =
+ keyring_alloc(".system_keyring",
+ KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(),
+ ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+ KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH),
+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(system_trusted_keyring))
+ panic("Can't allocate system trusted keyring\n");
+
+ set_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &system_trusted_keyring->flags);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Must be initialised before we try and load the keys into the keyring.
+ */
+device_initcall(system_trusted_keyring_init);
+
+/*
+ * Load the compiled-in list of X.509 certificates.
+ */
+static __init int load_system_certificate_list(void)
+{
+ key_ref_t key;
+ const u8 *p, *end;
+ size_t plen;
+
+ pr_notice("Loading compiled-in X.509 certificates\n");
+
+ p = system_certificate_list;
+ end = p + system_certificate_list_size;
+ while (p < end) {
+ /* Each cert begins with an ASN.1 SEQUENCE tag and must be more
+ * than 256 bytes in size.
+ */
+ if (end - p < 4)
+ goto dodgy_cert;
+ if (p[0] != 0x30 &&
+ p[1] != 0x82)
+ goto dodgy_cert;
+ plen = (p[2] << 8) | p[3];
+ plen += 4;
+ if (plen > end - p)
+ goto dodgy_cert;
+
+ key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(system_trusted_keyring, 1),
+ "asymmetric",
+ NULL,
+ p,
+ plen,
+ ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+ KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
+ KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED);
+ if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+ pr_err("Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (%ld)\n",
+ PTR_ERR(key));
+ } else {
+ set_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key_ref_to_ptr(key)->flags);
+ pr_notice("Loaded X.509 cert '%s'\n",
+ key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description);
+ key_ref_put(key);
+ }
+ p += plen;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+dodgy_cert:
+ pr_err("Problem parsing in-kernel X.509 certificate list\n");
+ return 0;
+}
+late_initcall(load_system_certificate_list);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
+
+/**
+ * Verify a PKCS#7-based signature on system data.
+ * @data: The data to be verified.
+ * @len: Size of @data.
+ * @raw_pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message that is the signature.
+ * @pkcs7_len: The size of @raw_pkcs7.
+ * @usage: The use to which the key is being put.
+ */
+int system_verify_data(const void *data, unsigned long len,
+ const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
+ bool trusted;
+ int ret;
+
+ pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(raw_pkcs7, pkcs7_len);
+ if (IS_ERR(pkcs7))
+ return PTR_ERR(pkcs7);
+
+ /* The data should be detached - so we need to supply it. */
+ if (pkcs7_supply_detached_data(pkcs7, data, len) < 0) {
+ pr_err("PKCS#7 signature with non-detached data\n");
+ ret = -EBADMSG;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7, usage);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, system_trusted_keyring, &trusted);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ if (!trusted) {
+ pr_err("PKCS#7 signature not signed with a trusted key\n");
+ ret = -ENOKEY;
+ }
+
+error:
+ pkcs7_free_message(pkcs7);
+ pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(system_verify_data);
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */
source "drivers/crypto/Kconfig"
source crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
+source certs/Kconfig
endif # if CRYPTO
obj-$(CONFIG_X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER) += x509_key_parser.o
x509_key_parser-y := \
x509-asn1.o \
+ x509_akid-asn1.o \
x509_rsakey-asn1.o \
x509_cert_parser.o \
x509_public_key.o
-$(obj)/x509_cert_parser.o: $(obj)/x509-asn1.h $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.h
+$(obj)/x509_cert_parser.o: \
+ $(obj)/x509-asn1.h \
+ $(obj)/x509_akid-asn1.h \
+ $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.h
$(obj)/x509-asn1.o: $(obj)/x509-asn1.c $(obj)/x509-asn1.h
+$(obj)/x509_akid-asn1.o: $(obj)/x509_akid-asn1.c $(obj)/x509_akid-asn1.h
$(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.o: $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.c $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.h
clean-files += x509-asn1.c x509-asn1.h
+clean-files += x509_akid-asn1.c x509_akid-asn1.h
clean-files += x509_rsakey-asn1.c x509_rsakey-asn1.h
#
*/
#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>
#include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+const char *const key_being_used_for[NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR] = {
+ [VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "mod sig",
+ [VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE] = "firmware sig",
+ [VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE] = "kexec PE sig",
+ [VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE] = "key sig",
+ [VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE] = "key self sig",
+ [VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE] = "unspec sig",
+};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_being_used_for);
+
static LIST_HEAD(asymmetric_key_parsers);
static DECLARE_RWSEM(asymmetric_key_parsers_sem);
case OID_sha256:
ctx->digest_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA256;
break;
+ case OID_sha384:
+ ctx->digest_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA384;
+ break;
+ case OID_sha512:
+ ctx->digest_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA512;
+ break;
+ case OID_sha224:
+ ctx->digest_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA224;
+ break;
case OID__NR:
sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
PKCS7ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
- contentType ContentType,
+ contentType ContentType ({ pkcs7_check_content_type }),
content [0] EXPLICIT SignedData OPTIONAL
}
ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID })
SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
- version INTEGER,
+ version INTEGER ({ pkcs7_note_signeddata_version }),
digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
- contentInfo ContentInfo,
+ contentInfo ContentInfo ({ pkcs7_note_content }),
certificates CHOICE {
certSet [0] IMPLICIT ExtendedCertificatesAndCertificates,
certSequence [2] IMPLICIT Certificates
}
ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
- contentType ContentType,
+ contentType ContentType ({ pkcs7_note_OID }),
content [0] EXPLICIT Data OPTIONAL
}
}
SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
- version INTEGER,
- issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber,
+ version INTEGER ({ pkcs7_note_signerinfo_version }),
+ sid SignerIdentifier, -- CMS variant, not PKCS#7
digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ({ pkcs7_sig_note_digest_algo }),
authenticatedAttributes CHOICE {
aaSet [0] IMPLICIT SetOfAuthenticatedAttribute
} OPTIONAL
} ({ pkcs7_note_signed_info })
+SignerIdentifier ::= CHOICE {
+ -- RFC5652 sec 5.3
+ issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber,
+ subjectKeyIdentifier [0] IMPLICIT SubjectKeyIdentifier
+}
+
IssuerAndSerialNumber ::= SEQUENCE {
issuer Name ({ pkcs7_sig_note_issuer }),
serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber ({ pkcs7_sig_note_serial })
CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER
+SubjectKeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING ({ pkcs7_sig_note_skid })
+
SetOfAuthenticatedAttribute ::= SET OF AuthenticatedAttribute
AuthenticatedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {
}
UnauthenticatedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {
- type OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }),
+ type OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
values SET OF ANY
}
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
#include <keys/user-type.h>
#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
#include "pkcs7_parser.h"
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("PKCS#7 testing key type");
+
+static unsigned pkcs7_usage;
+module_param_named(usage, pkcs7_usage, uint, S_IWUSR | S_IRUGO);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(pkcs7_usage,
+ "Usage to specify when verifying the PKCS#7 message");
+
/*
* Preparse a PKCS#7 wrapped and validated data blob.
*/
static int pkcs7_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
+ enum key_being_used_for usage = pkcs7_usage;
struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
const void *data, *saved_prep_data;
size_t datalen, saved_prep_datalen;
kenter("");
+ if (usage >= NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR) {
+ pr_err("Invalid usage type %d\n", usage);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
saved_prep_data = prep->data;
saved_prep_datalen = prep->datalen;
pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(saved_prep_data, saved_prep_datalen);
goto error;
}
- ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7);
+ ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7, usage);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_free;
unsigned raw_serial_size;
unsigned raw_issuer_size;
const void *raw_issuer;
+ const void *raw_skid;
+ unsigned raw_skid_size;
+ bool expect_skid;
};
/*
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_free_message);
+/*
+ * Check authenticatedAttributes are provided or not provided consistently.
+ */
+static int pkcs7_check_authattrs(struct pkcs7_message *msg)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
+ bool want;
+
+ sinfo = msg->signed_infos;
+ if (sinfo->authattrs) {
+ want = true;
+ msg->have_authattrs = true;
+ }
+
+ for (sinfo = sinfo->next; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next)
+ if (!!sinfo->authattrs != want)
+ goto inconsistent;
+ return 0;
+
+inconsistent:
+ pr_warn("Inconsistently supplied authAttrs\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
/**
* pkcs7_parse_message - Parse a PKCS#7 message
* @data: The raw binary ASN.1 encoded message to be parsed
goto out;
}
+ ret = pkcs7_check_authattrs(ctx->msg);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+
msg = ctx->msg;
ctx->msg = NULL;
case OID_sha256:
ctx->sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA256;
break;
+ case OID_sha384:
+ ctx->sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA384;
+ break;
+ case OID_sha512:
+ ctx->sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA512;
+ break;
+ case OID_sha224:
+ ctx->sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA224;
default:
printk("Unsupported digest algo: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
return -ENOPKG;
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * We only support signed data [RFC2315 sec 9].
+ */
+int pkcs7_check_content_type(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+ if (ctx->last_oid != OID_signed_data) {
+ pr_warn("Only support pkcs7_signedData type\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the SignedData version
+ */
+int pkcs7_note_signeddata_version(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+ unsigned version;
+
+ if (vlen != 1)
+ goto unsupported;
+
+ ctx->msg->version = version = *(const u8 *)value;
+ switch (version) {
+ case 1:
+ /* PKCS#7 SignedData [RFC2315 sec 9.1]
+ * CMS ver 1 SignedData [RFC5652 sec 5.1]
+ */
+ break;
+ case 3:
+ /* CMS ver 3 SignedData [RFC2315 sec 5.1] */
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto unsupported;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+unsupported:
+ pr_warn("Unsupported SignedData version\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the SignerInfo version
+ */
+int pkcs7_note_signerinfo_version(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+ unsigned version;
+
+ if (vlen != 1)
+ goto unsupported;
+
+ version = *(const u8 *)value;
+ switch (version) {
+ case 1:
+ /* PKCS#7 SignerInfo [RFC2315 sec 9.2]
+ * CMS ver 1 SignerInfo [RFC5652 sec 5.3]
+ */
+ if (ctx->msg->version != 1)
+ goto version_mismatch;
+ ctx->expect_skid = false;
+ break;
+ case 3:
+ /* CMS ver 3 SignerInfo [RFC2315 sec 5.3] */
+ if (ctx->msg->version == 1)
+ goto version_mismatch;
+ ctx->expect_skid = true;
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto unsupported;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+unsupported:
+ pr_warn("Unsupported SignerInfo version\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+version_mismatch:
+ pr_warn("SignedData-SignerInfo version mismatch\n");
+ return -EBADMSG;
+}
+
/*
* Extract a certificate and store it in the context.
*/
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * Note the content type.
+ */
+int pkcs7_note_content(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+ if (ctx->last_oid != OID_data &&
+ ctx->last_oid != OID_msIndirectData) {
+ pr_warn("Unsupported data type %d\n", ctx->last_oid);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ ctx->msg->data_type = ctx->last_oid;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* Extract the data from the message and store that and its content type OID in
* the context.
ctx->msg->data = value;
ctx->msg->data_len = vlen;
ctx->msg->data_hdrlen = hdrlen;
- ctx->msg->data_type = ctx->last_oid;
return 0;
}
/*
- * Parse authenticated attributes
+ * Parse authenticated attributes.
*/
int pkcs7_sig_note_authenticated_attr(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+ struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo = ctx->sinfo;
+ enum OID content_type;
pr_devel("AuthAttr: %02x %zu [%*ph]\n", tag, vlen, (unsigned)vlen, value);
switch (ctx->last_oid) {
+ case OID_contentType:
+ if (__test_and_set_bit(sinfo_has_content_type, &sinfo->aa_set))
+ goto repeated;
+ content_type = look_up_OID(value, vlen);
+ if (content_type != ctx->msg->data_type) {
+ pr_warn("Mismatch between global data type (%d) and sinfo %u (%d)\n",
+ ctx->msg->data_type, sinfo->index,
+ content_type);
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+ case OID_signingTime:
+ if (__test_and_set_bit(sinfo_has_signing_time, &sinfo->aa_set))
+ goto repeated;
+ /* Should we check that the signing time is consistent
+ * with the signer's X.509 cert?
+ */
+ return x509_decode_time(&sinfo->signing_time,
+ hdrlen, tag, value, vlen);
+
case OID_messageDigest:
+ if (__test_and_set_bit(sinfo_has_message_digest, &sinfo->aa_set))
+ goto repeated;
if (tag != ASN1_OTS)
return -EBADMSG;
- ctx->sinfo->msgdigest = value;
- ctx->sinfo->msgdigest_len = vlen;
+ sinfo->msgdigest = value;
+ sinfo->msgdigest_len = vlen;
+ return 0;
+
+ case OID_smimeCapabilites:
+ if (__test_and_set_bit(sinfo_has_smime_caps, &sinfo->aa_set))
+ goto repeated;
+ if (ctx->msg->data_type != OID_msIndirectData) {
+ pr_warn("S/MIME Caps only allowed with Authenticode\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Microsoft SpOpusInfo seems to be contain cont[0] 16-bit BE
+ * char URLs and cont[1] 8-bit char URLs.
+ *
+ * Microsoft StatementType seems to contain a list of OIDs that
+ * are also used as extendedKeyUsage types in X.509 certs.
+ */
+ case OID_msSpOpusInfo:
+ if (__test_and_set_bit(sinfo_has_ms_opus_info, &sinfo->aa_set))
+ goto repeated;
+ goto authenticode_check;
+ case OID_msStatementType:
+ if (__test_and_set_bit(sinfo_has_ms_statement_type, &sinfo->aa_set))
+ goto repeated;
+ authenticode_check:
+ if (ctx->msg->data_type != OID_msIndirectData) {
+ pr_warn("Authenticode AuthAttrs only allowed with Authenticode\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ /* I'm not sure how to validate these */
return 0;
default:
return 0;
}
+
+repeated:
+ /* We permit max one item per AuthenticatedAttribute and no repeats */
+ pr_warn("Repeated/multivalue AuthAttrs not permitted\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
}
/*
- * Note the set of auth attributes for digestion purposes [RFC2315 9.3]
+ * Note the set of auth attributes for digestion purposes [RFC2315 sec 9.3]
*/
int pkcs7_sig_note_set_of_authattrs(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+ struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo = ctx->sinfo;
+
+ if (!test_bit(sinfo_has_content_type, &sinfo->aa_set) ||
+ !test_bit(sinfo_has_message_digest, &sinfo->aa_set) ||
+ (ctx->msg->data_type == OID_msIndirectData &&
+ !test_bit(sinfo_has_ms_opus_info, &sinfo->aa_set))) {
+ pr_warn("Missing required AuthAttr\n");
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->msg->data_type != OID_msIndirectData &&
+ test_bit(sinfo_has_ms_opus_info, &sinfo->aa_set)) {
+ pr_warn("Unexpected Authenticode AuthAttr\n");
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
/* We need to switch the 'CONT 0' to a 'SET OF' when we digest */
- ctx->sinfo->authattrs = value - (hdrlen - 1);
- ctx->sinfo->authattrs_len = vlen + (hdrlen - 1);
+ sinfo->authattrs = value - (hdrlen - 1);
+ sinfo->authattrs_len = vlen + (hdrlen - 1);
return 0;
}
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * Note the issuing cert's subjectKeyIdentifier
+ */
+int pkcs7_sig_note_skid(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+ pr_devel("SKID: %02x %zu [%*ph]\n", tag, vlen, (unsigned)vlen, value);
+
+ ctx->raw_skid = value;
+ ctx->raw_skid_size = vlen;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* Note the signature data
*/
struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo = ctx->sinfo;
struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
+ if (ctx->msg->data_type == OID_msIndirectData && !sinfo->authattrs) {
+ pr_warn("Authenticode requires AuthAttrs\n");
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+
/* Generate cert issuer + serial number key ID */
- kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(ctx->raw_serial,
- ctx->raw_serial_size,
- ctx->raw_issuer,
- ctx->raw_issuer_size);
+ if (!ctx->expect_skid) {
+ kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(ctx->raw_serial,
+ ctx->raw_serial_size,
+ ctx->raw_issuer,
+ ctx->raw_issuer_size);
+ } else {
+ kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(ctx->raw_skid,
+ ctx->raw_skid_size,
+ "", 0);
+ }
if (IS_ERR(kid))
return PTR_ERR(kid);
+ pr_devel("SINFO KID: %u [%*phN]\n", kid->len, kid->len, kid->data);
+
sinfo->signing_cert_id = kid;
sinfo->index = ++ctx->sinfo_index;
*ctx->ppsinfo = sinfo;
struct pkcs7_signed_info {
struct pkcs7_signed_info *next;
struct x509_certificate *signer; /* Signing certificate (in msg->certs) */
- unsigned index;
- bool trusted;
- bool unsupported_crypto; /* T if not usable due to missing crypto */
+ unsigned index;
+ bool trusted;
+ bool unsupported_crypto; /* T if not usable due to missing crypto */
/* Message digest - the digest of the Content Data (or NULL) */
const void *msgdigest;
/* Authenticated Attribute data (or NULL) */
unsigned authattrs_len;
const void *authattrs;
+ unsigned long aa_set;
+#define sinfo_has_content_type 0
+#define sinfo_has_signing_time 1
+#define sinfo_has_message_digest 2
+#define sinfo_has_smime_caps 3
+#define sinfo_has_ms_opus_info 4
+#define sinfo_has_ms_statement_type 5
+ time64_t signing_time;
- /* Issuing cert serial number and issuer's name */
+ /* Issuing cert serial number and issuer's name [PKCS#7 or CMS ver 1]
+ * or issuing cert's SKID [CMS ver 3].
+ */
struct asymmetric_key_id *signing_cert_id;
/* Message signature.
struct x509_certificate *certs; /* Certificate list */
struct x509_certificate *crl; /* Revocation list */
struct pkcs7_signed_info *signed_infos;
+ u8 version; /* Version of cert (1 -> PKCS#7 or CMS; 3 -> CMS) */
+ bool have_authattrs; /* T if have authattrs */
/* Content Data (or NULL) */
enum OID data_type; /* Type of Data */
/* Look to see if this certificate is present in the trusted
* keys.
*/
- key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, x509->id,
+ key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
+ x509->id, x509->skid,
false);
if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
/* One of the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message
/* No match - see if the root certificate has a signer amongst the
* trusted keys.
*/
- if (last && last->authority) {
- key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, last->authority,
+ if (last && (last->akid_id || last->akid_skid)) {
+ key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
+ last->akid_id,
+ last->akid_skid,
false);
if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
x509 = last;
*/
key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
sinfo->signing_cert_id,
+ NULL,
false);
if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
pr_devel("sinfo %u: Direct signer is key %x\n",
* message digest attribute amongst them which corresponds to the
* digest we just calculated.
*/
- if (sinfo->msgdigest) {
+ if (sinfo->authattrs) {
u8 tag;
+ if (!sinfo->msgdigest) {
+ pr_warn("Sig %u: No messageDigest\n", sinfo->index);
+ ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
if (sinfo->msgdigest_len != sinfo->sig.digest_size) {
pr_debug("Sig %u: Invalid digest size (%u)\n",
sinfo->index, sinfo->msgdigest_len);
struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
{
struct x509_certificate *x509 = sinfo->signer, *p;
+ struct asymmetric_key_id *auth;
int ret;
kenter("");
goto maybe_missing_crypto_in_x509;
pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", x509->issuer);
- if (x509->authority)
- pr_debug("- authkeyid %*phN\n",
- x509->authority->len, x509->authority->data);
-
- if (!x509->authority ||
+ if (x509->akid_id)
+ pr_debug("- authkeyid.id %*phN\n",
+ x509->akid_id->len, x509->akid_id->data);
+ if (x509->akid_skid)
+ pr_debug("- authkeyid.skid %*phN\n",
+ x509->akid_skid->len, x509->akid_skid->data);
+
+ if ((!x509->akid_id && !x509->akid_skid) ||
strcmp(x509->subject, x509->issuer) == 0) {
/* If there's no authority certificate specified, then
* the certificate must be self-signed and is the root
/* Look through the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message's
* list to see if the next one is there.
*/
- pr_debug("- want %*phN\n",
- x509->authority->len, x509->authority->data);
- for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) {
- if (!p->skid)
- continue;
- pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %*phN\n",
- p->index, p->skid->len, p->skid->data);
- if (asymmetric_key_id_same(p->skid, x509->authority))
- goto found_issuer;
+ auth = x509->akid_id;
+ if (auth) {
+ pr_debug("- want %*phN\n", auth->len, auth->data);
+ for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) {
+ pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %*phN\n",
+ p->index, p->id->len, p->id->data);
+ if (asymmetric_key_id_same(p->id, auth))
+ goto found_issuer_check_skid;
+ }
+ } else {
+ auth = x509->akid_skid;
+ pr_debug("- want %*phN\n", auth->len, auth->data);
+ for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) {
+ if (!p->skid)
+ continue;
+ pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %*phN\n",
+ p->index, p->skid->len, p->skid->data);
+ if (asymmetric_key_id_same(p->skid, auth))
+ goto found_issuer;
+ }
}
/* We didn't find the root of this chain */
pr_debug("- top\n");
return 0;
+ found_issuer_check_skid:
+ /* We matched issuer + serialNumber, but if there's an
+ * authKeyId.keyId, that must match the CA subjKeyId also.
+ */
+ if (x509->akid_skid &&
+ !asymmetric_key_id_same(p->skid, x509->akid_skid)) {
+ pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 chain contains auth-skid nonmatch (%u->%u)\n",
+ sinfo->index, x509->index, p->index);
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
found_issuer:
pr_debug("- subject %s\n", p->subject);
if (p->seen) {
pr_devel("Using X.509[%u] for sig %u\n",
sinfo->signer->index, sinfo->index);
+ /* Check that the PKCS#7 signing time is valid according to the X.509
+ * certificate. We can't, however, check against the system clock
+ * since that may not have been set yet and may be wrong.
+ */
+ if (test_bit(sinfo_has_signing_time, &sinfo->aa_set)) {
+ if (sinfo->signing_time < sinfo->signer->valid_from ||
+ sinfo->signing_time > sinfo->signer->valid_to) {
+ pr_warn("Message signed outside of X.509 validity window\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ }
+
/* Verify the PKCS#7 binary against the key */
ret = public_key_verify_signature(sinfo->signer->pub, &sinfo->sig);
if (ret < 0)
/**
* pkcs7_verify - Verify a PKCS#7 message
* @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message to be verified
+ * @usage: The use to which the key is being put
*
* Verify a PKCS#7 message is internally consistent - that is, the data digest
* matches the digest in the AuthAttrs and any signature in the message or one
*
* Returns, in order of descending priority:
*
+ * (*) -EKEYREJECTED if a key was selected that had a usage restriction at
+ * odds with the specified usage, or:
+ *
* (*) -EKEYREJECTED if a signature failed to match for which we found an
* appropriate X.509 certificate, or:
*
* (*) 0 if all the signature chains that don't incur -ENOPKG can be verified
* (note that a signature chain may be of zero length), or:
*/
-int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
+int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage)
{
struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
struct x509_certificate *x509;
kenter("");
+ switch (usage) {
+ case VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE:
+ if (pkcs7->data_type != OID_data) {
+ pr_warn("Invalid module sig (not pkcs7-data)\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ if (pkcs7->have_authattrs) {
+ pr_warn("Invalid module sig (has authattrs)\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ break;
+ case VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE:
+ if (pkcs7->data_type != OID_data) {
+ pr_warn("Invalid firmware sig (not pkcs7-data)\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ if (!pkcs7->have_authattrs) {
+ pr_warn("Invalid firmware sig (missing authattrs)\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ break;
+ case VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE:
+ if (pkcs7->data_type != OID_msIndirectData) {
+ pr_warn("Invalid kexec sig (not Authenticode)\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ /* Authattr presence checked in parser */
+ break;
+ case VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE:
+ if (pkcs7->data_type != OID_data) {
+ pr_warn("Invalid unspecified sig (not pkcs7-data)\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
for (n = 0, x509 = pkcs7->certs; x509; x509 = x509->next, n++) {
ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- pr_debug("X.509[%u] %*phN\n",
- n, x509->authority->len, x509->authority->data);
}
for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) {
return enopkg;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_verify);
+
+/**
+ * pkcs7_supply_detached_data - Supply the data needed to verify a PKCS#7 message
+ * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message
+ * @data: The data to be verified
+ * @datalen: The amount of data
+ *
+ * Supply the detached data needed to verify a PKCS#7 message. Note that no
+ * attempt to retain/pin the data is made. That is left to the caller. The
+ * data will not be modified by pkcs7_verify() and will not be freed when the
+ * PKCS#7 message is freed.
+ *
+ * Returns -EINVAL if data is already supplied in the message, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int pkcs7_supply_detached_data(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+ const void *data, size_t datalen)
+{
+ if (pkcs7->data) {
+ pr_debug("Data already supplied\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ pkcs7->data = data;
+ pkcs7->data_len = datalen;
+ return 0;
+}
const char *const pkey_id_type_name[PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST] = {
[PKEY_ID_PGP] = "PGP",
[PKEY_ID_X509] = "X509",
+ [PKEY_ID_PKCS7] = "PKCS#7",
};
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_id_type_name);
* @pebuf: Buffer containing the PE binary image
* @pelen: Length of the binary image
* @trust_keyring: Signing certificates to use as starting points
+ * @usage: The use to which the key is being put.
* @_trusted: Set to true if trustworth, false otherwise
*
* Validate that the certificate chain inside the PKCS#7 message inside the PE
* May also return -ENOMEM.
*/
int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
- struct key *trusted_keyring, bool *_trusted)
+ struct key *trusted_keyring,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage,
+ bool *_trusted)
{
struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
struct pefile_context ctx;
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
- ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7);
+ ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7, usage);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
--- /dev/null
+-- X.509 AuthorityKeyIdentifier
+-- rfc5280 section 4.2.1.1
+
+AuthorityKeyIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
+ keyIdentifier [0] IMPLICIT KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
+ authorityCertIssuer [1] IMPLICIT GeneralNames OPTIONAL,
+ authorityCertSerialNumber [2] IMPLICIT CertificateSerialNumber OPTIONAL
+ }
+
+KeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING ({ x509_akid_note_kid })
+
+CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER ({ x509_akid_note_serial })
+
+GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE OF GeneralName
+
+GeneralName ::= CHOICE {
+ otherName [0] ANY,
+ rfc822Name [1] IA5String,
+ dNSName [2] IA5String,
+ x400Address [3] ANY,
+ directoryName [4] Name ({ x509_akid_note_name }),
+ ediPartyName [5] ANY,
+ uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String,
+ iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING,
+ registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ }
+
+Name ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName
+
+RelativeDistinguishedName ::= SET OF AttributeValueAssertion
+
+AttributeValueAssertion ::= SEQUENCE {
+ attributeType OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ x509_note_OID }),
+ attributeValue ANY ({ x509_extract_name_segment })
+ }
#include "public_key.h"
#include "x509_parser.h"
#include "x509-asn1.h"
+#include "x509_akid-asn1.h"
#include "x509_rsakey-asn1.h"
struct x509_parse_context {
u16 o_offset; /* Offset of organizationName (O) */
u16 cn_offset; /* Offset of commonName (CN) */
u16 email_offset; /* Offset of emailAddress */
+ unsigned raw_akid_size;
+ const void *raw_akid; /* Raw authorityKeyId in ASN.1 */
+ const void *akid_raw_issuer; /* Raw directoryName in authorityKeyId */
+ unsigned akid_raw_issuer_size;
};
/*
kfree(cert->subject);
kfree(cert->id);
kfree(cert->skid);
- kfree(cert->authority);
+ kfree(cert->akid_id);
+ kfree(cert->akid_skid);
kfree(cert->sig.digest);
mpi_free(cert->sig.rsa.s);
kfree(cert);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_decode;
+ /* Decode the AuthorityKeyIdentifier */
+ if (ctx->raw_akid) {
+ pr_devel("AKID: %u %*phN\n",
+ ctx->raw_akid_size, ctx->raw_akid_size, ctx->raw_akid);
+ ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&x509_akid_decoder, ctx,
+ ctx->raw_akid, ctx->raw_akid_size);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_warn("Couldn't decode AuthKeyIdentifier\n");
+ goto error_decode;
+ }
+ }
+
/* Decode the public key */
ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&x509_rsakey_decoder, ctx,
ctx->key, ctx->key_size);
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
const unsigned char *v = value;
- int i;
pr_debug("Extension: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
ctx->cert->raw_skid_size = vlen;
ctx->cert->raw_skid = v;
- kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(ctx->cert->raw_subject,
- ctx->cert->raw_subject_size,
- v, vlen);
+ kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(v, vlen, "", 0);
if (IS_ERR(kid))
return PTR_ERR(kid);
ctx->cert->skid = kid;
if (ctx->last_oid == OID_authorityKeyIdentifier) {
/* Get hold of the CA key fingerprint */
- if (ctx->cert->authority || vlen < 5)
- return -EBADMSG;
-
- /* Authority Key Identifier must be a Constructed SEQUENCE */
- if (v[0] != (ASN1_SEQ | (ASN1_CONS << 5)))
- return -EBADMSG;
-
- /* Authority Key Identifier is not indefinite length */
- if (unlikely(vlen == ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH))
- return -EBADMSG;
-
- if (vlen < ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH) {
- /* Short Form length */
- if (v[1] != vlen - 2 ||
- v[2] != SEQ_TAG_KEYID ||
- v[3] > vlen - 4)
- return -EBADMSG;
-
- vlen = v[3];
- v += 4;
- } else {
- /* Long Form length */
- size_t seq_len = 0;
- size_t sub = v[1] - ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH;
-
- if (sub > 2)
- return -EBADMSG;
-
- /* calculate the length from subsequent octets */
- v += 2;
- for (i = 0; i < sub; i++) {
- seq_len <<= 8;
- seq_len |= v[i];
- }
-
- if (seq_len != vlen - 2 - sub ||
- v[sub] != SEQ_TAG_KEYID ||
- v[sub + 1] > vlen - 4 - sub)
- return -EBADMSG;
-
- vlen = v[sub + 1];
- v += (sub + 2);
- }
-
- kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(ctx->cert->raw_issuer,
- ctx->cert->raw_issuer_size,
- v, vlen);
- if (IS_ERR(kid))
- return PTR_ERR(kid);
- pr_debug("authkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
- ctx->cert->authority = kid;
+ ctx->raw_akid = v;
+ ctx->raw_akid_size = vlen;
return 0;
}
return 0;
}
-/*
- * Record a certificate time.
+/**
+ * x509_decode_time - Decode an X.509 time ASN.1 object
+ * @_t: The time to fill in
+ * @hdrlen: The length of the object header
+ * @tag: The object tag
+ * @value: The object value
+ * @vlen: The size of the object value
+ *
+ * Decode an ASN.1 universal time or generalised time field into a struct the
+ * kernel can handle and check it for validity. The time is decoded thus:
+ *
+ * [RFC5280 §4.1.2.5]
+ * CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate validity
+ * dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity dates in
+ * 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime. Conforming
+ * applications MUST be able to process validity dates that are encoded in
+ * either UTCTime or GeneralizedTime.
*/
-static int x509_note_time(struct tm *tm, size_t hdrlen,
- unsigned char tag,
- const unsigned char *value, size_t vlen)
+int x509_decode_time(time64_t *_t, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const unsigned char *value, size_t vlen)
{
+ static const unsigned char month_lengths[] = { 31, 29, 31, 30, 31, 30,
+ 31, 31, 30, 31, 30, 31 };
const unsigned char *p = value;
+ unsigned year, mon, day, hour, min, sec, mon_len;
-#define dec2bin(X) ((X) - '0')
+#define dec2bin(X) ({ unsigned char x = (X) - '0'; if (x > 9) goto invalid_time; x; })
#define DD2bin(P) ({ unsigned x = dec2bin(P[0]) * 10 + dec2bin(P[1]); P += 2; x; })
if (tag == ASN1_UNITIM) {
/* UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ */
if (vlen != 13)
goto unsupported_time;
- tm->tm_year = DD2bin(p);
- if (tm->tm_year >= 50)
- tm->tm_year += 1900;
+ year = DD2bin(p);
+ if (year >= 50)
+ year += 1900;
else
- tm->tm_year += 2000;
+ year += 2000;
} else if (tag == ASN1_GENTIM) {
/* GenTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ */
if (vlen != 15)
goto unsupported_time;
- tm->tm_year = DD2bin(p) * 100 + DD2bin(p);
+ year = DD2bin(p) * 100 + DD2bin(p);
+ if (year >= 1950 && year <= 2049)
+ goto invalid_time;
} else {
goto unsupported_time;
}
- tm->tm_year -= 1900;
- tm->tm_mon = DD2bin(p) - 1;
- tm->tm_mday = DD2bin(p);
- tm->tm_hour = DD2bin(p);
- tm->tm_min = DD2bin(p);
- tm->tm_sec = DD2bin(p);
+ mon = DD2bin(p);
+ day = DD2bin(p);
+ hour = DD2bin(p);
+ min = DD2bin(p);
+ sec = DD2bin(p);
if (*p != 'Z')
goto unsupported_time;
+ mon_len = month_lengths[mon];
+ if (mon == 2) {
+ if (year % 4 == 0) {
+ mon_len = 29;
+ if (year % 100 == 0) {
+ year /= 100;
+ if (year % 4 != 0)
+ mon_len = 28;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (year < 1970 ||
+ mon < 1 || mon > 12 ||
+ day < 1 || day > mon_len ||
+ hour < 0 || hour > 23 ||
+ min < 0 || min > 59 ||
+ sec < 0 || sec > 59)
+ goto invalid_time;
+
+ *_t = mktime64(year, mon, day, hour, min, sec);
return 0;
unsupported_time:
- pr_debug("Got unsupported time [tag %02x]: '%*.*s'\n",
- tag, (int)vlen, (int)vlen, value);
+ pr_debug("Got unsupported time [tag %02x]: '%*phN'\n",
+ tag, (int)vlen, value);
+ return -EBADMSG;
+invalid_time:
+ pr_debug("Got invalid time [tag %02x]: '%*phN'\n",
+ tag, (int)vlen, value);
return -EBADMSG;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_decode_time);
int x509_note_not_before(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
- return x509_note_time(&ctx->cert->valid_from, hdrlen, tag, value, vlen);
+ return x509_decode_time(&ctx->cert->valid_from, hdrlen, tag, value, vlen);
}
int x509_note_not_after(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
- return x509_note_time(&ctx->cert->valid_to, hdrlen, tag, value, vlen);
+ return x509_decode_time(&ctx->cert->valid_to, hdrlen, tag, value, vlen);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note a key identifier-based AuthorityKeyIdentifier
+ */
+int x509_akid_note_kid(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
+ struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
+
+ pr_debug("AKID: keyid: %*phN\n", (int)vlen, value);
+
+ if (ctx->cert->akid_skid)
+ return 0;
+
+ kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(value, vlen, "", 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(kid))
+ return PTR_ERR(kid);
+ pr_debug("authkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
+ ctx->cert->akid_skid = kid;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note a directoryName in an AuthorityKeyIdentifier
+ */
+int x509_akid_note_name(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+ pr_debug("AKID: name: %*phN\n", (int)vlen, value);
+
+ ctx->akid_raw_issuer = value;
+ ctx->akid_raw_issuer_size = vlen;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note a serial number in an AuthorityKeyIdentifier
+ */
+int x509_akid_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
+ struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
+
+ pr_debug("AKID: serial: %*phN\n", (int)vlen, value);
+
+ if (!ctx->akid_raw_issuer || ctx->cert->akid_id)
+ return 0;
+
+ kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(value,
+ vlen,
+ ctx->akid_raw_issuer,
+ ctx->akid_raw_issuer_size);
+ if (IS_ERR(kid))
+ return PTR_ERR(kid);
+
+ pr_debug("authkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
+ ctx->cert->akid_id = kid;
+ return 0;
}
struct public_key_signature sig; /* Signature parameters */
char *issuer; /* Name of certificate issuer */
char *subject; /* Name of certificate subject */
- struct asymmetric_key_id *id; /* Serial number + issuer */
+ struct asymmetric_key_id *id; /* Issuer + Serial number */
struct asymmetric_key_id *skid; /* Subject + subjectKeyId (optional) */
- struct asymmetric_key_id *authority; /* Authority key identifier (optional) */
- struct tm valid_from;
- struct tm valid_to;
+ struct asymmetric_key_id *akid_id; /* CA AuthKeyId matching ->id (optional) */
+ struct asymmetric_key_id *akid_skid; /* CA AuthKeyId matching ->skid (optional) */
+ time64_t valid_from;
+ time64_t valid_to;
const void *tbs; /* Signed data */
unsigned tbs_size; /* Size of signed data */
unsigned raw_sig_size; /* Size of sigature */
*/
extern void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert);
extern struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen);
+extern int x509_decode_time(time64_t *_t, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const unsigned char *value, size_t vlen);
/*
* x509_public_key.c
/**
* x509_request_asymmetric_key - Request a key by X.509 certificate params.
* @keyring: The keys to search.
- * @kid: The key ID.
+ * @id: The issuer & serialNumber to look for or NULL.
+ * @skid: The subjectKeyIdentifier to look for or NULL.
* @partial: Use partial match if true, exact if false.
*
- * Find a key in the given keyring by subject name and key ID. These might,
- * for instance, be the issuer name and the authority key ID of an X.509
- * certificate that needs to be verified.
+ * Find a key in the given keyring by identifier. The preferred identifier is
+ * the issuer + serialNumber and the fallback identifier is the
+ * subjectKeyIdentifier. If both are given, the lookup is by the former, but
+ * the latter must also match.
*/
struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring,
- const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid,
+ const struct asymmetric_key_id *id,
+ const struct asymmetric_key_id *skid,
bool partial)
{
- key_ref_t key;
- char *id, *p;
-
+ struct key *key;
+ key_ref_t ref;
+ const char *lookup;
+ char *req, *p;
+ int len;
+
+ if (id) {
+ lookup = id->data;
+ len = id->len;
+ } else {
+ lookup = skid->data;
+ len = skid->len;
+ }
+
/* Construct an identifier "id:<keyid>". */
- p = id = kmalloc(2 + 1 + kid->len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!id)
+ p = req = kmalloc(2 + 1 + len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!req)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
if (partial) {
*p++ = 'x';
}
*p++ = ':';
- p = bin2hex(p, kid->data, kid->len);
+ p = bin2hex(p, lookup, len);
*p = 0;
- pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id);
+ pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", req);
- key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1),
- &key_type_asymmetric, id);
- if (IS_ERR(key))
- pr_debug("Request for key '%s' err %ld\n", id, PTR_ERR(key));
- kfree(id);
+ ref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1),
+ &key_type_asymmetric, req);
+ if (IS_ERR(ref))
+ pr_debug("Request for key '%s' err %ld\n", req, PTR_ERR(ref));
+ kfree(req);
- if (IS_ERR(key)) {
- switch (PTR_ERR(key)) {
+ if (IS_ERR(ref)) {
+ switch (PTR_ERR(ref)) {
/* Hide some search errors */
case -EACCES:
case -ENOTDIR:
case -EAGAIN:
return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
default:
- return ERR_CAST(key);
+ return ERR_CAST(ref);
+ }
+ }
+
+ key = key_ref_to_ptr(ref);
+ if (id && skid) {
+ const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key);
+ if (!kids->id[1]) {
+ pr_debug("issuer+serial match, but expected SKID missing\n");
+ goto reject;
+ }
+ if (!asymmetric_key_id_same(skid, kids->id[1])) {
+ pr_debug("issuer+serial match, but SKID does not\n");
+ goto reject;
}
}
+
+ pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__, key_serial(key));
+ return key;
- pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__,
- key_serial(key_ref_to_ptr(key)));
- return key_ref_to_ptr(key);
+reject:
+ key_put(key);
+ return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREJECTED);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_request_asymmetric_key);
if (!trust_keyring)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_partial(cert->authority, ca_keyid))
+ if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_partial(cert->akid_skid, ca_keyid))
return -EPERM;
- key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, cert->authority,
+ key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
+ cert->akid_id, cert->akid_skid,
false);
if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
if (!use_builtin_keys
}
pr_devel("Cert Key Algo: %s\n", pkey_algo_name[cert->pub->pkey_algo]);
- pr_devel("Cert Valid From: %04ld-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d\n",
- cert->valid_from.tm_year + 1900, cert->valid_from.tm_mon + 1,
- cert->valid_from.tm_mday, cert->valid_from.tm_hour,
- cert->valid_from.tm_min, cert->valid_from.tm_sec);
- pr_devel("Cert Valid To: %04ld-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d\n",
- cert->valid_to.tm_year + 1900, cert->valid_to.tm_mon + 1,
- cert->valid_to.tm_mday, cert->valid_to.tm_hour,
- cert->valid_to.tm_min, cert->valid_to.tm_sec);
+ pr_devel("Cert Valid period: %lld-%lld\n", cert->valid_from, cert->valid_to);
pr_devel("Cert Signature: %s + %s\n",
pkey_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_algo],
hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo]);
cert->pub->id_type = PKEY_ID_X509;
/* Check the signature on the key if it appears to be self-signed */
- if (!cert->authority ||
- asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->skid, cert->authority)) {
+ if ((!cert->akid_skid && !cert->akid_id) ||
+ asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->skid, cert->akid_skid) ||
+ asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->id, cert->akid_id)) {
ret = x509_check_signature(cert->pub, cert); /* self-signed */
if (ret < 0)
goto error_free_cert;
* 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
*/
+#ifndef _CRYPTO_PKCS7_H
+#define _CRYPTO_PKCS7_H
+
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
+
struct key;
struct pkcs7_message;
/*
* pkcs7_verify.c
*/
-extern int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7);
+extern int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage);
+
+extern int pkcs7_supply_detached_data(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+ const void *data, size_t datalen);
+
+#endif /* _CRYPTO_PKCS7_H */
enum pkey_id_type {
PKEY_ID_PGP, /* OpenPGP generated key ID */
PKEY_ID_X509, /* X.509 arbitrary subjectKeyIdentifier */
+ PKEY_ID_PKCS7, /* Signature in PKCS#7 message */
PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST
};
extern const char *const pkey_id_type_name[PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST];
+/*
+ * The use to which an asymmetric key is being put.
+ */
+enum key_being_used_for {
+ VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
+ VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE,
+ VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE,
+ VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE,
+ VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE,
+ VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE,
+ NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR
+};
+extern const char *const key_being_used_for[NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR];
+
/*
* Cryptographic data for the public-key subtype of the asymmetric key type.
*
struct asymmetric_key_id;
extern struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring,
- const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid,
+ const struct asymmetric_key_id *id,
+ const struct asymmetric_key_id *skid,
bool partial);
#endif /* _LINUX_PUBLIC_KEY_H */
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
extern struct key *system_trusted_keyring;
static inline struct key *get_system_trusted_keyring(void)
}
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
+extern int system_verify_data(const void *data, unsigned long len,
+ const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage);
+#endif
+
#endif /* _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H */
ASN1_OP_MATCH_JUMP = 0x04,
ASN1_OP_MATCH_JUMP_OR_SKIP = 0x05,
ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY = 0x08,
+ ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY_OR_SKIP = 0x09,
ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY_ACT = 0x0a,
+ ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY_ACT_OR_SKIP = 0x0b,
/* Everything before here matches unconditionally */
ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_OR_SKIP = 0x11,
ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ACT_OR_SKIP = 0x13,
ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_JUMP_OR_SKIP = 0x15,
ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY = 0x18,
+ ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_OR_SKIP = 0x19,
ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_ACT = 0x1a,
+ ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_ACT_OR_SKIP = 0x1b,
/* Everything before here will want a tag from the data */
-#define ASN1_OP__MATCHES_TAG ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_ACT
+#define ASN1_OP__MATCHES_TAG ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_ACT_OR_SKIP
/* These are here to help fill up space */
- ASN1_OP_COND_FAIL = 0x1b,
- ASN1_OP_COMPLETE = 0x1c,
- ASN1_OP_ACT = 0x1d,
- ASN1_OP_RETURN = 0x1e,
+ ASN1_OP_COND_FAIL = 0x1c,
+ ASN1_OP_COMPLETE = 0x1d,
+ ASN1_OP_ACT = 0x1e,
+ ASN1_OP_MAYBE_ACT = 0x1f,
/* The following eight have bit 0 -> SET, 1 -> OF, 2 -> ACT */
ASN1_OP_END_SEQ = 0x20,
#define ASN1_OP_END__OF 0x02
#define ASN1_OP_END__ACT 0x04
+ ASN1_OP_RETURN = 0x28,
+
ASN1_OP__NR
};
} fam;
};
+struct lsm_ioctlop_audit {
+ struct path path;
+ u16 cmd;
+};
+
/* Auxiliary data to use in generating the audit record. */
struct common_audit_data {
char type;
#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD 8
#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE 9
#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY 10
+#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP 11
union {
struct path path;
struct dentry *dentry;
} key_struct;
#endif
char *kmod_name;
+ struct lsm_ioctlop_audit *op;
} u;
/* this union contains LSM specific data */
union {
extern int __init security_module_enable(const char *module);
extern void __init capability_add_hooks(void);
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
-void __init yama_add_hooks(void);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA
+extern void __init yama_add_hooks(void);
+#else
+static inline void __init yama_add_hooks(void) { }
#endif
#endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */
OID_signed_data, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.7.2 */
/* PKCS#9 {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)} */
OID_email_address, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.9.1 */
- OID_content_type, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.9.3 */
+ OID_contentType, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.9.3 */
OID_messageDigest, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.9.4 */
OID_signingTime, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.9.5 */
OID_smimeCapabilites, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.9.15 */
/* Microsoft Authenticode & Software Publishing */
OID_msIndirectData, /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.4 */
+ OID_msStatementType, /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.11 */
+ OID_msSpOpusInfo, /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.12 */
OID_msPeImageDataObjId, /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.15 */
OID_msIndividualSPKeyPurpose, /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.21 */
OID_msOutlookExpress, /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.16.4 */
OID_certAuthInfoAccess, /* 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1 */
OID_sha1, /* 1.3.14.3.2.26 */
OID_sha256, /* 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1 */
+ OID_sha384, /* 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.2 */
+ OID_sha512, /* 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.3 */
+ OID_sha224, /* 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.4 */
/* Distinguished Name attribute IDs [RFC 2256] */
OID_commonName, /* 2.5.4.3 */
#define PT_TRACE_SECCOMP PT_EVENT_FLAG(PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP)
#define PT_EXITKILL (PTRACE_O_EXITKILL << PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT)
+#define PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP (PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP << PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT)
/* single stepping state bits (used on ARM and PA-RISC) */
#define PT_SINGLESTEP_BIT 31
static inline int seccomp_mode(struct seccomp *s)
{
- return 0;
+ return SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP */
#ifndef _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H
#define _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
+
extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
- struct key *trusted_keyring, bool *_trusted);
+ struct key *trusted_keyring,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage,
+ bool *_trusted);
#endif /* _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H */
#define PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP (1 << PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP)
/* eventless options */
-#define PTRACE_O_EXITKILL (1 << 20)
+#define PTRACE_O_EXITKILL (1 << 20)
+#define PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP (1 << 21)
-#define PTRACE_O_MASK (0x000000ff | PTRACE_O_EXITKILL)
+#define PTRACE_O_MASK (\
+ 0x000000ff | PTRACE_O_EXITKILL | PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP)
#include <asm/ptrace.h>
See Documentation/nommu-mmap.txt for more information.
-config SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
- bool "Provide system-wide ring of trusted keys"
- depends on KEYS
+config SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
+ def_bool n
+ select SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+ select KEYS
+ select CRYPTO
+ select ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
+ select ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
+ select PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA
+ select ASN1
+ select OID_REGISTRY
+ select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
+ select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
help
- Provide a system keyring to which trusted keys can be added. Keys in
- the keyring are considered to be trusted. Keys may be added at will
- by the kernel from compiled-in data and from hardware key stores, but
- userspace may only add extra keys if those keys can be verified by
- keys already in the keyring.
-
- Keys in this keyring are used by module signature checking.
+ Provide PKCS#7 message verification using the contents of the system
+ trusted keyring to provide public keys. This then can be used for
+ module verification, kexec image verification and firmware blob
+ verification.
config PROFILING
bool "Profiling support"
config MODULE_SIG
bool "Module signature verification"
depends on MODULES
- select SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
- select KEYS
- select CRYPTO
- select ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
- select ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
- select PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA
- select ASN1
- select OID_REGISTRY
- select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
+ select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
help
Check modules for valid signatures upon load: the signature
is simply appended to the module. For more information see
Documentation/module-signing.txt.
+ Note that this option adds the OpenSSL development packages as a
+ kernel build dependency so that the signing tool can use its crypto
+ library.
+
!!!WARNING!!! If you enable this option, you MUST make sure that the
module DOES NOT get stripped after being signed. This includes the
debuginfo strip done by some packagers (such as rpmbuild) and
obj-y += up.o
endif
obj-$(CONFIG_UID16) += uid16.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) += system_keyring.o system_certificates.o
obj-$(CONFIG_MODULES) += module.o
obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += module_signing.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KALLSYMS) += kallsyms.o
targets += config_data.h
$(obj)/config_data.h: $(obj)/config_data.gz FORCE
$(call filechk,ikconfiggz)
-
-###############################################################################
-#
-# Roll all the X.509 certificates that we can find together and pull them into
-# the kernel so that they get loaded into the system trusted keyring during
-# boot.
-#
-# We look in the source root and the build root for all files whose name ends
-# in ".x509". Unfortunately, this will generate duplicate filenames, so we
-# have make canonicalise the pathnames and then sort them to discard the
-# duplicates.
-#
-###############################################################################
-ifeq ($(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING),y)
-X509_CERTIFICATES-y := $(wildcard *.x509) $(wildcard $(srctree)/*.x509)
-X509_CERTIFICATES-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += $(objtree)/signing_key.x509
-X509_CERTIFICATES-raw := $(sort $(foreach CERT,$(X509_CERTIFICATES-y), \
- $(or $(realpath $(CERT)),$(CERT))))
-X509_CERTIFICATES := $(subst $(realpath $(objtree))/,,$(X509_CERTIFICATES-raw))
-
-ifeq ($(X509_CERTIFICATES),)
-$(warning *** No X.509 certificates found ***)
-endif
-
-ifneq ($(wildcard $(obj)/.x509.list),)
-ifneq ($(shell cat $(obj)/.x509.list),$(X509_CERTIFICATES))
-$(warning X.509 certificate list changed to "$(X509_CERTIFICATES)" from "$(shell cat $(obj)/.x509.list)")
-$(shell rm $(obj)/.x509.list)
-endif
-endif
-
-kernel/system_certificates.o: $(obj)/x509_certificate_list
-
-quiet_cmd_x509certs = CERTS $@
- cmd_x509certs = cat $(X509_CERTIFICATES) /dev/null >$@ $(foreach X509,$(X509_CERTIFICATES),; $(kecho) " - Including cert $(X509)")
-
-targets += $(obj)/x509_certificate_list
-$(obj)/x509_certificate_list: $(X509_CERTIFICATES) $(obj)/.x509.list
- $(call if_changed,x509certs)
-
-targets += $(obj)/.x509.list
-$(obj)/.x509.list:
- @echo $(X509_CERTIFICATES) >$@
-endif
-
-clean-files := x509_certificate_list .x509.list
-
-ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG),y)
-###############################################################################
-#
-# If module signing is requested, say by allyesconfig, but a key has not been
-# supplied, then one will need to be generated to make sure the build does not
-# fail and that the kernel may be used afterwards.
-#
-###############################################################################
-ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH
-$(error Could not determine digest type to use from kernel config)
-endif
-
-signing_key.priv signing_key.x509: x509.genkey
- @echo "###"
- @echo "### Now generating an X.509 key pair to be used for signing modules."
- @echo "###"
- @echo "### If this takes a long time, you might wish to run rngd in the"
- @echo "### background to keep the supply of entropy topped up. It"
- @echo "### needs to be run as root, and uses a hardware random"
- @echo "### number generator if one is available."
- @echo "###"
- openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH) -days 36500 \
- -batch -x509 -config x509.genkey \
- -outform DER -out signing_key.x509 \
- -keyout signing_key.priv 2>&1
- @echo "###"
- @echo "### Key pair generated."
- @echo "###"
-
-x509.genkey:
- @echo Generating X.509 key generation config
- @echo >x509.genkey "[ req ]"
- @echo >>x509.genkey "default_bits = 4096"
- @echo >>x509.genkey "distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name"
- @echo >>x509.genkey "prompt = no"
- @echo >>x509.genkey "string_mask = utf8only"
- @echo >>x509.genkey "x509_extensions = myexts"
- @echo >>x509.genkey
- @echo >>x509.genkey "[ req_distinguished_name ]"
- @echo >>x509.genkey "#O = Unspecified company"
- @echo >>x509.genkey "CN = Build time autogenerated kernel key"
- @echo >>x509.genkey "#emailAddress = unspecified.user@unspecified.company"
- @echo >>x509.genkey
- @echo >>x509.genkey "[ myexts ]"
- @echo >>x509.genkey "basicConstraints=critical,CA:FALSE"
- @echo >>x509.genkey "keyUsage=digitalSignature"
- @echo >>x509.genkey "subjectKeyIdentifier=hash"
- @echo >>x509.genkey "authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid"
-endif
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/err.h>
-#include <crypto/public_key.h>
-#include <crypto/hash.h>
-#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
#include "module-internal.h"
/*
* - Information block
*/
struct module_signature {
- u8 algo; /* Public-key crypto algorithm [enum pkey_algo] */
- u8 hash; /* Digest algorithm [enum hash_algo] */
- u8 id_type; /* Key identifier type [enum pkey_id_type] */
- u8 signer_len; /* Length of signer's name */
- u8 key_id_len; /* Length of key identifier */
+ u8 algo; /* Public-key crypto algorithm [0] */
+ u8 hash; /* Digest algorithm [0] */
+ u8 id_type; /* Key identifier type [PKEY_ID_PKCS7] */
+ u8 signer_len; /* Length of signer's name [0] */
+ u8 key_id_len; /* Length of key identifier [0] */
u8 __pad[3];
__be32 sig_len; /* Length of signature data */
};
-/*
- * Digest the module contents.
- */
-static struct public_key_signature *mod_make_digest(enum hash_algo hash,
- const void *mod,
- unsigned long modlen)
-{
- struct public_key_signature *pks;
- struct crypto_shash *tfm;
- struct shash_desc *desc;
- size_t digest_size, desc_size;
- int ret;
-
- pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
-
- /* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
- * big the hash operational data will be.
- */
- tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[hash], 0, 0);
- if (IS_ERR(tfm))
- return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? ERR_PTR(-ENOPKG) : ERR_CAST(tfm);
-
- desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
- digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
-
- /* We allocate the hash operational data storage on the end of our
- * context data and the digest output buffer on the end of that.
- */
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- pks = kzalloc(digest_size + sizeof(*pks) + desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!pks)
- goto error_no_pks;
-
- pks->pkey_hash_algo = hash;
- pks->digest = (u8 *)pks + sizeof(*pks) + desc_size;
- pks->digest_size = digest_size;
-
- desc = (void *)pks + sizeof(*pks);
- desc->tfm = tfm;
- desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
-
- ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto error;
-
- ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, mod, modlen, pks->digest);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto error;
-
- crypto_free_shash(tfm);
- pr_devel("<==%s() = ok\n", __func__);
- return pks;
-
-error:
- kfree(pks);
-error_no_pks:
- crypto_free_shash(tfm);
- pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
- return ERR_PTR(ret);
-}
-
-/*
- * Extract an MPI array from the signature data. This represents the actual
- * signature. Each raw MPI is prefaced by a BE 2-byte value indicating the
- * size of the MPI in bytes.
- *
- * RSA signatures only have one MPI, so currently we only read one.
- */
-static int mod_extract_mpi_array(struct public_key_signature *pks,
- const void *data, size_t len)
-{
- size_t nbytes;
- MPI mpi;
-
- if (len < 3)
- return -EBADMSG;
- nbytes = ((const u8 *)data)[0] << 8 | ((const u8 *)data)[1];
- data += 2;
- len -= 2;
- if (len != nbytes)
- return -EBADMSG;
-
- mpi = mpi_read_raw_data(data, nbytes);
- if (!mpi)
- return -ENOMEM;
- pks->mpi[0] = mpi;
- pks->nr_mpi = 1;
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Request an asymmetric key.
- */
-static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(const char *signer, size_t signer_len,
- const u8 *key_id, size_t key_id_len)
-{
- key_ref_t key;
- size_t i;
- char *id, *q;
-
- pr_devel("==>%s(,%zu,,%zu)\n", __func__, signer_len, key_id_len);
-
- /* Construct an identifier. */
- id = kmalloc(signer_len + 2 + key_id_len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!id)
- return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
-
- memcpy(id, signer, signer_len);
-
- q = id + signer_len;
- *q++ = ':';
- *q++ = ' ';
- for (i = 0; i < key_id_len; i++) {
- *q++ = hex_asc[*key_id >> 4];
- *q++ = hex_asc[*key_id++ & 0x0f];
- }
-
- *q = 0;
-
- pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id);
-
- key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(system_trusted_keyring, 1),
- &key_type_asymmetric, id);
- if (IS_ERR(key))
- pr_warn("Request for unknown module key '%s' err %ld\n",
- id, PTR_ERR(key));
- kfree(id);
-
- if (IS_ERR(key)) {
- switch (PTR_ERR(key)) {
- /* Hide some search errors */
- case -EACCES:
- case -ENOTDIR:
- case -EAGAIN:
- return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
- default:
- return ERR_CAST(key);
- }
- }
-
- pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__, key_serial(key_ref_to_ptr(key)));
- return key_ref_to_ptr(key);
-}
-
/*
* Verify the signature on a module.
*/
int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long *_modlen)
{
- struct public_key_signature *pks;
struct module_signature ms;
- struct key *key;
- const void *sig;
size_t modlen = *_modlen, sig_len;
- int ret;
pr_devel("==>%s(,%zu)\n", __func__, modlen);
if (sig_len >= modlen)
return -EBADMSG;
modlen -= sig_len;
- if ((size_t)ms.signer_len + ms.key_id_len >= modlen)
- return -EBADMSG;
- modlen -= (size_t)ms.signer_len + ms.key_id_len;
-
*_modlen = modlen;
- sig = mod + modlen;
-
- /* For the moment, only support RSA and X.509 identifiers */
- if (ms.algo != PKEY_ALGO_RSA ||
- ms.id_type != PKEY_ID_X509)
- return -ENOPKG;
- if (ms.hash >= PKEY_HASH__LAST ||
- !hash_algo_name[ms.hash])
+ if (ms.id_type != PKEY_ID_PKCS7) {
+ pr_err("Module is not signed with expected PKCS#7 message\n");
return -ENOPKG;
-
- key = request_asymmetric_key(sig, ms.signer_len,
- sig + ms.signer_len, ms.key_id_len);
- if (IS_ERR(key))
- return PTR_ERR(key);
-
- pks = mod_make_digest(ms.hash, mod, modlen);
- if (IS_ERR(pks)) {
- ret = PTR_ERR(pks);
- goto error_put_key;
}
- ret = mod_extract_mpi_array(pks, sig + ms.signer_len + ms.key_id_len,
- sig_len);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto error_free_pks;
-
- ret = verify_signature(key, pks);
- pr_devel("verify_signature() = %d\n", ret);
+ if (ms.algo != 0 ||
+ ms.hash != 0 ||
+ ms.signer_len != 0 ||
+ ms.key_id_len != 0 ||
+ ms.__pad[0] != 0 ||
+ ms.__pad[1] != 0 ||
+ ms.__pad[2] != 0) {
+ pr_err("PKCS#7 signature info has unexpected non-zero params\n");
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
-error_free_pks:
- mpi_free(pks->rsa.s);
- kfree(pks);
-error_put_key:
- key_put(key);
- pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
- return ret;
+ return system_verify_data(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
+ VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE);
}
if (data & ~(unsigned long)PTRACE_O_MASK)
return -EINVAL;
+ if (unlikely(data & PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP)) {
+ if (!config_enabled(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) ||
+ !config_enabled(CONFIG_SECCOMP))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (seccomp_mode(¤t->seccomp) != SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED ||
+ current->ptrace & PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP)
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
/* Avoid intermediate state when all opts are cleared */
flags = child->ptrace;
flags &= ~(PTRACE_O_MASK << PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT);
*/
static u32 seccomp_run_filters(struct seccomp_data *sd)
{
- struct seccomp_filter *f = ACCESS_ONCE(current->seccomp.filter);
struct seccomp_data sd_local;
u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW;
+ /* Make sure cross-thread synced filter points somewhere sane. */
+ struct seccomp_filter *f =
+ lockless_dereference(current->seccomp.filter);
/* Ensure unexpected behavior doesn't result in failing open. */
if (unlikely(WARN_ON(f == NULL)))
return SECCOMP_RET_KILL;
- /* Make sure cross-thread synced filter points somewhere sane. */
- smp_read_barrier_depends();
-
if (!sd) {
populate_seccomp_data(&sd_local);
sd = &sd_local;
{
int mode = current->seccomp.mode;
- if (mode == 0)
+ if (config_enabled(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) &&
+ unlikely(current->ptrace & PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP))
+ return;
+
+ if (mode == SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED)
return;
else if (mode == SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT)
__secure_computing_strict(this_syscall);
int this_syscall = sd ? sd->nr :
syscall_get_nr(current, task_pt_regs(current));
+ if (config_enabled(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) &&
+ unlikely(current->ptrace & PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP))
+ return SECCOMP_PHASE1_OK;
+
switch (mode) {
case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
__secure_computing_strict(this_syscall); /* may call do_exit */
+++ /dev/null
-#include <linux/export.h>
-#include <linux/init.h>
-
- __INITRODATA
-
- .align 8
- .globl VMLINUX_SYMBOL(system_certificate_list)
-VMLINUX_SYMBOL(system_certificate_list):
-__cert_list_start:
- .incbin "kernel/x509_certificate_list"
-__cert_list_end:
-
- .align 8
- .globl VMLINUX_SYMBOL(system_certificate_list_size)
-VMLINUX_SYMBOL(system_certificate_list_size):
-#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
- .quad __cert_list_end - __cert_list_start
-#else
- .long __cert_list_end - __cert_list_start
-#endif
+++ /dev/null
-/* System trusted keyring for trusted public keys
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
- * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
- * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
- * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
- * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
- */
-
-#include <linux/export.h>
-#include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/sched.h>
-#include <linux/cred.h>
-#include <linux/err.h>
-#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
-#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
-#include "module-internal.h"
-
-struct key *system_trusted_keyring;
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(system_trusted_keyring);
-
-extern __initconst const u8 system_certificate_list[];
-extern __initconst const unsigned long system_certificate_list_size;
-
-/*
- * Load the compiled-in keys
- */
-static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void)
-{
- pr_notice("Initialise system trusted keyring\n");
-
- system_trusted_keyring =
- keyring_alloc(".system_keyring",
- KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(),
- ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
- KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH),
- KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
- if (IS_ERR(system_trusted_keyring))
- panic("Can't allocate system trusted keyring\n");
-
- set_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &system_trusted_keyring->flags);
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Must be initialised before we try and load the keys into the keyring.
- */
-device_initcall(system_trusted_keyring_init);
-
-/*
- * Load the compiled-in list of X.509 certificates.
- */
-static __init int load_system_certificate_list(void)
-{
- key_ref_t key;
- const u8 *p, *end;
- size_t plen;
-
- pr_notice("Loading compiled-in X.509 certificates\n");
-
- p = system_certificate_list;
- end = p + system_certificate_list_size;
- while (p < end) {
- /* Each cert begins with an ASN.1 SEQUENCE tag and must be more
- * than 256 bytes in size.
- */
- if (end - p < 4)
- goto dodgy_cert;
- if (p[0] != 0x30 &&
- p[1] != 0x82)
- goto dodgy_cert;
- plen = (p[2] << 8) | p[3];
- plen += 4;
- if (plen > end - p)
- goto dodgy_cert;
-
- key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(system_trusted_keyring, 1),
- "asymmetric",
- NULL,
- p,
- plen,
- ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
- KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
- KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
- KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED);
- if (IS_ERR(key)) {
- pr_err("Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (%ld)\n",
- PTR_ERR(key));
- } else {
- set_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key_ref_to_ptr(key)->flags);
- pr_notice("Loaded X.509 cert '%s'\n",
- key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description);
- key_ref_put(key);
- }
- p += plen;
- }
-
- return 0;
-
-dodgy_cert:
- pr_err("Problem parsing in-kernel X.509 certificate list\n");
- return 0;
-}
-late_initcall(load_system_certificate_list);
[ASN1_OP_MATCH_JUMP] = 1 + 1 + 1,
[ASN1_OP_MATCH_JUMP_OR_SKIP] = 1 + 1 + 1,
[ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY] = 1,
+ [ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY_OR_SKIP] = 1,
[ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY_ACT] = 1 + 1,
+ [ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY_ACT_OR_SKIP] = 1 + 1,
[ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_OR_SKIP] = 1 + 1,
[ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ACT_OR_SKIP] = 1 + 1 + 1,
[ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_JUMP_OR_SKIP] = 1 + 1 + 1,
[ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY] = 1,
+ [ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_OR_SKIP] = 1,
[ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_ACT] = 1 + 1,
+ [ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_ACT_OR_SKIP] = 1 + 1,
[ASN1_OP_COND_FAIL] = 1,
[ASN1_OP_COMPLETE] = 1,
[ASN1_OP_ACT] = 1 + 1,
+ [ASN1_OP_MAYBE_ACT] = 1 + 1,
[ASN1_OP_RETURN] = 1,
[ASN1_OP_END_SEQ] = 1,
[ASN1_OP_END_SEQ_OF] = 1 + 1,
unsigned char flags = 0;
#define FLAG_INDEFINITE_LENGTH 0x01
#define FLAG_MATCHED 0x02
+#define FLAG_LAST_MATCHED 0x04 /* Last tag matched */
#define FLAG_CONS 0x20 /* Corresponds to CONS bit in the opcode tag
* - ie. whether or not we are going to parse
* a compound type.
unsigned char tmp;
/* Skip conditional matches if possible */
- if ((op & ASN1_OP_MATCH__COND &&
- flags & FLAG_MATCHED) ||
- dp == datalen) {
+ if ((op & ASN1_OP_MATCH__COND && flags & FLAG_MATCHED) ||
+ (op & ASN1_OP_MATCH__SKIP && dp == datalen)) {
+ flags &= ~FLAG_LAST_MATCHED;
pc += asn1_op_lengths[op];
goto next_op;
}
/* Decide how to handle the operation */
switch (op) {
case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY_ACT:
+ case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY_ACT_OR_SKIP:
case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_ACT:
+ case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_ACT_OR_SKIP:
ret = actions[machine[pc + 1]](context, hdr, tag, data + dp, len);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
case ASN1_OP_MATCH:
case ASN1_OP_MATCH_OR_SKIP:
case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY:
+ case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY_OR_SKIP:
case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_OR_SKIP:
case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY:
+ case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_OR_SKIP:
skip_data:
if (!(flags & FLAG_CONS)) {
if (flags & FLAG_INDEFINITE_LENGTH) {
pc += asn1_op_lengths[op];
goto next_op;
+ case ASN1_OP_MAYBE_ACT:
+ if (!(flags & FLAG_LAST_MATCHED)) {
+ pc += asn1_op_lengths[op];
+ goto next_op;
+ }
case ASN1_OP_ACT:
ret = actions[machine[pc + 1]](context, hdr, tag, data + tdp, len);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
pc += asn1_op_lengths[op];
goto next_op;
if (unlikely(jsp <= 0))
goto jump_stack_underflow;
pc = jump_stack[--jsp];
+ flags |= FLAG_MATCHED | FLAG_LAST_MATCHED;
goto next_op;
default:
}
/* Shouldn't reach here */
- pr_err("ASN.1 decoder error: Found reserved opcode (%u)\n", op);
+ pr_err("ASN.1 decoder error: Found reserved opcode (%u) pc=%zu\n",
+ op, pc);
return -EBADMSG;
data_overrun_error:
docproc
sortextable
asn1_compiler
+extract-cert
+sign-file
echo-why = $(call escsq, $(strip $(why)))
endif
+
+###############################################################################
+#
+# When a Kconfig string contains a filename, it is suitable for
+# passing to shell commands. It is surrounded by double-quotes, and
+# any double-quotes or backslashes within it are escaped by
+# backslashes.
+#
+# This is no use for dependencies or $(wildcard). We need to strip the
+# surrounding quotes and the escaping from quotes and backslashes, and
+# we *do* need to escape any spaces in the string. So, for example:
+#
+# Usage: $(eval $(call config_filename,FOO))
+#
+# Defines FOO_FILENAME based on the contents of the CONFIG_FOO option,
+# transformed as described above to be suitable for use within the
+# makefile.
+#
+# Also, if the filename is a relative filename and exists in the source
+# tree but not the build tree, define FOO_SRCPREFIX as $(srctree)/ to
+# be prefixed to *both* command invocation and dependencies.
+#
+# Note: We also print the filenames in the quiet_cmd_foo text, and
+# perhaps ought to have a version specially escaped for that purpose.
+# But it's only cosmetic, and $(patsubst "%",%,$(CONFIG_FOO)) is good
+# enough. It'll strip the quotes in the common case where there's no
+# space and it's a simple filename, and it'll retain the quotes when
+# there's a space. There are some esoteric cases in which it'll print
+# the wrong thing, but we don't really care. The actual dependencies
+# and commands *do* get it right, with various combinations of single
+# and double quotes, backslashes and spaces in the filenames.
+#
+###############################################################################
+#
+space_escape := %%%SPACE%%%
+#
+define config_filename
+ifneq ($$(CONFIG_$(1)),"")
+$(1)_FILENAME := $$(subst \\,\,$$(subst \$$(quote),$$(quote),$$(subst $$(space_escape),\$$(space),$$(patsubst "%",%,$$(subst $$(space),$$(space_escape),$$(CONFIG_$(1)))))))
+ifneq ($$(patsubst /%,%,$$(firstword $$($(1)_FILENAME))),$$(firstword $$($(1)_FILENAME)))
+else
+ifeq ($$(wildcard $$($(1)_FILENAME)),)
+ifneq ($$(wildcard $$(srctree)/$$($(1)_FILENAME)),)
+$(1)_SRCPREFIX := $(srctree)/
+endif
+endif
+endif
+endif
+endef
+#
+###############################################################################
hostprogs-$(BUILD_C_RECORDMCOUNT) += recordmcount
hostprogs-$(CONFIG_BUILDTIME_EXTABLE_SORT) += sortextable
hostprogs-$(CONFIG_ASN1) += asn1_compiler
+hostprogs-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += sign-file
+hostprogs-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) += extract-cert
HOSTCFLAGS_sortextable.o = -I$(srctree)/tools/include
HOSTCFLAGS_asn1_compiler.o = -I$(srctree)/include
+HOSTLOADLIBES_sign-file = -lcrypto
+HOSTLOADLIBES_extract-cert = -lcrypto
always := $(hostprogs-y) $(hostprogs-m)
mkdir -p $(2) ; \
cp $@ $(2) ; \
$(mod_strip_cmd) $(2)/$(notdir $@) ; \
- $(mod_sign_cmd) $(2)/$(notdir $@) $(patsubst %,|| true,$(KBUILD_EXTMOD)) ; \
+ $(mod_sign_cmd) $(2)/$(notdir $@) $(patsubst %,|| true,$(KBUILD_EXTMOD)) && \
$(mod_compress_cmd) $(2)/$(notdir $@)
# Modules built outside the kernel source tree go into extra by default
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <unistd.h>
struct action {
struct action *next;
+ char *name;
unsigned char index;
- char name[];
};
static struct action *action_list;
enum token_type token_type : 8;
unsigned char size;
struct action *action;
- const char *value;
+ char *content;
struct type *type;
};
static struct token *token_list;
static unsigned nr_tokens;
-static _Bool verbose;
+static bool verbose_opt;
+static bool debug_opt;
-#define debug(fmt, ...) do { if (verbose) printf(fmt, ## __VA_ARGS__); } while (0)
+#define verbose(fmt, ...) do { if (verbose_opt) printf(fmt, ## __VA_ARGS__); } while (0)
+#define debug(fmt, ...) do { if (debug_opt) printf(fmt, ## __VA_ARGS__); } while (0)
static int directive_compare(const void *_key, const void *_pdir)
{
dlen = strlen(dir);
clen = (dlen < token->size) ? dlen : token->size;
- //debug("cmp(%*.*s,%s) = ",
- // (int)token->size, (int)token->size, token->value,
- // dir);
+ //debug("cmp(%s,%s) = ", token->content, dir);
- val = memcmp(token->value, dir, clen);
+ val = memcmp(token->content, dir, clen);
if (val != 0) {
//debug("%d [cmp]\n", val);
return val;
static void tokenise(char *buffer, char *end)
{
struct token *tokens;
- char *line, *nl, *p, *q;
+ char *line, *nl, *start, *p, *q;
unsigned tix, lineno;
/* Assume we're going to have half as many tokens as we have
break;
tokens[tix].line = lineno;
- tokens[tix].value = p;
+ start = p;
/* Handle string tokens */
if (isalpha(*p)) {
- const char **dir;
+ const char **dir, *start = p;
/* Can be a directive, type name or element
* name. Find the end of the name.
tokens[tix].size = q - p;
p = q;
+ tokens[tix].content = malloc(tokens[tix].size + 1);
+ if (!tokens[tix].content) {
+ perror(NULL);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ memcpy(tokens[tix].content, start, tokens[tix].size);
+ tokens[tix].content[tokens[tix].size] = 0;
+
/* If it begins with a lowercase letter then
* it's an element name
*/
- if (islower(tokens[tix].value[0])) {
+ if (islower(tokens[tix].content[0])) {
tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_ELEMENT_NAME;
continue;
}
q++;
tokens[tix].size = q - p;
p = q;
+ tokens[tix].content = malloc(tokens[tix].size + 1);
+ if (!tokens[tix].content) {
+ perror(NULL);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ memcpy(tokens[tix].content, start, tokens[tix].size);
+ tokens[tix].content[tokens[tix].size] = 0;
tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_NUMBER;
continue;
}
if (memcmp(p, "::=", 3) == 0) {
p += 3;
tokens[tix].size = 3;
+ tokens[tix].content = "::=";
tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_ASSIGNMENT;
continue;
}
if (memcmp(p, "({", 2) == 0) {
p += 2;
tokens[tix].size = 2;
+ tokens[tix].content = "({";
tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_OPEN_ACTION;
continue;
}
if (memcmp(p, "})", 2) == 0) {
p += 2;
tokens[tix].size = 2;
+ tokens[tix].content = "})";
tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_CLOSE_ACTION;
continue;
}
switch (*p) {
case '{':
p += 1;
+ tokens[tix].content = "{";
tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_OPEN_CURLY;
continue;
case '}':
p += 1;
+ tokens[tix].content = "}";
tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_CLOSE_CURLY;
continue;
case '[':
p += 1;
+ tokens[tix].content = "[";
tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_OPEN_SQUARE;
continue;
case ']':
p += 1;
+ tokens[tix].content = "]";
tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_CLOSE_SQUARE;
continue;
case ',':
p += 1;
+ tokens[tix].content = ",";
tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_COMMA;
continue;
default:
}
nr_tokens = tix;
- debug("Extracted %u tokens\n", nr_tokens);
+ verbose("Extracted %u tokens\n", nr_tokens);
#if 0
{
int n;
for (n = 0; n < nr_tokens; n++)
- debug("Token %3u: '%*.*s'\n",
- n,
- (int)token_list[n].size, (int)token_list[n].size,
- token_list[n].value);
+ debug("Token %3u: '%s'\n", n, token_list[n].content);
}
#endif
}
static void build_type_list(void);
static void parse(void);
+static void dump_elements(void);
static void render(FILE *out, FILE *hdr);
/*
char *kbuild_verbose;
int fd;
+ kbuild_verbose = getenv("KBUILD_VERBOSE");
+ if (kbuild_verbose)
+ verbose_opt = atoi(kbuild_verbose);
+
+ while (argc > 4) {
+ if (strcmp(argv[1], "-v") == 0)
+ verbose_opt = true;
+ else if (strcmp(argv[1], "-d") == 0)
+ debug_opt = true;
+ else
+ break;
+ memmove(&argv[1], &argv[2], (argc - 2) * sizeof(char *));
+ argc--;
+ }
+
if (argc != 4) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Format: %s <grammar-file> <c-file> <hdr-file>\n",
+ fprintf(stderr, "Format: %s [-v] [-d] <grammar-file> <c-file> <hdr-file>\n",
argv[0]);
exit(2);
}
- kbuild_verbose = getenv("KBUILD_VERBOSE");
- if (kbuild_verbose)
- verbose = atoi(kbuild_verbose);
-
filename = argv[1];
outputname = argv[2];
headername = argv[3];
tokenise(buffer, buffer + readlen);
build_type_list();
parse();
+ dump_elements();
out = fopen(outputname, "w");
if (!out) {
unsigned flags;
#define ELEMENT_IMPLICIT 0x0001
#define ELEMENT_EXPLICIT 0x0002
-#define ELEMENT_MARKED 0x0004
+#define ELEMENT_TAG_SPECIFIED 0x0004
#define ELEMENT_RENDERED 0x0008
#define ELEMENT_SKIPPABLE 0x0010
#define ELEMENT_CONDITIONAL 0x0020
if ((*a)->name->size != (*b)->name->size)
return (*a)->name->size - (*b)->name->size;
else
- return memcmp((*a)->name->value, (*b)->name->value,
+ return memcmp((*a)->name->content, (*b)->name->content,
(*a)->name->size);
}
if (token->size != type->name->size)
return token->size - type->name->size;
else
- return memcmp(token->value, type->name->value,
+ return memcmp(token->content, type->name->content,
token->size);
}
qsort(type_index, nr, sizeof(type_index[0]), type_index_compare);
- debug("Extracted %u types\n", nr_types);
+ verbose("Extracted %u types\n", nr_types);
#if 0
for (n = 0; n < nr_types; n++) {
struct type *type = type_index[n];
- debug("- %*.*s\n",
- (int)type->name->size,
- (int)type->name->size,
- type->name->value);
+ debug("- %*.*s\n", type->name->content);
}
#endif
}
type->element->type_def = type;
if (cursor != type[1].name) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Parse error at token '%*.*s'\n",
- filename, cursor->line,
- (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Parse error at token '%s'\n",
+ filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
exit(1);
}
} while (type++, !(type->flags & TYPE_STOP_MARKER));
- debug("Extracted %u actions\n", nr_actions);
+ verbose("Extracted %u actions\n", nr_actions);
}
static struct element *element_list;
cursor++;
break;
default:
- fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Unrecognised tag class token '%*.*s'\n",
- filename, cursor->line,
- (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Unrecognised tag class token '%s'\n",
+ filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
exit(1);
}
if (cursor >= end)
goto overrun_error;
if (cursor->token_type != TOKEN_NUMBER) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Missing tag number '%*.*s'\n",
- filename, cursor->line,
- (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Missing tag number '%s'\n",
+ filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
exit(1);
}
element->tag &= ~0x1f;
- element->tag |= strtoul(cursor->value, &p, 10);
- if (p - cursor->value != cursor->size)
+ element->tag |= strtoul(cursor->content, &p, 10);
+ element->flags |= ELEMENT_TAG_SPECIFIED;
+ if (p - cursor->content != cursor->size)
abort();
cursor++;
if (cursor >= end)
goto overrun_error;
if (cursor->token_type != TOKEN_CLOSE_SQUARE) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Missing closing square bracket '%*.*s'\n",
- filename, cursor->line,
- (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Missing closing square bracket '%s'\n",
+ filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
exit(1);
}
cursor++;
ref = bsearch(cursor, type_index, nr_types, sizeof(type_index[0]),
type_finder);
if (!ref) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Type '%*.*s' undefined\n",
- filename, cursor->line,
- (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Type '%s' undefined\n",
+ filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
exit(1);
}
cursor->type = *ref;
break;
default:
- fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Token '%*.*s' does not introduce a type\n",
- filename, cursor->line,
- (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Token '%s' does not introduce a type\n",
+ filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
exit(1);
}
if (cursor >= end)
goto overrun_error;
if (cursor->token_type != TOKEN_ELEMENT_NAME) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Token '%*.*s' is not an action function name\n",
- filename, cursor->line,
- (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Token '%s' is not an action function name\n",
+ filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
exit(1);
}
- action = malloc(sizeof(struct action) + cursor->size + 1);
+ action = malloc(sizeof(struct action));
if (!action) {
perror(NULL);
exit(1);
}
action->index = 0;
- memcpy(action->name, cursor->value, cursor->size);
- action->name[cursor->size] = 0;
+ action->name = cursor->content;
for (ppaction = &action_list;
*ppaction;
if (cursor >= end)
goto overrun_error;
if (cursor->token_type != TOKEN_CLOSE_ACTION) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Missing close action, got '%*.*s'\n",
- filename, cursor->line,
- (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Missing close action, got '%s'\n",
+ filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
exit(1);
}
cursor++;
return top;
parse_error:
- fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Unexpected token '%*.*s'\n",
- filename, cursor->line,
- (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Unexpected token '%s'\n",
+ filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
exit(1);
overrun_error:
struct token *cursor = *_cursor, *name;
if (cursor->token_type != TOKEN_OPEN_CURLY) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Expected compound to start with brace not '%*.*s'\n",
- filename, cursor->line,
- (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Expected compound to start with brace not '%s'\n",
+ filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
exit(1);
}
cursor++;
children->flags &= ~ELEMENT_CONDITIONAL;
if (cursor->token_type != TOKEN_CLOSE_CURLY) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Expected compound closure, got '%*.*s'\n",
- filename, cursor->line,
- (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Expected compound closure, got '%s'\n",
+ filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
exit(1);
}
cursor++;
exit(1);
}
+static void dump_element(const struct element *e, int level)
+{
+ const struct element *c;
+ const struct type *t = e->type_def;
+ const char *name = e->name ? e->name->content : ".";
+ const char *tname = t && t->name ? t->name->content : ".";
+ char tag[32];
+
+ if (e->class == 0 && e->method == 0 && e->tag == 0)
+ strcpy(tag, "<...>");
+ else if (e->class == ASN1_UNIV)
+ sprintf(tag, "%s %s %s",
+ asn1_classes[e->class],
+ asn1_methods[e->method],
+ asn1_universal_tags[e->tag]);
+ else
+ sprintf(tag, "%s %s %u",
+ asn1_classes[e->class],
+ asn1_methods[e->method],
+ e->tag);
+
+ printf("%c%c%c%c%c %c %*s[*] \e[33m%s\e[m %s %s \e[35m%s\e[m\n",
+ e->flags & ELEMENT_IMPLICIT ? 'I' : '-',
+ e->flags & ELEMENT_EXPLICIT ? 'E' : '-',
+ e->flags & ELEMENT_TAG_SPECIFIED ? 'T' : '-',
+ e->flags & ELEMENT_SKIPPABLE ? 'S' : '-',
+ e->flags & ELEMENT_CONDITIONAL ? 'C' : '-',
+ "-tTqQcaro"[e->compound],
+ level, "",
+ tag,
+ tname,
+ name,
+ e->action ? e->action->name : "");
+ if (e->compound == TYPE_REF)
+ dump_element(e->type->type->element, level + 3);
+ else
+ for (c = e->children; c; c = c->next)
+ dump_element(c, level + 3);
+}
+
+static void dump_elements(void)
+{
+ if (debug_opt)
+ dump_element(type_list[0].element, 0);
+}
+
static void render_element(FILE *out, struct element *e, struct element *tag);
static void render_out_of_line_list(FILE *out);
}
/* We do two passes - the first one calculates all the offsets */
- debug("Pass 1\n");
+ verbose("Pass 1\n");
nr_entries = 0;
root = &type_list[0];
render_element(NULL, root->element, NULL);
e->flags &= ~ELEMENT_RENDERED;
/* And then we actually render */
- debug("Pass 2\n");
+ verbose("Pass 2\n");
fprintf(out, "\n");
fprintf(out, "static const unsigned char %s_machine[] = {\n",
grammar_name);
*/
static void render_element(FILE *out, struct element *e, struct element *tag)
{
- struct element *ec;
+ struct element *ec, *x;
const char *cond, *act;
int entry, skippable = 0, outofline = 0;
outofline = 1;
if (e->type_def && out) {
- render_more(out, "\t// %*.*s\n",
- (int)e->type_def->name->size, (int)e->type_def->name->size,
- e->type_def->name->value);
+ render_more(out, "\t// %s\n", e->type_def->name->content);
}
/* Render the operation */
act = e->action ? "_ACT" : "";
switch (e->compound) {
case ANY:
- render_opcode(out, "ASN1_OP_%sMATCH_ANY%s,", cond, act);
+ render_opcode(out, "ASN1_OP_%sMATCH_ANY%s%s,",
+ cond, act, skippable ? "_OR_SKIP" : "");
if (e->name)
- render_more(out, "\t\t// %*.*s",
- (int)e->name->size, (int)e->name->size,
- e->name->value);
+ render_more(out, "\t\t// %s", e->name->content);
render_more(out, "\n");
goto dont_render_tag;
break;
}
- if (e->name)
- render_more(out, "\t\t// %*.*s",
- (int)e->name->size, (int)e->name->size,
- e->name->value);
+ x = tag ?: e;
+ if (x->name)
+ render_more(out, "\t\t// %s", x->name->content);
render_more(out, "\n");
/* Render the tag */
- if (!tag)
+ if (!tag || !(tag->flags & ELEMENT_TAG_SPECIFIED))
tag = e;
+
if (tag->class == ASN1_UNIV &&
tag->tag != 14 &&
tag->tag != 15 &&
case TYPE_REF:
render_element(out, e->type->type->element, tag);
if (e->action)
- render_opcode(out, "ASN1_OP_ACT,\n");
+ render_opcode(out, "ASN1_OP_%sACT,\n",
+ skippable ? "MAYBE_" : "");
break;
case SEQUENCE:
* skipability */
render_opcode(out, "_jump_target(%u),", e->entry_index);
if (e->type_def && e->type_def->name)
- render_more(out, "\t\t// --> %*.*s",
- (int)e->type_def->name->size,
- (int)e->type_def->name->size,
- e->type_def->name->value);
+ render_more(out, "\t\t// --> %s",
+ e->type_def->name->content);
render_more(out, "\n");
if (!(e->flags & ELEMENT_RENDERED)) {
e->flags |= ELEMENT_RENDERED;
* skipability */
render_opcode(out, "_jump_target(%u),", e->entry_index);
if (e->type_def && e->type_def->name)
- render_more(out, "\t\t// --> %*.*s",
- (int)e->type_def->name->size,
- (int)e->type_def->name->size,
- e->type_def->name->value);
+ render_more(out, "\t\t// --> %s",
+ e->type_def->name->content);
render_more(out, "\n");
if (!(e->flags & ELEMENT_RENDERED)) {
e->flags |= ELEMENT_RENDERED;
case CHOICE:
for (ec = e->children; ec; ec = ec->next)
- render_element(out, ec, NULL);
+ render_element(out, ec, ec);
if (!skippable)
render_opcode(out, "ASN1_OP_COND_FAIL,\n");
if (e->action)
--- /dev/null
+/* Extract X.509 certificate in DER form from PKCS#11 or PEM.
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2014 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright © 2015 Intel Corporation.
+ *
+ * Authors: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+ * David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <getopt.h>
+#include <err.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+
+#define PKEY_ID_PKCS7 2
+
+static __attribute__((noreturn))
+void format(void)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Usage: scripts/extract-cert <source> <dest>\n");
+ exit(2);
+}
+
+static void display_openssl_errors(int l)
+{
+ const char *file;
+ char buf[120];
+ int e, line;
+
+ if (ERR_peek_error() == 0)
+ return;
+ fprintf(stderr, "At main.c:%d:\n", l);
+
+ while ((e = ERR_get_error_line(&file, &line))) {
+ ERR_error_string(e, buf);
+ fprintf(stderr, "- SSL %s: %s:%d\n", buf, file, line);
+ }
+}
+
+static void drain_openssl_errors(void)
+{
+ const char *file;
+ int line;
+
+ if (ERR_peek_error() == 0)
+ return;
+ while (ERR_get_error_line(&file, &line)) {}
+}
+
+#define ERR(cond, fmt, ...) \
+ do { \
+ bool __cond = (cond); \
+ display_openssl_errors(__LINE__); \
+ if (__cond) { \
+ err(1, fmt, ## __VA_ARGS__); \
+ } \
+ } while(0)
+
+static const char *key_pass;
+static BIO *wb;
+static char *cert_dst;
+int kbuild_verbose;
+
+static void write_cert(X509 *x509)
+{
+ char buf[200];
+
+ if (!wb) {
+ wb = BIO_new_file(cert_dst, "wb");
+ ERR(!wb, "%s", cert_dst);
+ }
+ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(x509), buf, sizeof(buf));
+ ERR(!i2d_X509_bio(wb, x509), cert_dst);
+ if (kbuild_verbose)
+ fprintf(stderr, "Extracted cert: %s\n", buf);
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ char *cert_src;
+
+ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+ ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ kbuild_verbose = atoi(getenv("KBUILD_VERBOSE")?:"0");
+
+ key_pass = getenv("KBUILD_SIGN_PIN");
+
+ if (argc != 3)
+ format();
+
+ cert_src = argv[1];
+ cert_dst = argv[2];
+
+ if (!cert_src[0]) {
+ /* Invoked with no input; create empty file */
+ FILE *f = fopen(cert_dst, "wb");
+ ERR(!f, "%s", cert_dst);
+ fclose(f);
+ exit(0);
+ } else if (!strncmp(cert_src, "pkcs11:", 7)) {
+ ENGINE *e;
+ struct {
+ const char *cert_id;
+ X509 *cert;
+ } parms;
+
+ parms.cert_id = cert_src;
+ parms.cert = NULL;
+
+ ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
+ drain_openssl_errors();
+ e = ENGINE_by_id("pkcs11");
+ ERR(!e, "Load PKCS#11 ENGINE");
+ if (ENGINE_init(e))
+ drain_openssl_errors();
+ else
+ ERR(1, "ENGINE_init");
+ if (key_pass)
+ ERR(!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, "PIN", key_pass, 0), "Set PKCS#11 PIN");
+ ENGINE_ctrl_cmd(e, "LOAD_CERT_CTRL", 0, &parms, NULL, 1);
+ ERR(!parms.cert, "Get X.509 from PKCS#11");
+ write_cert(parms.cert);
+ } else {
+ BIO *b;
+ X509 *x509;
+
+ b = BIO_new_file(cert_src, "rb");
+ ERR(!b, "%s", cert_src);
+
+ while (1) {
+ x509 = PEM_read_bio_X509(b, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (wb && !x509) {
+ unsigned long err = ERR_peek_last_error();
+ if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_PEM &&
+ ERR_GET_REASON(err) == PEM_R_NO_START_LINE) {
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ ERR(!x509, "%s", cert_src);
+ write_cert(x509);
+ }
+ }
+
+ BIO_free(wb);
+
+ return 0;
+}
/* types, roles, and allows */
fprintf(fout, "type base_t;\n");
+ fprintf(fout, "role base_r;\n");
fprintf(fout, "role base_r types { base_t };\n");
for (i = 0; secclass_map[i].name; i++)
fprintf(fout, "allow base_t base_t:%s *;\n",
+++ /dev/null
-#!/usr/bin/perl -w
-#
-# Sign a module file using the given key.
-#
-
-my $USAGE =
-"Usage: scripts/sign-file [-v] <hash algo> <key> <x509> <module> [<dest>]\n" .
-" scripts/sign-file [-v] -s <raw sig> <hash algo> <x509> <module> [<dest>]\n";
-
-use strict;
-use FileHandle;
-use IPC::Open2;
-use Getopt::Std;
-
-my %opts;
-getopts('vs:', \%opts) or die $USAGE;
-my $verbose = $opts{'v'};
-my $signature_file = $opts{'s'};
-
-die $USAGE if ($#ARGV > 4);
-die $USAGE if (!$signature_file && $#ARGV < 3 || $signature_file && $#ARGV < 2);
-
-my $dgst = shift @ARGV;
-my $private_key;
-if (!$signature_file) {
- $private_key = shift @ARGV;
-}
-my $x509 = shift @ARGV;
-my $module = shift @ARGV;
-my ($dest, $keep_orig);
-if (@ARGV) {
- $dest = $ARGV[0];
- $keep_orig = 1;
-} else {
- $dest = $module . "~";
-}
-
-die "Can't read private key\n" if (!$signature_file && !-r $private_key);
-die "Can't read signature file\n" if ($signature_file && !-r $signature_file);
-die "Can't read X.509 certificate\n" unless (-r $x509);
-die "Can't read module\n" unless (-r $module);
-
-#
-# Function to read the contents of a file into a variable.
-#
-sub read_file($)
-{
- my ($file) = @_;
- my $contents;
- my $len;
-
- open(FD, "<$file") || die $file;
- binmode FD;
- my @st = stat(FD);
- die $file if (!@st);
- $len = read(FD, $contents, $st[7]) || die $file;
- close(FD) || die $file;
- die "$file: Wanted length ", $st[7], ", got ", $len, "\n"
- if ($len != $st[7]);
- return $contents;
-}
-
-###############################################################################
-#
-# First of all, we have to parse the X.509 certificate to find certain details
-# about it.
-#
-# We read the DER-encoded X509 certificate and parse it to extract the Subject
-# name and Subject Key Identifier. Theis provides the data we need to build
-# the certificate identifier.
-#
-# The signer's name part of the identifier is fabricated from the commonName,
-# the organizationName or the emailAddress components of the X.509 subject
-# name.
-#
-# The subject key ID is used to select which of that signer's certificates
-# we're intending to use to sign the module.
-#
-###############################################################################
-my $x509_certificate = read_file($x509);
-
-my $UNIV = 0 << 6;
-my $APPL = 1 << 6;
-my $CONT = 2 << 6;
-my $PRIV = 3 << 6;
-
-my $CONS = 0x20;
-
-my $BOOLEAN = 0x01;
-my $INTEGER = 0x02;
-my $BIT_STRING = 0x03;
-my $OCTET_STRING = 0x04;
-my $NULL = 0x05;
-my $OBJ_ID = 0x06;
-my $UTF8String = 0x0c;
-my $SEQUENCE = 0x10;
-my $SET = 0x11;
-my $UTCTime = 0x17;
-my $GeneralizedTime = 0x18;
-
-my %OIDs = (
- pack("CCC", 85, 4, 3) => "commonName",
- pack("CCC", 85, 4, 6) => "countryName",
- pack("CCC", 85, 4, 10) => "organizationName",
- pack("CCC", 85, 4, 11) => "organizationUnitName",
- pack("CCCCCCCCC", 42, 134, 72, 134, 247, 13, 1, 1, 1) => "rsaEncryption",
- pack("CCCCCCCCC", 42, 134, 72, 134, 247, 13, 1, 1, 5) => "sha1WithRSAEncryption",
- pack("CCCCCCCCC", 42, 134, 72, 134, 247, 13, 1, 9, 1) => "emailAddress",
- pack("CCC", 85, 29, 35) => "authorityKeyIdentifier",
- pack("CCC", 85, 29, 14) => "subjectKeyIdentifier",
- pack("CCC", 85, 29, 19) => "basicConstraints"
-);
-
-###############################################################################
-#
-# Extract an ASN.1 element from a string and return information about it.
-#
-###############################################################################
-sub asn1_extract($$@)
-{
- my ($cursor, $expected_tag, $optional) = @_;
-
- return [ -1 ]
- if ($cursor->[1] == 0 && $optional);
-
- die $x509, ": ", $cursor->[0], ": ASN.1 data underrun (elem ", $cursor->[1], ")\n"
- if ($cursor->[1] < 2);
-
- my ($tag, $len) = unpack("CC", substr(${$cursor->[2]}, $cursor->[0], 2));
-
- if ($expected_tag != -1 && $tag != $expected_tag) {
- return [ -1 ]
- if ($optional);
- die $x509, ": ", $cursor->[0], ": ASN.1 unexpected tag (", $tag,
- " not ", $expected_tag, ")\n";
- }
-
- $cursor->[0] += 2;
- $cursor->[1] -= 2;
-
- die $x509, ": ", $cursor->[0], ": ASN.1 long tag\n"
- if (($tag & 0x1f) == 0x1f);
- die $x509, ": ", $cursor->[0], ": ASN.1 indefinite length\n"
- if ($len == 0x80);
-
- if ($len > 0x80) {
- my $l = $len - 0x80;
- die $x509, ": ", $cursor->[0], ": ASN.1 data underrun (len len $l)\n"
- if ($cursor->[1] < $l);
-
- if ($l == 0x1) {
- $len = unpack("C", substr(${$cursor->[2]}, $cursor->[0], 1));
- } elsif ($l == 0x2) {
- $len = unpack("n", substr(${$cursor->[2]}, $cursor->[0], 2));
- } elsif ($l == 0x3) {
- $len = unpack("C", substr(${$cursor->[2]}, $cursor->[0], 1)) << 16;
- $len = unpack("n", substr(${$cursor->[2]}, $cursor->[0] + 1, 2));
- } elsif ($l == 0x4) {
- $len = unpack("N", substr(${$cursor->[2]}, $cursor->[0], 4));
- } else {
- die $x509, ": ", $cursor->[0], ": ASN.1 element too long (", $l, ")\n";
- }
-
- $cursor->[0] += $l;
- $cursor->[1] -= $l;
- }
-
- die $x509, ": ", $cursor->[0], ": ASN.1 data underrun (", $len, ")\n"
- if ($cursor->[1] < $len);
-
- my $ret = [ $tag, [ $cursor->[0], $len, $cursor->[2] ] ];
- $cursor->[0] += $len;
- $cursor->[1] -= $len;
-
- return $ret;
-}
-
-###############################################################################
-#
-# Retrieve the data referred to by a cursor
-#
-###############################################################################
-sub asn1_retrieve($)
-{
- my ($cursor) = @_;
- my ($offset, $len, $data) = @$cursor;
- return substr($$data, $offset, $len);
-}
-
-###############################################################################
-#
-# Roughly parse the X.509 certificate
-#
-###############################################################################
-my $cursor = [ 0, length($x509_certificate), \$x509_certificate ];
-
-my $cert = asn1_extract($cursor, $UNIV | $CONS | $SEQUENCE);
-my $tbs = asn1_extract($cert->[1], $UNIV | $CONS | $SEQUENCE);
-my $version = asn1_extract($tbs->[1], $CONT | $CONS | 0, 1);
-my $serial_number = asn1_extract($tbs->[1], $UNIV | $INTEGER);
-my $sig_type = asn1_extract($tbs->[1], $UNIV | $CONS | $SEQUENCE);
-my $issuer = asn1_extract($tbs->[1], $UNIV | $CONS | $SEQUENCE);
-my $validity = asn1_extract($tbs->[1], $UNIV | $CONS | $SEQUENCE);
-my $subject = asn1_extract($tbs->[1], $UNIV | $CONS | $SEQUENCE);
-my $key = asn1_extract($tbs->[1], $UNIV | $CONS | $SEQUENCE);
-my $issuer_uid = asn1_extract($tbs->[1], $CONT | $CONS | 1, 1);
-my $subject_uid = asn1_extract($tbs->[1], $CONT | $CONS | 2, 1);
-my $extension_list = asn1_extract($tbs->[1], $CONT | $CONS | 3, 1);
-
-my $subject_key_id = ();
-my $authority_key_id = ();
-
-#
-# Parse the extension list
-#
-if ($extension_list->[0] != -1) {
- my $extensions = asn1_extract($extension_list->[1], $UNIV | $CONS | $SEQUENCE);
-
- while ($extensions->[1]->[1] > 0) {
- my $ext = asn1_extract($extensions->[1], $UNIV | $CONS | $SEQUENCE);
- my $x_oid = asn1_extract($ext->[1], $UNIV | $OBJ_ID);
- my $x_crit = asn1_extract($ext->[1], $UNIV | $BOOLEAN, 1);
- my $x_val = asn1_extract($ext->[1], $UNIV | $OCTET_STRING);
-
- my $raw_oid = asn1_retrieve($x_oid->[1]);
- next if (!exists($OIDs{$raw_oid}));
- my $x_type = $OIDs{$raw_oid};
-
- my $raw_value = asn1_retrieve($x_val->[1]);
-
- if ($x_type eq "subjectKeyIdentifier") {
- my $vcursor = [ 0, length($raw_value), \$raw_value ];
-
- $subject_key_id = asn1_extract($vcursor, $UNIV | $OCTET_STRING);
- }
- }
-}
-
-###############################################################################
-#
-# Determine what we're going to use as the signer's name. In order of
-# preference, take one of: commonName, organizationName or emailAddress.
-#
-###############################################################################
-my $org = "";
-my $cn = "";
-my $email = "";
-
-while ($subject->[1]->[1] > 0) {
- my $rdn = asn1_extract($subject->[1], $UNIV | $CONS | $SET);
- my $attr = asn1_extract($rdn->[1], $UNIV | $CONS | $SEQUENCE);
- my $n_oid = asn1_extract($attr->[1], $UNIV | $OBJ_ID);
- my $n_val = asn1_extract($attr->[1], -1);
-
- my $raw_oid = asn1_retrieve($n_oid->[1]);
- next if (!exists($OIDs{$raw_oid}));
- my $n_type = $OIDs{$raw_oid};
-
- my $raw_value = asn1_retrieve($n_val->[1]);
-
- if ($n_type eq "organizationName") {
- $org = $raw_value;
- } elsif ($n_type eq "commonName") {
- $cn = $raw_value;
- } elsif ($n_type eq "emailAddress") {
- $email = $raw_value;
- }
-}
-
-my $signers_name = $email;
-
-if ($org && $cn) {
- # Don't use the organizationName if the commonName repeats it
- if (length($org) <= length($cn) &&
- substr($cn, 0, length($org)) eq $org) {
- $signers_name = $cn;
- goto got_id_name;
- }
-
- # Or a signifcant chunk of it
- if (length($org) >= 7 &&
- length($cn) >= 7 &&
- substr($cn, 0, 7) eq substr($org, 0, 7)) {
- $signers_name = $cn;
- goto got_id_name;
- }
-
- $signers_name = $org . ": " . $cn;
-} elsif ($org) {
- $signers_name = $org;
-} elsif ($cn) {
- $signers_name = $cn;
-}
-
-got_id_name:
-
-die $x509, ": ", "X.509: Couldn't find the Subject Key Identifier extension\n"
- if (!$subject_key_id);
-
-my $key_identifier = asn1_retrieve($subject_key_id->[1]);
-
-###############################################################################
-#
-# Create and attach the module signature
-#
-###############################################################################
-
-#
-# Signature parameters
-#
-my $algo = 1; # Public-key crypto algorithm: RSA
-my $hash = 0; # Digest algorithm
-my $id_type = 1; # Identifier type: X.509
-
-#
-# Digest the data
-#
-my $prologue;
-if ($dgst eq "sha1") {
- $prologue = pack("C*",
- 0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05,
- 0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A,
- 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14);
- $hash = 2;
-} elsif ($dgst eq "sha224") {
- $prologue = pack("C*",
- 0x30, 0x2d, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
- 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04,
- 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x1C);
- $hash = 7;
-} elsif ($dgst eq "sha256") {
- $prologue = pack("C*",
- 0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
- 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01,
- 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20);
- $hash = 4;
-} elsif ($dgst eq "sha384") {
- $prologue = pack("C*",
- 0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
- 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02,
- 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30);
- $hash = 5;
-} elsif ($dgst eq "sha512") {
- $prologue = pack("C*",
- 0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
- 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03,
- 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40);
- $hash = 6;
-} else {
- die "Unknown hash algorithm: $dgst\n";
-}
-
-my $signature;
-if ($signature_file) {
- $signature = read_file($signature_file);
-} else {
- #
- # Generate the digest and read from openssl's stdout
- #
- my $digest;
- $digest = readpipe("openssl dgst -$dgst -binary $module") || die "openssl dgst";
-
- #
- # Generate the binary signature, which will be just the integer that
- # comprises the signature with no metadata attached.
- #
- my $pid;
- $pid = open2(*read_from, *write_to,
- "openssl rsautl -sign -inkey $private_key -keyform PEM") ||
- die "openssl rsautl";
- binmode write_to;
- print write_to $prologue . $digest || die "pipe to openssl rsautl";
- close(write_to) || die "pipe to openssl rsautl";
-
- binmode read_from;
- read(read_from, $signature, 4096) || die "pipe from openssl rsautl";
- close(read_from) || die "pipe from openssl rsautl";
- waitpid($pid, 0) || die;
- die "openssl rsautl died: $?" if ($? >> 8);
-}
-$signature = pack("n", length($signature)) . $signature,
-
-#
-# Build the signed binary
-#
-my $unsigned_module = read_file($module);
-
-my $magic_number = "~Module signature appended~\n";
-
-my $info = pack("CCCCCxxxN",
- $algo, $hash, $id_type,
- length($signers_name),
- length($key_identifier),
- length($signature));
-
-if ($verbose) {
- print "Size of unsigned module: ", length($unsigned_module), "\n";
- print "Size of signer's name : ", length($signers_name), "\n";
- print "Size of key identifier : ", length($key_identifier), "\n";
- print "Size of signature : ", length($signature), "\n";
- print "Size of information : ", length($info), "\n";
- print "Size of magic number : ", length($magic_number), "\n";
- print "Signer's name : '", $signers_name, "'\n";
- print "Digest : $dgst\n";
-}
-
-open(FD, ">$dest") || die $dest;
-binmode FD;
-print FD
- $unsigned_module,
- $signers_name,
- $key_identifier,
- $signature,
- $info,
- $magic_number
- ;
-close FD || die $dest;
-
-if (!$keep_orig) {
- rename($dest, $module) || die $module;
-}
--- /dev/null
+/* Sign a module file using the given key.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <getopt.h>
+#include <err.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+
+struct module_signature {
+ uint8_t algo; /* Public-key crypto algorithm [0] */
+ uint8_t hash; /* Digest algorithm [0] */
+ uint8_t id_type; /* Key identifier type [PKEY_ID_PKCS7] */
+ uint8_t signer_len; /* Length of signer's name [0] */
+ uint8_t key_id_len; /* Length of key identifier [0] */
+ uint8_t __pad[3];
+ uint32_t sig_len; /* Length of signature data */
+};
+
+#define PKEY_ID_PKCS7 2
+
+static char magic_number[] = "~Module signature appended~\n";
+
+static __attribute__((noreturn))
+void format(void)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Usage: scripts/sign-file [-dp] <hash algo> <key> <x509> <module> [<dest>]\n");
+ exit(2);
+}
+
+static void display_openssl_errors(int l)
+{
+ const char *file;
+ char buf[120];
+ int e, line;
+
+ if (ERR_peek_error() == 0)
+ return;
+ fprintf(stderr, "At main.c:%d:\n", l);
+
+ while ((e = ERR_get_error_line(&file, &line))) {
+ ERR_error_string(e, buf);
+ fprintf(stderr, "- SSL %s: %s:%d\n", buf, file, line);
+ }
+}
+
+static void drain_openssl_errors(void)
+{
+ const char *file;
+ int line;
+
+ if (ERR_peek_error() == 0)
+ return;
+ while (ERR_get_error_line(&file, &line)) {}
+}
+
+#define ERR(cond, fmt, ...) \
+ do { \
+ bool __cond = (cond); \
+ display_openssl_errors(__LINE__); \
+ if (__cond) { \
+ err(1, fmt, ## __VA_ARGS__); \
+ } \
+ } while(0)
+
+static const char *key_pass;
+
+static int pem_pw_cb(char *buf, int len, int w, void *v)
+{
+ int pwlen;
+
+ if (!key_pass)
+ return -1;
+
+ pwlen = strlen(key_pass);
+ if (pwlen >= len)
+ return -1;
+
+ strcpy(buf, key_pass);
+
+ /* If it's wrong, don't keep trying it. */
+ key_pass = NULL;
+
+ return pwlen;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ struct module_signature sig_info = { .id_type = PKEY_ID_PKCS7 };
+ char *hash_algo = NULL;
+ char *private_key_name, *x509_name, *module_name, *dest_name;
+ bool save_cms = false, replace_orig;
+ bool sign_only = false;
+ unsigned char buf[4096];
+ unsigned long module_size, cms_size;
+ unsigned int use_keyid = 0, use_signed_attrs = CMS_NOATTR;
+ const EVP_MD *digest_algo;
+ EVP_PKEY *private_key;
+ CMS_ContentInfo *cms;
+ X509 *x509;
+ BIO *b, *bd = NULL, *bm;
+ int opt, n;
+
+ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+ ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ key_pass = getenv("KBUILD_SIGN_PIN");
+
+ do {
+ opt = getopt(argc, argv, "dpk");
+ switch (opt) {
+ case 'p': save_cms = true; break;
+ case 'd': sign_only = true; save_cms = true; break;
+ case 'k': use_keyid = CMS_USE_KEYID; break;
+ case -1: break;
+ default: format();
+ }
+ } while (opt != -1);
+
+ argc -= optind;
+ argv += optind;
+ if (argc < 4 || argc > 5)
+ format();
+
+ hash_algo = argv[0];
+ private_key_name = argv[1];
+ x509_name = argv[2];
+ module_name = argv[3];
+ if (argc == 5) {
+ dest_name = argv[4];
+ replace_orig = false;
+ } else {
+ ERR(asprintf(&dest_name, "%s.~signed~", module_name) < 0,
+ "asprintf");
+ replace_orig = true;
+ }
+
+ /* Read the private key and the X.509 cert the PKCS#7 message
+ * will point to.
+ */
+ if (!strncmp(private_key_name, "pkcs11:", 7)) {
+ ENGINE *e;
+
+ ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
+ drain_openssl_errors();
+ e = ENGINE_by_id("pkcs11");
+ ERR(!e, "Load PKCS#11 ENGINE");
+ if (ENGINE_init(e))
+ drain_openssl_errors();
+ else
+ ERR(1, "ENGINE_init");
+ if (key_pass)
+ ERR(!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, "PIN", key_pass, 0), "Set PKCS#11 PIN");
+ private_key = ENGINE_load_private_key(e, private_key_name, NULL,
+ NULL);
+ ERR(!private_key, "%s", private_key_name);
+ } else {
+ b = BIO_new_file(private_key_name, "rb");
+ ERR(!b, "%s", private_key_name);
+ private_key = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(b, NULL, pem_pw_cb, NULL);
+ ERR(!private_key, "%s", private_key_name);
+ BIO_free(b);
+ }
+
+ b = BIO_new_file(x509_name, "rb");
+ ERR(!b, "%s", x509_name);
+ x509 = d2i_X509_bio(b, NULL); /* Binary encoded X.509 */
+ if (!x509) {
+ ERR(BIO_reset(b) != 1, "%s", x509_name);
+ x509 = PEM_read_bio_X509(b, NULL, NULL, NULL); /* PEM encoded X.509 */
+ if (x509)
+ drain_openssl_errors();
+ }
+ BIO_free(b);
+ ERR(!x509, "%s", x509_name);
+
+ /* Open the destination file now so that we can shovel the module data
+ * across as we read it.
+ */
+ if (!sign_only) {
+ bd = BIO_new_file(dest_name, "wb");
+ ERR(!bd, "%s", dest_name);
+ }
+
+ /* Digest the module data. */
+ OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
+ display_openssl_errors(__LINE__);
+ digest_algo = EVP_get_digestbyname(hash_algo);
+ ERR(!digest_algo, "EVP_get_digestbyname");
+
+ bm = BIO_new_file(module_name, "rb");
+ ERR(!bm, "%s", module_name);
+
+ /* Load the CMS message from the digest buffer. */
+ cms = CMS_sign(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ CMS_NOCERTS | CMS_PARTIAL | CMS_BINARY | CMS_DETACHED | CMS_STREAM);
+ ERR(!cms, "CMS_sign");
+
+ ERR(!CMS_add1_signer(cms, x509, private_key, digest_algo,
+ CMS_NOCERTS | CMS_BINARY | CMS_NOSMIMECAP |
+ use_keyid | use_signed_attrs),
+ "CMS_sign_add_signer");
+ ERR(CMS_final(cms, bm, NULL, CMS_NOCERTS | CMS_BINARY) < 0,
+ "CMS_final");
+
+ if (save_cms) {
+ char *cms_name;
+
+ ERR(asprintf(&cms_name, "%s.p7s", module_name) < 0, "asprintf");
+ b = BIO_new_file(cms_name, "wb");
+ ERR(!b, "%s", cms_name);
+ ERR(i2d_CMS_bio_stream(b, cms, NULL, 0) < 0, "%s", cms_name);
+ BIO_free(b);
+ }
+
+ if (sign_only)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Append the marker and the PKCS#7 message to the destination file */
+ ERR(BIO_reset(bm) < 0, "%s", module_name);
+ while ((n = BIO_read(bm, buf, sizeof(buf))),
+ n > 0) {
+ ERR(BIO_write(bd, buf, n) < 0, "%s", dest_name);
+ }
+ ERR(n < 0, "%s", module_name);
+ module_size = BIO_number_written(bd);
+
+ ERR(i2d_CMS_bio_stream(bd, cms, NULL, 0) < 0, "%s", dest_name);
+ cms_size = BIO_number_written(bd) - module_size;
+ sig_info.sig_len = htonl(cms_size);
+ ERR(BIO_write(bd, &sig_info, sizeof(sig_info)) < 0, "%s", dest_name);
+ ERR(BIO_write(bd, magic_number, sizeof(magic_number) - 1) < 0, "%s", dest_name);
+
+ ERR(BIO_free(bd) < 0, "%s", dest_name);
+
+ /* Finally, if we're signing in place, replace the original. */
+ if (replace_orig)
+ ERR(rename(dest_name, module_name) < 0, "%s", dest_name);
+
+ return 0;
+}
default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR
- default DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA if SECURITY_YAMA
default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
help
config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
- config DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA
- bool "Yama" if SECURITY_YAMA=y
-
config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls"
default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
- default "yama" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA
default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
endmenu
}
break;
}
+ case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP: {
+ struct inode *inode;
+
+ audit_log_d_path(ab, " path=", &a->u.op->path);
+
+ inode = a->u.op->path.dentry->d_inode;
+ if (inode) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " dev=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, inode->i_sb->s_id);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%lu", inode->i_ino);
+ }
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, " ioctlcmd=%hx", a->u.op->cmd);
+ break;
+ }
case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY: {
struct inode *inode;
pr_info("Security Framework initialized\n");
/*
- * Always load the capability module.
+ * Load minor LSMs, with the capability module always first.
*/
capability_add_hooks();
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
- /*
- * If Yama is configured for stacking load it next.
- */
yama_add_hooks();
-#endif
+
/*
- * Load the chosen module if there is one.
- * This will also find yama if it is stacking
+ * Load all the remaining security modules.
*/
do_security_initcalls();
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <linux/un.h>
#include <net/af_unix.h>
u32 tsid;
u16 tclass;
struct av_decision avd;
+ struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node;
};
struct avc_node {
struct rcu_head rhead;
};
+struct avc_xperms_decision_node {
+ struct extended_perms_decision xpd;
+ struct list_head xpd_list; /* list of extended_perms_decision */
+};
+
+struct avc_xperms_node {
+ struct extended_perms xp;
+ struct list_head xpd_head; /* list head of extended_perms_decision */
+};
+
struct avc_cache {
struct hlist_head slots[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS]; /* head for avc_node->list */
spinlock_t slots_lock[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS]; /* lock for writes */
static struct avc_cache avc_cache;
static struct avc_callback_node *avc_callbacks;
static struct kmem_cache *avc_node_cachep;
+static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_data_cachep;
+static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_decision_cachep;
+static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_cachep;
static inline int avc_hash(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
{
return;
}
+ BUG_ON(!tclass || tclass >= ARRAY_SIZE(secclass_map));
perms = secclass_map[tclass-1].perms;
audit_log_format(ab, " {");
kfree(scontext);
}
- BUG_ON(tclass >= ARRAY_SIZE(secclass_map));
+ BUG_ON(!tclass || tclass >= ARRAY_SIZE(secclass_map));
audit_log_format(ab, " tclass=%s", secclass_map[tclass-1].name);
}
atomic_set(&avc_cache.lru_hint, 0);
avc_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_node", sizeof(struct avc_node),
- 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+ 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+ avc_xperms_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_xperms_node",
+ sizeof(struct avc_xperms_node),
+ 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+ avc_xperms_decision_cachep = kmem_cache_create(
+ "avc_xperms_decision_node",
+ sizeof(struct avc_xperms_decision_node),
+ 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+ avc_xperms_data_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_xperms_data",
+ sizeof(struct extended_perms_data),
+ 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_KERNEL, "AVC INITIALIZED\n");
}
slots_used, AVC_CACHE_SLOTS, max_chain_len);
}
+/*
+ * using a linked list for extended_perms_decision lookup because the list is
+ * always small. i.e. less than 5, typically 1
+ */
+static struct extended_perms_decision *avc_xperms_decision_lookup(u8 driver,
+ struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
+{
+ struct avc_xperms_decision_node *xpd_node;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(xpd_node, &xp_node->xpd_head, xpd_list) {
+ if (xpd_node->xpd.driver == driver)
+ return &xpd_node->xpd;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int
+avc_xperms_has_perm(struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
+ u8 perm, u8 which)
+{
+ unsigned int rc = 0;
+
+ if ((which == XPERMS_ALLOWED) &&
+ (xpd->used & XPERMS_ALLOWED))
+ rc = security_xperm_test(xpd->allowed->p, perm);
+ else if ((which == XPERMS_AUDITALLOW) &&
+ (xpd->used & XPERMS_AUDITALLOW))
+ rc = security_xperm_test(xpd->auditallow->p, perm);
+ else if ((which == XPERMS_DONTAUDIT) &&
+ (xpd->used & XPERMS_DONTAUDIT))
+ rc = security_xperm_test(xpd->dontaudit->p, perm);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static void avc_xperms_allow_perm(struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node,
+ u8 driver, u8 perm)
+{
+ struct extended_perms_decision *xpd;
+ security_xperm_set(xp_node->xp.drivers.p, driver);
+ xpd = avc_xperms_decision_lookup(driver, xp_node);
+ if (xpd && xpd->allowed)
+ security_xperm_set(xpd->allowed->p, perm);
+}
+
+static void avc_xperms_decision_free(struct avc_xperms_decision_node *xpd_node)
+{
+ struct extended_perms_decision *xpd;
+
+ xpd = &xpd_node->xpd;
+ if (xpd->allowed)
+ kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_data_cachep, xpd->allowed);
+ if (xpd->auditallow)
+ kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_data_cachep, xpd->auditallow);
+ if (xpd->dontaudit)
+ kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_data_cachep, xpd->dontaudit);
+ kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_decision_cachep, xpd_node);
+}
+
+static void avc_xperms_free(struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
+{
+ struct avc_xperms_decision_node *xpd_node, *tmp;
+
+ if (!xp_node)
+ return;
+
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(xpd_node, tmp, &xp_node->xpd_head, xpd_list) {
+ list_del(&xpd_node->xpd_list);
+ avc_xperms_decision_free(xpd_node);
+ }
+ kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_cachep, xp_node);
+}
+
+static void avc_copy_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *dest,
+ struct extended_perms_decision *src)
+{
+ dest->driver = src->driver;
+ dest->used = src->used;
+ if (dest->used & XPERMS_ALLOWED)
+ memcpy(dest->allowed->p, src->allowed->p,
+ sizeof(src->allowed->p));
+ if (dest->used & XPERMS_AUDITALLOW)
+ memcpy(dest->auditallow->p, src->auditallow->p,
+ sizeof(src->auditallow->p));
+ if (dest->used & XPERMS_DONTAUDIT)
+ memcpy(dest->dontaudit->p, src->dontaudit->p,
+ sizeof(src->dontaudit->p));
+}
+
+/*
+ * similar to avc_copy_xperms_decision, but only copy decision
+ * information relevant to this perm
+ */
+static inline void avc_quick_copy_xperms_decision(u8 perm,
+ struct extended_perms_decision *dest,
+ struct extended_perms_decision *src)
+{
+ /*
+ * compute index of the u32 of the 256 bits (8 u32s) that contain this
+ * command permission
+ */
+ u8 i = perm >> 5;
+
+ dest->used = src->used;
+ if (dest->used & XPERMS_ALLOWED)
+ dest->allowed->p[i] = src->allowed->p[i];
+ if (dest->used & XPERMS_AUDITALLOW)
+ dest->auditallow->p[i] = src->auditallow->p[i];
+ if (dest->used & XPERMS_DONTAUDIT)
+ dest->dontaudit->p[i] = src->dontaudit->p[i];
+}
+
+static struct avc_xperms_decision_node
+ *avc_xperms_decision_alloc(u8 which)
+{
+ struct avc_xperms_decision_node *xpd_node;
+ struct extended_perms_decision *xpd;
+
+ xpd_node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_decision_cachep,
+ GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
+ if (!xpd_node)
+ return NULL;
+
+ xpd = &xpd_node->xpd;
+ if (which & XPERMS_ALLOWED) {
+ xpd->allowed = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep,
+ GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
+ if (!xpd->allowed)
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (which & XPERMS_AUDITALLOW) {
+ xpd->auditallow = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep,
+ GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
+ if (!xpd->auditallow)
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (which & XPERMS_DONTAUDIT) {
+ xpd->dontaudit = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep,
+ GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
+ if (!xpd->dontaudit)
+ goto error;
+ }
+ return xpd_node;
+error:
+ avc_xperms_decision_free(xpd_node);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int avc_add_xperms_decision(struct avc_node *node,
+ struct extended_perms_decision *src)
+{
+ struct avc_xperms_decision_node *dest_xpd;
+
+ node->ae.xp_node->xp.len++;
+ dest_xpd = avc_xperms_decision_alloc(src->used);
+ if (!dest_xpd)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ avc_copy_xperms_decision(&dest_xpd->xpd, src);
+ list_add(&dest_xpd->xpd_list, &node->ae.xp_node->xpd_head);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct avc_xperms_node *avc_xperms_alloc(void)
+{
+ struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node;
+
+ xp_node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_cachep,
+ GFP_ATOMIC|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
+ if (!xp_node)
+ return xp_node;
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&xp_node->xpd_head);
+ return xp_node;
+}
+
+static int avc_xperms_populate(struct avc_node *node,
+ struct avc_xperms_node *src)
+{
+ struct avc_xperms_node *dest;
+ struct avc_xperms_decision_node *dest_xpd;
+ struct avc_xperms_decision_node *src_xpd;
+
+ if (src->xp.len == 0)
+ return 0;
+ dest = avc_xperms_alloc();
+ if (!dest)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ memcpy(dest->xp.drivers.p, src->xp.drivers.p, sizeof(dest->xp.drivers.p));
+ dest->xp.len = src->xp.len;
+
+ /* for each source xpd allocate a destination xpd and copy */
+ list_for_each_entry(src_xpd, &src->xpd_head, xpd_list) {
+ dest_xpd = avc_xperms_decision_alloc(src_xpd->xpd.used);
+ if (!dest_xpd)
+ goto error;
+ avc_copy_xperms_decision(&dest_xpd->xpd, &src_xpd->xpd);
+ list_add(&dest_xpd->xpd_list, &dest->xpd_head);
+ }
+ node->ae.xp_node = dest;
+ return 0;
+error:
+ avc_xperms_free(dest);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+}
+
+static inline u32 avc_xperms_audit_required(u32 requested,
+ struct av_decision *avd,
+ struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
+ u8 perm,
+ int result,
+ u32 *deniedp)
+{
+ u32 denied, audited;
+
+ denied = requested & ~avd->allowed;
+ if (unlikely(denied)) {
+ audited = denied & avd->auditdeny;
+ if (audited && xpd) {
+ if (avc_xperms_has_perm(xpd, perm, XPERMS_DONTAUDIT))
+ audited &= ~requested;
+ }
+ } else if (result) {
+ audited = denied = requested;
+ } else {
+ audited = requested & avd->auditallow;
+ if (audited && xpd) {
+ if (!avc_xperms_has_perm(xpd, perm, XPERMS_AUDITALLOW))
+ audited &= ~requested;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *deniedp = denied;
+ return audited;
+}
+
+static inline int avc_xperms_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+ u32 requested, struct av_decision *avd,
+ struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
+ u8 perm, int result,
+ struct common_audit_data *ad)
+{
+ u32 audited, denied;
+
+ audited = avc_xperms_audit_required(
+ requested, avd, xpd, perm, result, &denied);
+ if (likely(!audited))
+ return 0;
+ return slow_avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
+ audited, denied, result, ad, 0);
+}
+
static void avc_node_free(struct rcu_head *rhead)
{
struct avc_node *node = container_of(rhead, struct avc_node, rhead);
+ avc_xperms_free(node->ae.xp_node);
kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
avc_cache_stats_incr(frees);
}
static void avc_node_kill(struct avc_node *node)
{
+ avc_xperms_free(node->ae.xp_node);
kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
avc_cache_stats_incr(frees);
atomic_dec(&avc_cache.active_nodes);
* @tsid: target security identifier
* @tclass: target security class
* @avd: resulting av decision
+ * @xp_node: resulting extended permissions
*
* Insert an AVC entry for the SID pair
* (@ssid, @tsid) and class @tclass.
* the access vectors into a cache entry, returns
* avc_node inserted. Otherwise, this function returns NULL.
*/
-static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd)
+static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+ struct av_decision *avd,
+ struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
{
struct avc_node *pos, *node = NULL;
int hvalue;
if (node) {
struct hlist_head *head;
spinlock_t *lock;
+ int rc = 0;
hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
-
+ rc = avc_xperms_populate(node, xp_node);
+ if (rc) {
+ kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
+ return NULL;
+ }
head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
* @perms : Permission mask bits
* @ssid,@tsid,@tclass : identifier of an AVC entry
* @seqno : sequence number when decision was made
+ * @xpd: extended_perms_decision to be added to the node
*
* if a valid AVC entry doesn't exist,this function returns -ENOENT.
* if kmalloc() called internal returns NULL, this function returns -ENOMEM.
* otherwise, this function updates the AVC entry. The original AVC-entry object
* will release later by RCU.
*/
-static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
- u32 seqno)
+static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u8 driver, u8 xperm, u32 ssid,
+ u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 seqno,
+ struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
+ u32 flags)
{
int hvalue, rc = 0;
unsigned long flag;
avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, &orig->ae.avd);
+ if (orig->ae.xp_node) {
+ rc = avc_xperms_populate(node, orig->ae.xp_node);
+ if (rc) {
+ kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ }
+
switch (event) {
case AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT:
node->ae.avd.allowed |= perms;
+ if (node->ae.xp_node && (flags & AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS))
+ avc_xperms_allow_perm(node->ae.xp_node, driver, xperm);
break;
case AVC_CALLBACK_TRY_REVOKE:
case AVC_CALLBACK_REVOKE:
case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_DISABLE:
node->ae.avd.auditdeny &= ~perms;
break;
+ case AVC_CALLBACK_ADD_XPERMS:
+ avc_add_xperms_decision(node, xpd);
+ break;
}
avc_node_replace(node, orig);
out_unlock:
* results in a bigger stack frame.
*/
static noinline struct avc_node *avc_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
- u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd)
+ u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
+ struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
{
rcu_read_unlock();
- security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&xp_node->xpd_head);
+ security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, &xp_node->xp);
rcu_read_lock();
- return avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
+ return avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, xp_node);
}
static noinline int avc_denied(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
- u16 tclass, u32 requested,
- unsigned flags,
- struct av_decision *avd)
+ u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+ u8 driver, u8 xperm, unsigned flags,
+ struct av_decision *avd)
{
if (flags & AVC_STRICT)
return -EACCES;
if (selinux_enforcing && !(avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE))
return -EACCES;
- avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, requested, ssid,
- tsid, tclass, avd->seqno);
+ avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, requested, driver, xperm, ssid,
+ tsid, tclass, avd->seqno, NULL, flags);
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * The avc extended permissions logic adds an additional 256 bits of
+ * permissions to an avc node when extended permissions for that node are
+ * specified in the avtab. If the additional 256 permissions is not adequate,
+ * as-is the case with ioctls, then multiple may be chained together and the
+ * driver field is used to specify which set contains the permission.
+ */
+int avc_has_extended_perms(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+ u8 driver, u8 xperm, struct common_audit_data *ad)
+{
+ struct avc_node *node;
+ struct av_decision avd;
+ u32 denied;
+ struct extended_perms_decision local_xpd;
+ struct extended_perms_decision *xpd = NULL;
+ struct extended_perms_data allowed;
+ struct extended_perms_data auditallow;
+ struct extended_perms_data dontaudit;
+ struct avc_xperms_node local_xp_node;
+ struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node;
+ int rc = 0, rc2;
+
+ xp_node = &local_xp_node;
+ BUG_ON(!requested);
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+
+ node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass);
+ if (unlikely(!node)) {
+ node = avc_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, &avd, xp_node);
+ } else {
+ memcpy(&avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(avd));
+ xp_node = node->ae.xp_node;
+ }
+ /* if extended permissions are not defined, only consider av_decision */
+ if (!xp_node || !xp_node->xp.len)
+ goto decision;
+
+ local_xpd.allowed = &allowed;
+ local_xpd.auditallow = &auditallow;
+ local_xpd.dontaudit = &dontaudit;
+
+ xpd = avc_xperms_decision_lookup(driver, xp_node);
+ if (unlikely(!xpd)) {
+ /*
+ * Compute the extended_perms_decision only if the driver
+ * is flagged
+ */
+ if (!security_xperm_test(xp_node->xp.drivers.p, driver)) {
+ avd.allowed &= ~requested;
+ goto decision;
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ security_compute_xperms_decision(ssid, tsid, tclass, driver,
+ &local_xpd);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_ADD_XPERMS, requested, driver, xperm,
+ ssid, tsid, tclass, avd.seqno, &local_xpd, 0);
+ } else {
+ avc_quick_copy_xperms_decision(xperm, &local_xpd, xpd);
+ }
+ xpd = &local_xpd;
+
+ if (!avc_xperms_has_perm(xpd, xperm, XPERMS_ALLOWED))
+ avd.allowed &= ~requested;
+
+decision:
+ denied = requested & ~(avd.allowed);
+ if (unlikely(denied))
+ rc = avc_denied(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, driver, xperm,
+ AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS, &avd);
+
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ rc2 = avc_xperms_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
+ &avd, xpd, xperm, rc, ad);
+ if (rc2)
+ return rc2;
+ return rc;
+}
/**
* avc_has_perm_noaudit - Check permissions but perform no auditing.
struct av_decision *avd)
{
struct avc_node *node;
+ struct avc_xperms_node xp_node;
int rc = 0;
u32 denied;
node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass);
if (unlikely(!node))
- node = avc_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
+ node = avc_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, &xp_node);
else
memcpy(avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(*avd));
denied = requested & ~(avd->allowed);
if (unlikely(denied))
- rc = avc_denied(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, flags, avd);
+ rc = avc_denied(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, 0, flags, avd);
rcu_read_unlock();
return rc;
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
- spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
- if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
+ /*
+ * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
+ * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
+ * time taking a lock doing nothing.
+ *
+ * The list_del_init() function can be safely called more than once.
+ * It should not be possible for this function to be called with
+ * concurrent list_add(), but for better safety against future changes
+ * in the code, we use list_empty_careful() here.
+ */
+ if (!list_empty_careful(&isec->list)) {
+ spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
list_del_init(&isec->list);
- spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+ spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+ }
/*
* The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
return rc;
}
+/*
+ * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned.
+ */
+static int selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct inode *dir,
+ const struct qstr *name,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u32 *_new_isid)
+{
+ const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
+ const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = dir->i_security;
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+
+ if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
+ (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
+ *_new_isid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
+ } else if ((sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) &&
+ tsec->create_sid) {
+ *_new_isid = tsec->create_sid;
+ } else {
+ return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
+ name, _new_isid);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* Check whether a task can create a file. */
static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry,
sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
sid = tsec->sid;
- newsid = tsec->create_sid;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
ad.u.dentry = dentry;
if (rc)
return rc;
- if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) {
- rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
- &dentry->d_name, &newsid);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
- }
+ rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(dir, &dentry->d_name, tclass,
+ &newsid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
if (rc)
struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
u32 *ctxlen)
{
- const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
- struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
- struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
- struct inode *dir = d_backing_inode(dentry->d_parent);
u32 newsid;
int rc;
- tsec = cred->security;
- dsec = dir->i_security;
- sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
-
- if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
- newsid = tsec->create_sid;
- } else {
- rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
- inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
- name,
- &newsid);
- if (rc) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING
- "%s: security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d\n",
- __func__, -rc);
- return rc;
- }
- }
+ rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
+ inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
+ &newsid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
return security_sid_to_context(newsid, (char **)ctx, ctxlen);
}
sid = tsec->sid;
newsid = tsec->create_sid;
- if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
- (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT))
- newsid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
- else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) {
- rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
- inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
- qstr, &newsid);
- if (rc) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
- "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
- "ino=%ld)\n",
- __func__,
- -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
- return rc;
- }
- }
+ rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(
+ dir, qstr,
+ inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
+ &newsid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
/* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
file_free_security(file);
}
+/*
+ * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
+ * operation to an inode.
+ */
+int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
+ u32 requested, u16 cmd)
+{
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl;
+ u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred);
+ int rc;
+ u8 driver = cmd >> 8;
+ u8 xperm = cmd & 0xff;
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP;
+ ad.u.op = &ioctl;
+ ad.u.op->cmd = cmd;
+ ad.u.op->path = file->f_path;
+
+ if (ssid != fsec->sid) {
+ rc = avc_has_perm(ssid, fsec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_FD,
+ FD__USE,
+ &ad);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+ return 0;
+
+ rc = avc_has_extended_perms(ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
+ requested, driver, xperm, &ad);
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
* to the file's ioctl() function.
*/
default:
- error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL);
+ error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
}
return error;
}
sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
sk->sk_security = sksec;
}
#define AVC_STRICT 1 /* Ignore permissive mode. */
+#define AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS 2 /* update extended permissions */
int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 requested,
unsigned flags,
struct common_audit_data *auditdata,
int flags);
+int avc_has_extended_perms(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+ u8 driver, u8 perm, struct common_audit_data *ad);
+
+
u32 avc_policy_seqno(void);
#define AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT 1
#define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_DISABLE 32
#define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_ENABLE 64
#define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_DISABLE 128
+#define AVC_CALLBACK_ADD_XPERMS 256
int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event), u32 events);
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS 27
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE 28
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES 29
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL 30
/* Range of policy versions we understand*/
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX_VALUE
#else
-#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL
#endif
/* Mask for just the mount related flags */
u32 flags;
};
+#define XPERMS_ALLOWED 1
+#define XPERMS_AUDITALLOW 2
+#define XPERMS_DONTAUDIT 4
+
+#define security_xperm_set(perms, x) (perms[x >> 5] |= 1 << (x & 0x1f))
+#define security_xperm_test(perms, x) (1 & (perms[x >> 5] >> (x & 0x1f)))
+struct extended_perms_data {
+ u32 p[8];
+};
+
+struct extended_perms_decision {
+ u8 used;
+ u8 driver;
+ struct extended_perms_data *allowed;
+ struct extended_perms_data *auditallow;
+ struct extended_perms_data *dontaudit;
+};
+
+struct extended_perms {
+ u16 len; /* length associated decision chain */
+ struct extended_perms_data drivers; /* flag drivers that are used */
+};
+
/* definitions of av_decision.flags */
#define AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE 0x0001
void security_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
- u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd);
+ u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
+ struct extended_perms *xperms);
+
+void security_compute_xperms_decision(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+ u8 driver, struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd);
void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd);
#include "policydb.h"
static struct kmem_cache *avtab_node_cachep;
+static struct kmem_cache *avtab_xperms_cachep;
/* Based on MurmurHash3, written by Austin Appleby and placed in the
* public domain.
struct avtab_key *key, struct avtab_datum *datum)
{
struct avtab_node *newnode;
+ struct avtab_extended_perms *xperms;
newnode = kmem_cache_zalloc(avtab_node_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (newnode == NULL)
return NULL;
newnode->key = *key;
- newnode->datum = *datum;
+
+ if (key->specified & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
+ xperms = kmem_cache_zalloc(avtab_xperms_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (xperms == NULL) {
+ kmem_cache_free(avtab_node_cachep, newnode);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ *xperms = *(datum->u.xperms);
+ newnode->datum.u.xperms = xperms;
+ } else {
+ newnode->datum.u.data = datum->u.data;
+ }
+
if (prev) {
newnode->next = prev->next;
prev->next = newnode;
if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
key->target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
- (specified & cur->key.specified))
+ (specified & cur->key.specified)) {
+ /* extended perms may not be unique */
+ if (specified & AVTAB_XPERMS)
+ break;
return -EEXIST;
+ }
if (key->source_type < cur->key.source_type)
break;
if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
while (cur) {
temp = cur;
cur = cur->next;
+ if (temp->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS)
+ kmem_cache_free(avtab_xperms_cachep,
+ temp->datum.u.xperms);
kmem_cache_free(avtab_node_cachep, temp);
}
}
AVTAB_AUDITALLOW,
AVTAB_TRANSITION,
AVTAB_CHANGE,
- AVTAB_MEMBER
+ AVTAB_MEMBER,
+ AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED,
+ AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW,
+ AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT
};
int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
{
__le16 buf16[4];
u16 enabled;
- __le32 buf32[7];
u32 items, items2, val, vers = pol->policyvers;
struct avtab_key key;
struct avtab_datum datum;
+ struct avtab_extended_perms xperms;
+ __le32 buf32[ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p)];
int i, rc;
unsigned set;
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: entry has both access vectors and types\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if (val & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: entry has extended permissions\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spec_order); i++) {
if (val & spec_order[i]) {
key.specified = spec_order[i] | enabled;
- datum.data = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
+ datum.u.data = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
rc = insertf(a, &key, &datum, p);
if (rc)
return rc;
return -EINVAL;
}
- rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32));
- if (rc) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
- return rc;
+ if ((vers < POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL) &&
+ (key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: policy version %u does not "
+ "support extended permissions rules and one "
+ "was specified\n", vers);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ } else if (key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
+ memset(&xperms, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_extended_perms));
+ rc = next_entry(&xperms.specified, fp, sizeof(u8));
+ if (rc) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+ return rc;
+ }
+ rc = next_entry(&xperms.driver, fp, sizeof(u8));
+ if (rc) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+ return rc;
+ }
+ rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32)*ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p));
+ if (rc) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+ return rc;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p); i++)
+ xperms.perms.p[i] = le32_to_cpu(buf32[i]);
+ datum.u.xperms = &xperms;
+ } else {
+ rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+ return rc;
+ }
+ datum.u.data = le32_to_cpu(*buf32);
}
- datum.data = le32_to_cpu(*buf32);
if ((key.specified & AVTAB_TYPE) &&
- !policydb_type_isvalid(pol, datum.data)) {
+ !policydb_type_isvalid(pol, datum.u.data)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: invalid type\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
int avtab_write_item(struct policydb *p, struct avtab_node *cur, void *fp)
{
__le16 buf16[4];
- __le32 buf32[1];
+ __le32 buf32[ARRAY_SIZE(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p)];
int rc;
+ unsigned int i;
buf16[0] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.source_type);
buf16[1] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.target_type);
rc = put_entry(buf16, sizeof(u16), 4, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
- buf32[0] = cpu_to_le32(cur->datum.data);
- rc = put_entry(buf32, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+
+ if (cur->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
+ rc = put_entry(&cur->datum.u.xperms->specified, sizeof(u8), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = put_entry(&cur->datum.u.xperms->driver, sizeof(u8), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p); i++)
+ buf32[i] = cpu_to_le32(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i]);
+ rc = put_entry(buf32, sizeof(u32),
+ ARRAY_SIZE(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p), fp);
+ } else {
+ buf32[0] = cpu_to_le32(cur->datum.u.data);
+ rc = put_entry(buf32, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ }
if (rc)
return rc;
return 0;
avtab_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avtab_node",
sizeof(struct avtab_node),
0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+ avtab_xperms_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avtab_extended_perms",
+ sizeof(struct avtab_extended_perms),
+ 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
}
void avtab_cache_destroy(void)
{
kmem_cache_destroy(avtab_node_cachep);
+ kmem_cache_destroy(avtab_xperms_cachep);
}
#ifndef _SS_AVTAB_H_
#define _SS_AVTAB_H_
+#include "security.h"
#include <linux/flex_array.h>
struct avtab_key {
#define AVTAB_MEMBER 0x0020
#define AVTAB_CHANGE 0x0040
#define AVTAB_TYPE (AVTAB_TRANSITION | AVTAB_MEMBER | AVTAB_CHANGE)
+/* extended permissions */
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED 0x0100
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW 0x0200
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT 0x0400
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS (AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED | \
+ AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW | \
+ AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT)
#define AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD 0x80000000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
#define AVTAB_ENABLED 0x8000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
u16 specified; /* what field is specified */
};
+/*
+ * For operations that require more than the 32 permissions provided by the avc
+ * extended permissions may be used to provide 256 bits of permissions.
+ */
+struct avtab_extended_perms {
+/* These are not flags. All 256 values may be used */
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION 0x01
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER 0x02
+ /* extension of the avtab_key specified */
+ u8 specified; /* ioctl, netfilter, ... */
+ /*
+ * if 256 bits is not adequate as is often the case with ioctls, then
+ * multiple extended perms may be used and the driver field
+ * specifies which permissions are included.
+ */
+ u8 driver;
+ /* 256 bits of permissions */
+ struct extended_perms_data perms;
+};
+
struct avtab_datum {
- u32 data; /* access vector or type value */
+ union {
+ u32 data; /* access vector or type value */
+ struct avtab_extended_perms *xperms;
+ } u;
};
struct avtab_node {
#include "security.h"
#include "conditional.h"
+#include "services.h"
/*
* cond_evaluate_expr evaluates a conditional expr
return 0;
}
+
+void cond_compute_xperms(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
+ struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd)
+{
+ struct avtab_node *node;
+
+ if (!ctab || !key || !xpermd)
+ return;
+
+ for (node = avtab_search_node(ctab, key); node;
+ node = avtab_search_node_next(node, key->specified)) {
+ if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED)
+ services_compute_xperms_decision(xpermd, node);
+ }
+ return;
+
+}
/* Determine whether additional permissions are granted by the conditional
* av table, and if so, add them to the result
*/
-void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key, struct av_decision *avd)
+void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
+ struct av_decision *avd, struct extended_perms *xperms)
{
struct avtab_node *node;
- if (!ctab || !key || !avd)
+ if (!ctab || !key || !avd || !xperms)
return;
for (node = avtab_search_node(ctab, key); node;
node = avtab_search_node_next(node, key->specified)) {
if ((u16)(AVTAB_ALLOWED|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
(node->key.specified & (AVTAB_ALLOWED|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
- avd->allowed |= node->datum.data;
+ avd->allowed |= node->datum.u.data;
if ((u16)(AVTAB_AUDITDENY|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
(node->key.specified & (AVTAB_AUDITDENY|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
/* Since a '0' in an auditdeny mask represents a
* the '&' operand to ensure that all '0's in the mask
* are retained (much unlike the allow and auditallow cases).
*/
- avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.data;
+ avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.u.data;
if ((u16)(AVTAB_AUDITALLOW|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
(node->key.specified & (AVTAB_AUDITALLOW|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
- avd->auditallow |= node->datum.data;
+ avd->auditallow |= node->datum.u.data;
+ if ((node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) &&
+ (node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS))
+ services_compute_xperms_drivers(xperms, node);
}
return;
}
int cond_write_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *ptr);
int cond_write_list(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *list, void *fp);
-void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key, struct av_decision *avd);
-
+void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
+ struct av_decision *avd, struct extended_perms *xperms);
+void cond_compute_xperms(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
+ struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd);
int evaluate_cond_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node);
#endif /* _CONDITIONAL_H_ */
.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
.ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
},
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
+ },
};
static struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(int version)
u32 *scontext_len);
static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
- struct context *tcontext,
- u16 tclass,
- struct av_decision *avd);
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ u16 tclass,
+ struct av_decision *avd,
+ struct extended_perms *xperms);
struct selinux_mapping {
u16 value; /* policy value */
context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
tcontext,
tclass,
- &lo_avd);
+ &lo_avd,
+ NULL);
if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
return; /* no masked permission */
masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
context_struct_compute_av(scontext,
&lo_tcontext,
tclass,
- &lo_avd);
+ &lo_avd,
+ NULL);
if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
return; /* no masked permission */
masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
&lo_tcontext,
tclass,
- &lo_avd);
+ &lo_avd,
+ NULL);
if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
return; /* no masked permission */
masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
}
/*
- * Compute access vectors based on a context structure pair for
- * the permissions in a particular class.
+ * flag which drivers have permissions
+ * only looking for ioctl based extended permssions
+ */
+void services_compute_xperms_drivers(
+ struct extended_perms *xperms,
+ struct avtab_node *node)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
+ /* if one or more driver has all permissions allowed */
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xperms->drivers.p); i++)
+ xperms->drivers.p[i] |= node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
+ } else if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
+ /* if allowing permissions within a driver */
+ security_xperm_set(xperms->drivers.p,
+ node->datum.u.xperms->driver);
+ }
+
+ /* If no ioctl commands are allowed, ignore auditallow and auditdeny */
+ if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED)
+ xperms->len = 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute access vectors and extended permissions based on a context
+ * structure pair for the permissions in a particular class.
*/
static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
- struct context *tcontext,
- u16 tclass,
- struct av_decision *avd)
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ u16 tclass,
+ struct av_decision *avd,
+ struct extended_perms *xperms)
{
struct constraint_node *constraint;
struct role_allow *ra;
avd->allowed = 0;
avd->auditallow = 0;
avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
+ if (xperms) {
+ memset(&xperms->drivers, 0, sizeof(xperms->drivers));
+ xperms->len = 0;
+ }
if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) {
if (printk_ratelimit())
* this permission check, then use it.
*/
avkey.target_class = tclass;
- avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV;
+ avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_XPERMS;
sattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, scontext->type - 1);
BUG_ON(!sattr);
tattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, tcontext->type - 1);
node;
node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified)) {
if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_ALLOWED)
- avd->allowed |= node->datum.data;
+ avd->allowed |= node->datum.u.data;
else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITALLOW)
- avd->auditallow |= node->datum.data;
+ avd->auditallow |= node->datum.u.data;
else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
- avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.data;
+ avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.u.data;
+ else if (xperms && (node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS))
+ services_compute_xperms_drivers(xperms, node);
}
/* Check conditional av table for additional permissions */
- cond_compute_av(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey, avd);
+ cond_compute_av(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey,
+ avd, xperms);
}
}
avd->flags = 0;
}
+void services_compute_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd,
+ struct avtab_node *node)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
+ if (xpermd->driver != node->datum.u.xperms->driver)
+ return;
+ } else if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
+ if (!security_xperm_test(node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p,
+ xpermd->driver))
+ return;
+ } else {
+ BUG();
+ }
+
+ if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED) {
+ xpermd->used |= XPERMS_ALLOWED;
+ if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
+ memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0xff,
+ sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
+ }
+ if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->allowed->p); i++)
+ xpermd->allowed->p[i] |=
+ node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
+ }
+ } else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW) {
+ xpermd->used |= XPERMS_AUDITALLOW;
+ if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
+ memset(xpermd->auditallow->p, 0xff,
+ sizeof(xpermd->auditallow->p));
+ }
+ if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->auditallow->p); i++)
+ xpermd->auditallow->p[i] |=
+ node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
+ }
+ } else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT) {
+ xpermd->used |= XPERMS_DONTAUDIT;
+ if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
+ memset(xpermd->dontaudit->p, 0xff,
+ sizeof(xpermd->dontaudit->p));
+ }
+ if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->dontaudit->p); i++)
+ xpermd->dontaudit->p[i] |=
+ node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
+ }
+ } else {
+ BUG();
+ }
+}
+
+void security_compute_xperms_decision(u32 ssid,
+ u32 tsid,
+ u16 orig_tclass,
+ u8 driver,
+ struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd)
+{
+ u16 tclass;
+ struct context *scontext, *tcontext;
+ struct avtab_key avkey;
+ struct avtab_node *node;
+ struct ebitmap *sattr, *tattr;
+ struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode;
+ unsigned int i, j;
+
+ xpermd->driver = driver;
+ xpermd->used = 0;
+ memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
+ memset(xpermd->auditallow->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->auditallow->p));
+ memset(xpermd->dontaudit->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->dontaudit->p));
+
+ read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+ if (!ss_initialized)
+ goto allow;
+
+ scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
+ if (!scontext) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, ssid);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
+ if (!tcontext) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, tsid);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
+ if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
+ if (policydb.allow_unknown)
+ goto allow;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+
+ if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) {
+ pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ avkey.target_class = tclass;
+ avkey.specified = AVTAB_XPERMS;
+ sattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array,
+ scontext->type - 1);
+ BUG_ON(!sattr);
+ tattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array,
+ tcontext->type - 1);
+ BUG_ON(!tattr);
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
+ avkey.source_type = i + 1;
+ avkey.target_type = j + 1;
+ for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
+ node;
+ node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified))
+ services_compute_xperms_decision(xpermd, node);
+
+ cond_compute_xperms(&policydb.te_cond_avtab,
+ &avkey, xpermd);
+ }
+ }
+out:
+ read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+ return;
+allow:
+ memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0xff, sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
+ goto out;
+}
/**
* security_compute_av - Compute access vector decisions.
* @tsid: target security identifier
* @tclass: target security class
* @avd: access vector decisions
+ * @xperms: extended permissions
*
* Compute a set of access vector decisions based on the
* SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) for the permissions in @tclass.
void security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
u32 tsid,
u16 orig_tclass,
- struct av_decision *avd)
+ struct av_decision *avd,
+ struct extended_perms *xperms)
{
u16 tclass;
struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
avd_init(avd);
+ xperms->len = 0;
if (!ss_initialized)
goto allow;
goto allow;
goto out;
}
- context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd);
+ context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd, xperms);
map_decision(orig_tclass, avd, policydb.allow_unknown);
out:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
goto out;
}
- context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd);
+ context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd, NULL);
out:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
return;
if (avdatum) {
/* Use the type from the type transition/member/change rule. */
- newcontext.type = avdatum->data;
+ newcontext.type = avdatum->u.data;
}
/* if we have a objname this is a file trans check so check those rules */
extern struct policydb policydb;
+void services_compute_xperms_drivers(struct extended_perms *xperms,
+ struct avtab_node *node);
+
+void services_compute_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd,
+ struct avtab_node *node);
+
#endif /* _SS_SERVICES_H_ */
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <linux/in.h>
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+#include <linux/in6.h>
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
#include <net/netlabel.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/rculist.h>
#include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
+/*
+ * Use IPv6 port labeling if IPv6 is enabled and secmarks
+ * are not being used.
+ */
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && !defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER)
+#define SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING 1
+#endif
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER)
+#define SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING 1
+#endif
+
/*
* Smack labels were limited to 23 characters for a long time.
*/
};
/*
- * An entry in the table identifying hosts.
+ * An entry in the table identifying IPv4 hosts.
*/
-struct smk_netlbladdr {
+struct smk_net4addr {
struct list_head list;
- struct sockaddr_in smk_host; /* network address */
+ struct in_addr smk_host; /* network address */
struct in_addr smk_mask; /* network mask */
+ int smk_masks; /* mask size */
+ struct smack_known *smk_label; /* label */
+};
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+/*
+ * An entry in the table identifying IPv6 hosts.
+ */
+struct smk_net6addr {
+ struct list_head list;
+ struct in6_addr smk_host; /* network address */
+ struct in6_addr smk_mask; /* network mask */
+ int smk_masks; /* mask size */
struct smack_known *smk_label; /* label */
};
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
/*
* An entry in the table identifying ports.
*/
struct smack_known *smk_in; /* inbound label */
struct smack_known *smk_out; /* outgoing label */
};
+#endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
struct smack_onlycap {
struct list_head list;
struct smack_known *smk_label;
};
+/* Super block security struct flags for mount options */
+#define FSDEFAULT_MNT 0x01
+#define FSFLOOR_MNT 0x02
+#define FSHAT_MNT 0x04
+#define FSROOT_MNT 0x08
+#define FSTRANS_MNT 0x10
+
+#define NUM_SMK_MNT_OPTS 5
+
+enum {
+ Opt_error = -1,
+ Opt_fsdefault = 1,
+ Opt_fsfloor = 2,
+ Opt_fshat = 3,
+ Opt_fsroot = 4,
+ Opt_fstransmute = 5,
+};
+
/*
* Mount options
*/
#define SMK_FSROOT "smackfsroot="
#define SMK_FSTRANS "smackfstransmute="
+#define SMACK_DELETE_OPTION "-DELETE"
#define SMACK_CIPSO_OPTION "-CIPSO"
/*
struct smack_audit_data sad;
#endif
};
-/*
- * These functions are in smack_lsm.c
- */
-struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(struct smack_known *);
/*
* These functions are in smack_access.c
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
extern struct smack_known *smack_unconfined;
#endif
-extern struct smack_known smack_cipso_option;
extern int smack_ptrace_rule;
extern struct smack_known smack_known_floor;
extern struct mutex smack_known_lock;
extern struct list_head smack_known_list;
-extern struct list_head smk_netlbladdr_list;
+extern struct list_head smk_net4addr_list;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+extern struct list_head smk_net6addr_list;
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
extern struct mutex smack_onlycap_lock;
extern struct list_head smack_onlycap_list;
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
struct smack_onlycap *sop;
+ /*
+ * All kernel tasks are privileged
+ */
+ if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD))
+ return 1;
+
if (!capable(cap))
return 0;
#include <linux/msg.h>
#include <linux/shm.h>
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+#include <linux/parser.h>
#include "smack.h"
#define TRANS_TRUE "TRUE"
#define SMK_RECEIVING 1
#define SMK_SENDING 2
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && !defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER)
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
LIST_HEAD(smk_ipv6_port_list);
-#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 && !CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
+#endif
static struct kmem_cache *smack_inode_cache;
int smack_enabled;
+static const match_table_t smk_mount_tokens = {
+ {Opt_fsdefault, SMK_FSDEFAULT "%s"},
+ {Opt_fsfloor, SMK_FSFLOOR "%s"},
+ {Opt_fshat, SMK_FSHAT "%s"},
+ {Opt_fsroot, SMK_FSROOT "%s"},
+ {Opt_fstransmute, SMK_FSTRANS "%s"},
+ {Opt_error, NULL},
+};
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
static char *smk_bu_mess[] = {
"Bringup Error", /* Unused */
*
* Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
*/
-struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(struct smack_known *skp)
+static struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(struct smack_known *skp)
{
struct inode_smack *isp;
}
/**
- * smack_sb_kern_mount - Smack specific mount processing
+ * smack_parse_opts_str - parse Smack specific mount options
+ * @options: mount options string
+ * @opts: where to store converted mount opts
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
+ *
+ * converts Smack specific mount options to generic security option format
+ */
+static int smack_parse_opts_str(char *options,
+ struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
+{
+ char *p;
+ char *fsdefault = NULL;
+ char *fsfloor = NULL;
+ char *fshat = NULL;
+ char *fsroot = NULL;
+ char *fstransmute = NULL;
+ int rc = -ENOMEM;
+ int num_mnt_opts = 0;
+ int token;
+
+ opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
+
+ if (!options)
+ return 0;
+
+ while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) {
+ substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
+
+ if (!*p)
+ continue;
+
+ token = match_token(p, smk_mount_tokens, args);
+
+ switch (token) {
+ case Opt_fsdefault:
+ if (fsdefault)
+ goto out_opt_err;
+ fsdefault = match_strdup(&args[0]);
+ if (!fsdefault)
+ goto out_err;
+ break;
+ case Opt_fsfloor:
+ if (fsfloor)
+ goto out_opt_err;
+ fsfloor = match_strdup(&args[0]);
+ if (!fsfloor)
+ goto out_err;
+ break;
+ case Opt_fshat:
+ if (fshat)
+ goto out_opt_err;
+ fshat = match_strdup(&args[0]);
+ if (!fshat)
+ goto out_err;
+ break;
+ case Opt_fsroot:
+ if (fsroot)
+ goto out_opt_err;
+ fsroot = match_strdup(&args[0]);
+ if (!fsroot)
+ goto out_err;
+ break;
+ case Opt_fstransmute:
+ if (fstransmute)
+ goto out_opt_err;
+ fstransmute = match_strdup(&args[0]);
+ if (!fstransmute)
+ goto out_err;
+ break;
+ default:
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ pr_warn("Smack: unknown mount option\n");
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SMK_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!opts->mnt_opts)
+ goto out_err;
+
+ opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SMK_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int),
+ GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
+ kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+
+ if (fsdefault) {
+ opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsdefault;
+ opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSDEFAULT_MNT;
+ }
+ if (fsfloor) {
+ opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsfloor;
+ opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSFLOOR_MNT;
+ }
+ if (fshat) {
+ opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fshat;
+ opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSHAT_MNT;
+ }
+ if (fsroot) {
+ opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsroot;
+ opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSROOT_MNT;
+ }
+ if (fstransmute) {
+ opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fstransmute;
+ opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSTRANS_MNT;
+ }
+
+ opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
+ return 0;
+
+out_opt_err:
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ pr_warn("Smack: duplicate mount options\n");
+
+out_err:
+ kfree(fsdefault);
+ kfree(fsfloor);
+ kfree(fshat);
+ kfree(fsroot);
+ kfree(fstransmute);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_set_mnt_opts - set Smack specific mount options
* @sb: the file system superblock
- * @flags: the mount flags
- * @data: the smack mount options
+ * @opts: Smack mount options
+ * @kern_flags: mount option from kernel space or user space
+ * @set_kern_flags: where to store converted mount opts
*
* Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
+ *
+ * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set Smack mount
+ * labels.
*/
-static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
+static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
+ struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
+ unsigned long kern_flags,
+ unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
{
struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(root);
struct superblock_smack *sp = sb->s_security;
struct inode_smack *isp;
struct smack_known *skp;
- char *op;
- char *commap;
+ int i;
+ int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
int transmute = 0;
- int specified = 0;
if (sp->smk_initialized)
return 0;
sp->smk_initialized = 1;
- for (op = data; op != NULL; op = commap) {
- commap = strchr(op, ',');
- if (commap != NULL)
- *commap++ = '\0';
-
- if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSHAT, strlen(SMK_FSHAT)) == 0) {
- op += strlen(SMK_FSHAT);
- skp = smk_import_entry(op, 0);
+ for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
+ switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
+ case FSDEFAULT_MNT:
+ skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
if (IS_ERR(skp))
return PTR_ERR(skp);
- sp->smk_hat = skp;
- specified = 1;
-
- } else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSFLOOR, strlen(SMK_FSFLOOR)) == 0) {
- op += strlen(SMK_FSFLOOR);
- skp = smk_import_entry(op, 0);
+ sp->smk_default = skp;
+ break;
+ case FSFLOOR_MNT:
+ skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
if (IS_ERR(skp))
return PTR_ERR(skp);
sp->smk_floor = skp;
- specified = 1;
-
- } else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSDEFAULT,
- strlen(SMK_FSDEFAULT)) == 0) {
- op += strlen(SMK_FSDEFAULT);
- skp = smk_import_entry(op, 0);
+ break;
+ case FSHAT_MNT:
+ skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
if (IS_ERR(skp))
return PTR_ERR(skp);
- sp->smk_default = skp;
- specified = 1;
-
- } else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSROOT, strlen(SMK_FSROOT)) == 0) {
- op += strlen(SMK_FSROOT);
- skp = smk_import_entry(op, 0);
+ sp->smk_hat = skp;
+ break;
+ case FSROOT_MNT:
+ skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
if (IS_ERR(skp))
return PTR_ERR(skp);
sp->smk_root = skp;
- specified = 1;
-
- } else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSTRANS, strlen(SMK_FSTRANS)) == 0) {
- op += strlen(SMK_FSTRANS);
- skp = smk_import_entry(op, 0);
+ break;
+ case FSTRANS_MNT:
+ skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
if (IS_ERR(skp))
return PTR_ERR(skp);
sp->smk_root = skp;
transmute = 1;
- specified = 1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
}
}
/*
* Unprivileged mounts don't get to specify Smack values.
*/
- if (specified)
+ if (num_opts)
return -EPERM;
/*
* Unprivileged mounts get root and default from the caller.
sp->smk_root = skp;
sp->smk_default = skp;
}
+
/*
* Initialize the root inode.
*/
return 0;
}
+/**
+ * smack_sb_kern_mount - Smack specific mount processing
+ * @sb: the file system superblock
+ * @flags: the mount flags
+ * @data: the smack mount options
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
+ */
+static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ char *options = data;
+ struct security_mnt_opts opts;
+
+ security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
+
+ if (!options)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = smack_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_err;
+
+out:
+ rc = smack_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts, 0, NULL);
+
+out_err:
+ security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
+ return rc;
+}
+
/**
* smack_sb_statfs - Smack check on statfs
* @dentry: identifies the file system in question
}
/**
-* smack_host_label - check host based restrictions
+* smack_ipv4host_label - check host based restrictions
* @sip: the object end
*
* looks for host based access restrictions
*
* Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
*/
-static struct smack_known *smack_host_label(struct sockaddr_in *sip)
+static struct smack_known *smack_ipv4host_label(struct sockaddr_in *sip)
{
- struct smk_netlbladdr *snp;
+ struct smk_net4addr *snp;
struct in_addr *siap = &sip->sin_addr;
if (siap->s_addr == 0)
return NULL;
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_netlbladdr_list, list)
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net4addr_list, list)
+ /*
+ * we break after finding the first match because
+ * the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
+ * so we have found the most specific match
+ */
+ if (snp->smk_host.s_addr ==
+ (siap->s_addr & snp->smk_mask.s_addr))
+ return snp->smk_label;
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+/*
+ * smk_ipv6_localhost - Check for local ipv6 host address
+ * @sip: the address
+ *
+ * Returns boolean true if this is the localhost address
+ */
+static bool smk_ipv6_localhost(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
+{
+ __be16 *be16p = (__be16 *)&sip->sin6_addr;
+ __be32 *be32p = (__be32 *)&sip->sin6_addr;
+
+ if (be32p[0] == 0 && be32p[1] == 0 && be32p[2] == 0 && be16p[6] == 0 &&
+ ntohs(be16p[7]) == 1)
+ return true;
+ return false;
+}
+
+/**
+* smack_ipv6host_label - check host based restrictions
+* @sip: the object end
+*
+* looks for host based access restrictions
+*
+* This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label
+* hosts. The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is
+* taken before calling this function.
+*
+* Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
+*/
+static struct smack_known *smack_ipv6host_label(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
+{
+ struct smk_net6addr *snp;
+ struct in6_addr *sap = &sip->sin6_addr;
+ int i;
+ int found = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * It's local. Don't look for a host label.
+ */
+ if (smk_ipv6_localhost(sip))
+ return NULL;
+
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net6addr_list, list) {
/*
* we break after finding the first match because
* the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
* so we have found the most specific match
*/
- if ((&snp->smk_host.sin_addr)->s_addr ==
- (siap->s_addr & (&snp->smk_mask)->s_addr)) {
- /* we have found the special CIPSO option */
- if (snp->smk_label == &smack_cipso_option)
- return NULL;
- return snp->smk_label;
+ for (found = 1, i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+ /*
+ * If the label is NULL the entry has
+ * been renounced. Ignore it.
+ */
+ if (snp->smk_label == NULL)
+ continue;
+ if ((sap->s6_addr16[i] & snp->smk_mask.s6_addr16[i]) !=
+ snp->smk_host.s6_addr16[i]) {
+ found = 0;
+ break;
+ }
}
+ if (found)
+ return snp->smk_label;
+ }
return NULL;
}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
/**
* smack_netlabel - Set the secattr on a socket
struct smk_audit_info ad;
rcu_read_lock();
- hkp = smack_host_label(sap);
+ hkp = smack_ipv4host_label(sap);
if (hkp != NULL) {
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
struct lsm_network_audit net;
return smack_netlabel(sk, sk_lbl);
}
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && !defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER)
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+/**
+ * smk_ipv6_check - check Smack access
+ * @subject: subject Smack label
+ * @object: object Smack label
+ * @address: address
+ * @act: the action being taken
+ *
+ * Check an IPv6 access
+ */
+static int smk_ipv6_check(struct smack_known *subject,
+ struct smack_known *object,
+ struct sockaddr_in6 *address, int act)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ struct lsm_network_audit net;
+#endif
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ int rc;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
+ ad.a.u.net->family = PF_INET6;
+ ad.a.u.net->dport = ntohs(address->sin6_port);
+ if (act == SMK_RECEIVING)
+ ad.a.u.net->v6info.saddr = address->sin6_addr;
+ else
+ ad.a.u.net->v6info.daddr = address->sin6_addr;
+#endif
+ rc = smk_access(subject, object, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 check", subject, object, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+ return rc;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
/**
* smk_ipv6_port_label - Smack port access table management
* @sock: socket
static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address,
int act)
{
- __be16 *bep;
- __be32 *be32p;
struct smk_port_label *spp;
struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
- struct smack_known *skp;
- unsigned short port = 0;
+ struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
+ unsigned short port;
struct smack_known *object;
- struct smk_audit_info ad;
- int rc;
-#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
- struct lsm_network_audit net;
-#endif
if (act == SMK_RECEIVING) {
- skp = smack_net_ambient;
+ skp = smack_ipv6host_label(address);
object = ssp->smk_in;
} else {
skp = ssp->smk_out;
- object = smack_net_ambient;
+ object = smack_ipv6host_label(address);
}
/*
- * Get the IP address and port from the address.
+ * The other end is a single label host.
*/
- port = ntohs(address->sin6_port);
- bep = (__be16 *)(&address->sin6_addr);
- be32p = (__be32 *)(&address->sin6_addr);
+ if (skp != NULL && object != NULL)
+ return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
+ if (skp == NULL)
+ skp = smack_net_ambient;
+ if (object == NULL)
+ object = smack_net_ambient;
/*
* It's remote, so port lookup does no good.
*/
- if (be32p[0] || be32p[1] || be32p[2] || bep[6] || ntohs(bep[7]) != 1)
- goto auditout;
+ if (!smk_ipv6_localhost(address))
+ return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
/*
* It's local so the send check has to have passed.
*/
- if (act == SMK_RECEIVING) {
- skp = &smack_known_web;
- goto auditout;
- }
+ if (act == SMK_RECEIVING)
+ return 0;
+ port = ntohs(address->sin6_port);
list_for_each_entry(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
if (spp->smk_port != port)
continue;
break;
}
-auditout:
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
- smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
- ad.a.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
- ad.a.u.net->dport = port;
- if (act == SMK_RECEIVING)
- ad.a.u.net->v6info.saddr = address->sin6_addr;
- else
- ad.a.u.net->v6info.daddr = address->sin6_addr;
-#endif
- rc = smk_access(skp, object, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
- rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 port check", skp, object, MAY_WRITE, rc);
- return rc;
+ return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
}
-#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 && !CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
+#endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
/**
* smack_inode_setsecurity - set smack xattrs
} else
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && !defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER)
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6)
smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, NULL);
-#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 && !CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
+#endif
return 0;
}
return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
}
-#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
/**
* smack_socket_bind - record port binding information.
* @sock: the socket
static int smack_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
int addrlen)
{
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
if (sock->sk != NULL && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6)
smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, address);
-#endif
-
return 0;
}
-#endif /* !CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
+#endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
/**
* smack_socket_connect - connect access check
int addrlen)
{
int rc = 0;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+ struct sockaddr_in6 *sip = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sap;
+#endif
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
+ struct smack_known *rsp;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+#endif
if (sock->sk == NULL)
return 0;
case PF_INET6:
if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6))
return -EINVAL;
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && !defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER)
- rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sap,
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
+ rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sip);
+ if (rsp != NULL)
+ rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sip,
SMK_CONNECTING);
-#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 && !CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
+#endif
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
+ rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sip, SMK_CONNECTING);
+#endif
break;
}
return rc;
int size)
{
struct sockaddr_in *sip = (struct sockaddr_in *) msg->msg_name;
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && !defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER)
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
struct sockaddr_in6 *sap = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name;
-#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 && !CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
+#endif
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct smack_known *rsp;
+#endif
int rc = 0;
/*
rc = smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, sip);
break;
case AF_INET6:
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && !defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER)
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
+ rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sap);
+ if (rsp != NULL)
+ rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sap,
+ SMK_CONNECTING);
+#endif
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sap, SMK_SENDING);
-#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 && !CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
+#endif
break;
}
return rc;
proto = smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(skb, &sadd);
if (proto != IPPROTO_UDP && proto != IPPROTO_TCP)
break;
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
if (skb && skb->secmark != 0)
skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
else
+ skp = smack_ipv6host_label(&sadd);
+ if (skp == NULL)
skp = smack_net_ambient;
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in,
MAY_WRITE, rc);
-#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
+#endif /* SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING */
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sk, &sadd, SMK_RECEIVING);
-#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
+#endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
break;
#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
}
}
netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
break;
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
case PF_INET6:
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
s = skb->secmark;
-#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
+#endif
break;
-#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
}
*secid = s;
if (s == 0)
hdr = ip_hdr(skb);
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = hdr->saddr;
rcu_read_lock();
- hskp = smack_host_label(&addr);
+ hskp = smack_ipv4host_label(&addr);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (hskp == NULL)
return 0;
}
-struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] = {
+static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, smack_syslog),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data, smack_sb_copy_data),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, smack_sb_kern_mount),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, smack_sb_statfs),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, smack_set_mnt_opts),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_parse_opts_str, smack_parse_opts_str),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, smack_bprm_set_creds),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, smack_bprm_committing_creds),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, smack_unix_may_send),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, smack_socket_post_create),
-#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, smack_socket_bind),
-#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
+#endif
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, smack_socket_connect),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, smack_socket_sendmsg),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
return -ENOMEM;
}
- printk(KERN_INFO "Smack: Initializing.\n");
+ pr_info("Smack: Initializing.\n");
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
+ pr_info("Smack: Netfilter enabled.\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
+ pr_info("Smack: IPv6 port labeling enabled.\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
+ pr_info("Smack: IPv6 Netfilter enabled.\n");
+#endif
/*
* Set the security state for the initial task.
#include <linux/magic.h>
#include "smack.h"
+#define BEBITS (sizeof(__be32) * 8)
/*
* smackfs pseudo filesystem.
*/
SMK_DOI = 5, /* CIPSO DOI */
SMK_DIRECT = 6, /* CIPSO level indicating direct label */
SMK_AMBIENT = 7, /* internet ambient label */
- SMK_NETLBLADDR = 8, /* single label hosts */
+ SMK_NET4ADDR = 8, /* single label hosts */
SMK_ONLYCAP = 9, /* the only "capable" label */
SMK_LOGGING = 10, /* logging */
SMK_LOAD_SELF = 11, /* task specific rules */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
SMK_UNCONFINED = 22, /* define an unconfined label */
#endif
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+ SMK_NET6ADDR = 23, /* single label IPv6 hosts */
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
};
/*
*/
static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_cipso_lock);
static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_ambient_lock);
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(smk_netlbladdr_lock);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(smk_net4addr_lock);
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(smk_net6addr_lock);
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
/*
* This is the "ambient" label for network traffic.
* can write to the specified label.
*/
-LIST_HEAD(smk_netlbladdr_list);
+LIST_HEAD(smk_net4addr_list);
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+LIST_HEAD(smk_net6addr_list);
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
/*
* Rule lists are maintained for each label.
struct smack_rule *smk_rule;
};
-LIST_HEAD(smack_rule_list);
+static LIST_HEAD(smack_rule_list);
struct smack_parsed_rule {
struct smack_known *smk_subject;
static int smk_cipso_doi_value = SMACK_CIPSO_DOI_DEFAULT;
-struct smack_known smack_cipso_option = {
- .smk_known = SMACK_CIPSO_OPTION,
- .smk_secid = 0,
-};
-
/*
* Values for parsing cipso rules
* SMK_DIGITLEN: Length of a digit field in a rule.
* Seq_file read operations for /smack/netlabel
*/
-static void *netlbladdr_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
+static void *net4addr_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
{
- return smk_seq_start(s, pos, &smk_netlbladdr_list);
+ return smk_seq_start(s, pos, &smk_net4addr_list);
}
-static void *netlbladdr_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+static void *net4addr_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
{
- return smk_seq_next(s, v, pos, &smk_netlbladdr_list);
+ return smk_seq_next(s, v, pos, &smk_net4addr_list);
}
-#define BEBITS (sizeof(__be32) * 8)
/*
* Print host/label pairs
*/
-static int netlbladdr_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+static int net4addr_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
{
struct list_head *list = v;
- struct smk_netlbladdr *skp =
- list_entry_rcu(list, struct smk_netlbladdr, list);
- unsigned char *hp = (char *) &skp->smk_host.sin_addr.s_addr;
- int maskn;
- u32 temp_mask = be32_to_cpu(skp->smk_mask.s_addr);
-
- for (maskn = 0; temp_mask; temp_mask <<= 1, maskn++);
+ struct smk_net4addr *skp =
+ list_entry_rcu(list, struct smk_net4addr, list);
+ char *kp = SMACK_CIPSO_OPTION;
- seq_printf(s, "%u.%u.%u.%u/%d %s\n",
- hp[0], hp[1], hp[2], hp[3], maskn, skp->smk_label->smk_known);
+ if (skp->smk_label != NULL)
+ kp = skp->smk_label->smk_known;
+ seq_printf(s, "%pI4/%d %s\n", &skp->smk_host.s_addr,
+ skp->smk_masks, kp);
return 0;
}
-static const struct seq_operations netlbladdr_seq_ops = {
- .start = netlbladdr_seq_start,
- .next = netlbladdr_seq_next,
- .show = netlbladdr_seq_show,
+static const struct seq_operations net4addr_seq_ops = {
+ .start = net4addr_seq_start,
+ .next = net4addr_seq_next,
+ .show = net4addr_seq_show,
.stop = smk_seq_stop,
};
/**
- * smk_open_netlbladdr - open() for /smack/netlabel
+ * smk_open_net4addr - open() for /smack/netlabel
* @inode: inode structure representing file
* @file: "netlabel" file pointer
*
- * Connect our netlbladdr_seq_* operations with /smack/netlabel
+ * Connect our net4addr_seq_* operations with /smack/netlabel
* file_operations
*/
-static int smk_open_netlbladdr(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+static int smk_open_net4addr(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
- return seq_open(file, &netlbladdr_seq_ops);
+ return seq_open(file, &net4addr_seq_ops);
}
/**
- * smk_netlbladdr_insert
+ * smk_net4addr_insert
* @new : netlabel to insert
*
- * This helper insert netlabel in the smack_netlbladdrs list
+ * This helper insert netlabel in the smack_net4addrs list
* sorted by netmask length (longest to smallest)
- * locked by &smk_netlbladdr_lock in smk_write_netlbladdr
+ * locked by &smk_net4addr_lock in smk_write_net4addr
*
*/
-static void smk_netlbladdr_insert(struct smk_netlbladdr *new)
+static void smk_net4addr_insert(struct smk_net4addr *new)
{
- struct smk_netlbladdr *m, *m_next;
+ struct smk_net4addr *m;
+ struct smk_net4addr *m_next;
- if (list_empty(&smk_netlbladdr_list)) {
- list_add_rcu(&new->list, &smk_netlbladdr_list);
+ if (list_empty(&smk_net4addr_list)) {
+ list_add_rcu(&new->list, &smk_net4addr_list);
return;
}
- m = list_entry_rcu(smk_netlbladdr_list.next,
- struct smk_netlbladdr, list);
+ m = list_entry_rcu(smk_net4addr_list.next,
+ struct smk_net4addr, list);
/* the comparison '>' is a bit hacky, but works */
- if (new->smk_mask.s_addr > m->smk_mask.s_addr) {
- list_add_rcu(&new->list, &smk_netlbladdr_list);
+ if (new->smk_masks > m->smk_masks) {
+ list_add_rcu(&new->list, &smk_net4addr_list);
return;
}
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(m, &smk_netlbladdr_list, list) {
- if (list_is_last(&m->list, &smk_netlbladdr_list)) {
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(m, &smk_net4addr_list, list) {
+ if (list_is_last(&m->list, &smk_net4addr_list)) {
list_add_rcu(&new->list, &m->list);
return;
}
m_next = list_entry_rcu(m->list.next,
- struct smk_netlbladdr, list);
- if (new->smk_mask.s_addr > m_next->smk_mask.s_addr) {
+ struct smk_net4addr, list);
+ if (new->smk_masks > m_next->smk_masks) {
list_add_rcu(&new->list, &m->list);
return;
}
/**
- * smk_write_netlbladdr - write() for /smack/netlabel
+ * smk_write_net4addr - write() for /smack/netlabel
* @file: file pointer, not actually used
* @buf: where to get the data from
* @count: bytes sent
* @ppos: where to start
*
- * Accepts only one netlbladdr per write call.
+ * Accepts only one net4addr per write call.
* Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
*/
-static ssize_t smk_write_netlbladdr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
- struct smk_netlbladdr *snp;
+ struct smk_net4addr *snp;
struct sockaddr_in newname;
char *smack;
- struct smack_known *skp;
+ struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
char *data;
char *host = (char *)&newname.sin_addr.s_addr;
int rc;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
struct in_addr mask;
unsigned int m;
+ unsigned int masks;
int found;
u32 mask_bits = (1<<31);
__be32 nsa;
data[count] = '\0';
rc = sscanf(data, "%hhd.%hhd.%hhd.%hhd/%u %s",
- &host[0], &host[1], &host[2], &host[3], &m, smack);
+ &host[0], &host[1], &host[2], &host[3], &masks, smack);
if (rc != 6) {
rc = sscanf(data, "%hhd.%hhd.%hhd.%hhd %s",
&host[0], &host[1], &host[2], &host[3], smack);
goto free_out;
}
m = BEBITS;
+ masks = 32;
}
- if (m > BEBITS) {
+ if (masks > BEBITS) {
rc = -EINVAL;
goto free_out;
}
goto free_out;
}
} else {
- /* check known options */
- if (strcmp(smack, smack_cipso_option.smk_known) == 0)
- skp = &smack_cipso_option;
- else {
+ /*
+ * Only the -CIPSO option is supported for IPv4
+ */
+ if (strcmp(smack, SMACK_CIPSO_OPTION) != 0) {
rc = -EINVAL;
goto free_out;
}
}
- for (temp_mask = 0; m > 0; m--) {
+ for (m = masks, temp_mask = 0; m > 0; m--) {
temp_mask |= mask_bits;
mask_bits >>= 1;
}
* Only allow one writer at a time. Writes should be
* quite rare and small in any case.
*/
- mutex_lock(&smk_netlbladdr_lock);
+ mutex_lock(&smk_net4addr_lock);
nsa = newname.sin_addr.s_addr;
/* try to find if the prefix is already in the list */
found = 0;
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_netlbladdr_list, list) {
- if (snp->smk_host.sin_addr.s_addr == nsa &&
- snp->smk_mask.s_addr == mask.s_addr) {
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net4addr_list, list) {
+ if (snp->smk_host.s_addr == nsa && snp->smk_masks == masks) {
found = 1;
break;
}
rc = -ENOMEM;
else {
rc = 0;
- snp->smk_host.sin_addr.s_addr = newname.sin_addr.s_addr;
+ snp->smk_host.s_addr = newname.sin_addr.s_addr;
snp->smk_mask.s_addr = mask.s_addr;
snp->smk_label = skp;
- smk_netlbladdr_insert(snp);
+ snp->smk_masks = masks;
+ smk_net4addr_insert(snp);
}
} else {
- /* we delete the unlabeled entry, only if the previous label
- * wasn't the special CIPSO option */
- if (snp->smk_label != &smack_cipso_option)
+ /*
+ * Delete the unlabeled entry, only if the previous label
+ * wasn't the special CIPSO option
+ */
+ if (snp->smk_label != NULL)
rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del(&init_net, NULL,
- &snp->smk_host.sin_addr, &snp->smk_mask,
+ &snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask,
PF_INET, &audit_info);
else
rc = 0;
* this host so that incoming packets get labeled.
* but only if we didn't get the special CIPSO option
*/
- if (rc == 0 && skp != &smack_cipso_option)
+ if (rc == 0 && skp != NULL)
rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(&init_net, NULL,
- &snp->smk_host.sin_addr, &snp->smk_mask, PF_INET,
+ &snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask, PF_INET,
snp->smk_label->smk_secid, &audit_info);
if (rc == 0)
rc = count;
- mutex_unlock(&smk_netlbladdr_lock);
+ mutex_unlock(&smk_net4addr_lock);
free_out:
kfree(smack);
return rc;
}
-static const struct file_operations smk_netlbladdr_ops = {
- .open = smk_open_netlbladdr,
+static const struct file_operations smk_net4addr_ops = {
+ .open = smk_open_net4addr,
.read = seq_read,
.llseek = seq_lseek,
- .write = smk_write_netlbladdr,
+ .write = smk_write_net4addr,
.release = seq_release,
};
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+/*
+ * Seq_file read operations for /smack/netlabel6
+ */
+
+static void *net6addr_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ return smk_seq_start(s, pos, &smk_net6addr_list);
+}
+
+static void *net6addr_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ return smk_seq_next(s, v, pos, &smk_net6addr_list);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Print host/label pairs
+ */
+static int net6addr_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+ struct list_head *list = v;
+ struct smk_net6addr *skp =
+ list_entry(list, struct smk_net6addr, list);
+
+ if (skp->smk_label != NULL)
+ seq_printf(s, "%pI6/%d %s\n", &skp->smk_host, skp->smk_masks,
+ skp->smk_label->smk_known);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations net6addr_seq_ops = {
+ .start = net6addr_seq_start,
+ .next = net6addr_seq_next,
+ .show = net6addr_seq_show,
+ .stop = smk_seq_stop,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_open_net6addr - open() for /smack/netlabel
+ * @inode: inode structure representing file
+ * @file: "netlabel" file pointer
+ *
+ * Connect our net6addr_seq_* operations with /smack/netlabel
+ * file_operations
+ */
+static int smk_open_net6addr(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return seq_open(file, &net6addr_seq_ops);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_net6addr_insert
+ * @new : entry to insert
+ *
+ * This inserts an entry in the smack_net6addrs list
+ * sorted by netmask length (longest to smallest)
+ * locked by &smk_net6addr_lock in smk_write_net6addr
+ *
+ */
+static void smk_net6addr_insert(struct smk_net6addr *new)
+{
+ struct smk_net6addr *m_next;
+ struct smk_net6addr *m;
+
+ if (list_empty(&smk_net6addr_list)) {
+ list_add_rcu(&new->list, &smk_net6addr_list);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ m = list_entry_rcu(smk_net6addr_list.next,
+ struct smk_net6addr, list);
+
+ if (new->smk_masks > m->smk_masks) {
+ list_add_rcu(&new->list, &smk_net6addr_list);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(m, &smk_net6addr_list, list) {
+ if (list_is_last(&m->list, &smk_net6addr_list)) {
+ list_add_rcu(&new->list, &m->list);
+ return;
+ }
+ m_next = list_entry_rcu(m->list.next,
+ struct smk_net6addr, list);
+ if (new->smk_masks > m_next->smk_masks) {
+ list_add_rcu(&new->list, &m->list);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_net6addr - write() for /smack/netlabel
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Accepts only one net6addr per write call.
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_net6addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct smk_net6addr *snp;
+ struct in6_addr newname;
+ struct in6_addr fullmask;
+ struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
+ char *smack;
+ char *data;
+ int rc = 0;
+ int found = 0;
+ int i;
+ unsigned int scanned[8];
+ unsigned int m;
+ unsigned int mask = 128;
+
+ /*
+ * Must have privilege.
+ * No partial writes.
+ * Enough data must be present.
+ * "<addr/mask, as a:b:c:d:e:f:g:h/e><space><label>"
+ * "<addr, as a:b:c:d:e:f:g:h><space><label>"
+ */
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (count < SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ data = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (data == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) {
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ goto free_data_out;
+ }
+
+ smack = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (smack == NULL) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto free_data_out;
+ }
+
+ data[count] = '\0';
+
+ i = sscanf(data, "%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x/%u %s",
+ &scanned[0], &scanned[1], &scanned[2], &scanned[3],
+ &scanned[4], &scanned[5], &scanned[6], &scanned[7],
+ &mask, smack);
+ if (i != 10) {
+ i = sscanf(data, "%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x %s",
+ &scanned[0], &scanned[1], &scanned[2],
+ &scanned[3], &scanned[4], &scanned[5],
+ &scanned[6], &scanned[7], smack);
+ if (i != 9) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto free_out;
+ }
+ }
+ if (mask > 128) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto free_out;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+ if (scanned[i] > 0xffff) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto free_out;
+ }
+ newname.s6_addr16[i] = htons(scanned[i]);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If smack begins with '-', it is an option, don't import it
+ */
+ if (smack[0] != '-') {
+ skp = smk_import_entry(smack, 0);
+ if (skp == NULL) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto free_out;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Only -DELETE is supported for IPv6
+ */
+ if (strcmp(smack, SMACK_DELETE_OPTION) != 0) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto free_out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0, m = mask; i < 8; i++) {
+ if (m >= 16) {
+ fullmask.s6_addr16[i] = 0xffff;
+ m -= 16;
+ } else if (m > 0) {
+ fullmask.s6_addr16[i] = (1 << m) - 1;
+ m = 0;
+ } else
+ fullmask.s6_addr16[i] = 0;
+ newname.s6_addr16[i] &= fullmask.s6_addr16[i];
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Only allow one writer at a time. Writes should be
+ * quite rare and small in any case.
+ */
+ mutex_lock(&smk_net6addr_lock);
+ /*
+ * Try to find the prefix in the list
+ */
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net6addr_list, list) {
+ if (mask != snp->smk_masks)
+ continue;
+ for (found = 1, i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+ if (newname.s6_addr16[i] !=
+ snp->smk_host.s6_addr16[i]) {
+ found = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (found == 1)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (found == 0) {
+ snp = kzalloc(sizeof(*snp), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (snp == NULL)
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ else {
+ snp->smk_host = newname;
+ snp->smk_mask = fullmask;
+ snp->smk_masks = mask;
+ snp->smk_label = skp;
+ smk_net6addr_insert(snp);
+ }
+ } else {
+ snp->smk_label = skp;
+ }
+
+ if (rc == 0)
+ rc = count;
+
+ mutex_unlock(&smk_net6addr_lock);
+
+free_out:
+ kfree(smack);
+free_data_out:
+ kfree(data);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_net6addr_ops = {
+ .open = smk_open_net6addr,
+ .read = seq_read,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .write = smk_write_net6addr,
+ .release = seq_release,
+};
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+
/**
* smk_read_doi - read() for /smack/doi
* @filp: file pointer, not actually used
*/
static int smk_init_sysfs(void)
{
- int err;
- err = sysfs_create_mount_point(fs_kobj, "smackfs");
- if (err)
- return err;
- return 0;
+ return sysfs_create_mount_point(fs_kobj, "smackfs");
}
/**
"direct", &smk_direct_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
[SMK_AMBIENT] = {
"ambient", &smk_ambient_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
- [SMK_NETLBLADDR] = {
- "netlabel", &smk_netlbladdr_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ [SMK_NET4ADDR] = {
+ "netlabel", &smk_net4addr_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
[SMK_ONLYCAP] = {
"onlycap", &smk_onlycap_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
[SMK_LOGGING] = {
[SMK_UNCONFINED] = {
"unconfined", &smk_unconfined_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
#endif
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+ [SMK_NET6ADDR] = {
+ "ipv6host", &smk_net6addr_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
/* last one */
{""}
};
This selects Yama, which extends DAC support with additional
system-wide security settings beyond regular Linux discretionary
access controls. Currently available is ptrace scope restriction.
+ Like capabilities, this security module stacks with other LSMs.
Further information can be found in Documentation/security/Yama.txt.
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
-
-config SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
- bool "Yama stacked with other LSMs"
- depends on SECURITY_YAMA
- default n
- help
- When Yama is built into the kernel, force it to stack with the
- selected primary LSM.
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, yama_task_free),
};
-void __init yama_add_hooks(void)
-{
- security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks));
-}
-
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
static int yama_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
},
{ }
};
-#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
-
-static __init int yama_init(void)
+static void __init yama_init_sysctl(void)
{
-#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
- /*
- * If yama is being stacked this is already taken care of.
- */
- if (!security_module_enable("yama"))
- return 0;
- yama_add_hooks();
-#endif
- pr_info("Yama: becoming mindful.\n");
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
if (!register_sysctl_paths(yama_sysctl_path, yama_sysctl_table))
panic("Yama: sysctl registration failed.\n");
-#endif
-
- return 0;
}
+#else
+static inline void yama_init_sysctl(void) { }
+#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
-security_initcall(yama_init);
+void __init yama_add_hooks(void)
+{
+ pr_info("Yama: becoming mindful.\n");
+ security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks));
+ yama_init_sysctl();
+}
projects / cascardo / linux.git / commitdiff